THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

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INTRODUCTION

From the beginning, to put this essay in its proper focus, we would want to distinguish between the metaphysics of beauty and a philosophy of aesthetics. It is not the metaphysics of beauty that first of all interests us here. It has its own transcendent object and its own problems. It is aesthetics as a human philosophy, as having its own proper object, that will first of all be the field of our investigation.[1] We are to be concerned with the beauty of sensible things, with beauty as proportioned to man in his existing condition, as union of body-soul. In addition, within this field, aesthetic experience or aesthetic perception is to be understood in the broadest possible sense. It is not to be limited to the activity or experience of the artist in the strict sense, in relation to his making or producing a work of art. It is to be broad enough to embrace both the experience of the artist that is presupposed in making a work of art and also the experience of the ordinary man whose enjoyment of the beauty of nature or art never terminates in active artistic production. Aesthetic perception is to be understood as simply that experience of beauty that differentiates itself from all other cognitional and affective experience.

Of particular interest to this essay will be the approach of contemporary Thomists to the problems of aesthetics. This will be done by considering the aesthetic writings of Jacques Maritain and Maurice DeWulf. For among the Thomists there are two trends in aesthetics, which two trends are respectively and adequately represented by M. Maritain and M. DeWulf.[2]

The essay will be developed in the following fashion: (1) An

examination and presentation of the fact of aesthetic experience. An investigation of the characteristics that are distinctive and distinguish this experience from all other human activities. Then, after these factual observations and descriptions, a pointing out of the main problems that these facts impose upon us. A presentation of the philosophical problems of aesthetic experience that demand a proper intellectual interpretation and explanation.

(2) A consideration of what Maritain and DeWulf have written of aesthetics, of the way in which they have formulated and conceived its problems. These considerations will be followed by a critical examination of the solution offered by DeWulf and Maritain for the problems of a philosophy of aesthetics. Particularly we will point out those areas of aesthetic experience and consequent problems that have been neglected by these two philosophers. (3) This part should follow from the foregoing, as positive and synthetic. Its efforts will be constructive with reference to the contributions of contemporary Thomism toward the resolution of the problems of aesthetics. Its purpose will not be to construct a complete philosophy of aesthetics. It will be an attempt, first of all, to clarify as much as possible and point out exactly where the problems of aesthetic perception lie and in what direction their solution is to be sought. Perhaps the most positive contribution of this part will be an indication that there is something proper to a philosophy of aesthetics that cannot be reduced either to metaphysics or to a theory of art, strictly speaking. And there is really no philosophy of aesthetic until the problems proper to it have been dealt with on their own level.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE AESTHETIC PROBLEM

The fact of aesthetic experience is incontestable. The experience and enjoyment of what is commonly called the beautiful is simply an acknowledged part of human activity. But not only the fact, also its uniqueness and singularity is the agreed opinion of practically all philosophers who concern themselves with its problems, whatever their differences of explanation.

Maurice Pradines, as psychologist, remarks the irreducible and specific character of aesthetic sensations as compared to ordinary sense experience. "It is easy to grasp immediately the specific and original quality of aesthetic sensations by comparing them to the most elementary perceptive sensations of the common or adaptive order. The irreducibility of one to the other can be seen from the very beginning by a few very striking characteristics."[1]

Lalande, placing aesthetic experience in the scale of values, clearly marks its singular character in his definition. "Aesthetic emotion is a certain state that is sui generis, analagous to pleasure, to that which is agreeable, to moral sentiment, but which is not identical with any one of these."[2]

Delacroix, while professing to see aesthetic activity as originating in any kind of activity, takes care to underline, nevertheless, its unique and original form. "Art springs from every form of activity. . . . But to each one it adds something and it brings together all of them into a whole that is irreducible and new. It is sufficient to say that it consists in an original form of activity which gives direction to subordinate activities and combines them into some-

thing unforeseen. It is not sufficient to say that it calls into play the whole human person. This is the case of all spiritual activities."[3]

The first task that this unique aesthetic experience imposes, then, is an examination of its proper characteristics. Only after these have been discovered can it be compared to other experiences of a speculative or practical nature and the problems proper to it be posed and clearly presented.

The Characteristics of Aesthetic Experience.

It should be stressed from the beginning that aesthetic experience is not a restricted and limited experience, in the sense of being restricted to artists or particularly sensitive critics and philosophers. It is the experience of the common man too; it is simply a fact in the structure of human activity of which philosophy must give an account. This is not to deny that the testimony of artists themselves should be of a privileged sort, having special value as material that the philosopher is to use in his speculation, in his effort to give an account of aesthetic activity and to determine its meaning. In comparison with common experience, the artist shows a sensitivity especially geared to the nuances of aesthetic experience, his knowledge is more acute, profound, and complete than that of the average man. There is no doubt that the philosopher must take into account the special value of the artist's reflections upon his own consciousness.[4] Indeed, a philosophy of art that does not integrate into its speculations the experience of artists might be compared to a Cosmology that ignores the investigations of modern science.[5]

However, this does not mean that the testimonies of the artist destroy the value of the aesthetic experience common to human nature. Artistic experience may be a corrective, a prolongation, an intensification of common experience. But common experience is not just simply replaced. No more than scientific investigations negate the value of the common man's experience of nature. The philosopher is not left without any critical means of examining the data furnished him by artists themselves, nor must he neces-

sarily be an artist himself before he can philosophize about art. Surely the philosopher is concerned with principles, in the light of which he can judge all reality, and he occupies a position that embrases all other human activities.[6]

This is a reason valid universally for the transcendent position of philosophy. The two following considerations are more concrete and should clarify the philosopher's position of independence on the very level of aesthetics itself:

1. The experience of the artist is a privileged moment. However, it is not a completely isolated moment. It is at the interior of or refers to a larger experience that is available to everyone. No doubt it varies from this experience that is common, but it has its point of departure there. Common aesthetic experience can be distinguished from all other human functions. However we might ultimately characterize the level of this experience, as liberation or ecstasy or as pleasurable, it is on the same level as that on which the artist expresses his experience and upon which the work of art is experienced by others. Whether the difference between common aesthetic experience and artistic experience properly speaking is one of degree or not, there is the fundamental experience of attaining one common level. Because of this, the artist's experience can never free itself completely from the meaning and value of common aesthetic experience. An artist's experience must always have a reference to that of the common man. The meaning of common aesthetic experience will always integrate itself into any explanation of artistic data. The artist is not cut off from the rest of the world. Common aesthetic experience is the very condition for understanding what he says and plays a part in the very judgment of the worth of the artist's testimony.[7]

2. The artist's testimony, more than any other, is always in danger of being one-sided, slanted or partial. For, unlike the abstract sciences, the more art perfects itself, the more it becomes impossible to separate the subjective and the objective elements integrated in it. Its perfection tends to transcend more and more the categories of the objective and the subjective. And the subjective prejudices and partialities of the artist are often impossible

to discern. The narrow or exclusive discoveries of one aspect of nature by a scientist might almost be anticipated by knowing the philosophical principles he follows or his own intellectual interests. The bias of an artist is more often rooted in a physical and psychological structure that defies investigation. And because of this subjective limitation, for the most part, his privileged experience is limited to only a part of the aesthetic field.[8]

From the above it should be somewhat evident that the data furnished by artists, not only cannot escape the influence of common experience, but that, in order to be interpreted as objectively as possible, it has great need of a sane and understanding common experience. This is a valuable part of a philosopher's contribution to a philosophy of art.

If these observations, preliminary to pointing out the characteristics of aesthetic experience, seem unduly long, they might be justified by the fact that an ex-professo discussion of the relation between common experience and artistic experience on the aesthetic level itself is very rare. Speculation about aesthetics is too often thin, general and abstract, too far from facts. The other extreme is an attempted philosophy lost in an uncritical acceptance of artistic data. A happy integration of the two extremes is not common. Such an integration would seem to be greatly facilitated by a stress on the respective aspects just pointed out and, in turn, an elucidation of the interdependence of common aesthetic experience and artistic experience and their mutual value for one another.

Further, the distinctions that have just been pointed out should help to justify, in the establishment of aesthetic characteristics that is to follow, the indiscriminate use made of data furnished by artists themselves, critics of art, philosophers and the simple reflections upon common experience. The philosopher gets his material from any and all of these. And, finally, in this indiscriminate acceptance of data, an effort has been made to cut across all barriers of time and place and theory. An effort has been made to discover those aesthetic characteristics that the facts themselves impose upon the philosopher, the artist and the

common man alike, regardless of whether one is an idealist or materialist, seeking to justify a preconceived metaphysics or making a psychological investigation, whether one is contemporary or speculated during the first Greek eras of philosophic thought. On this principle, the testimony of the Existentialist and that of Plato can go side by side, the experience of the idealist Kant and the sensualist Guyau enter on the same footing. And whatever agreement there might be concerning the characteristics of the aesthetic fact, it should be the more valuable, just because of the varied time, place and background against which it arose.

The following presentation of aesthetic characteristics will make no claim to absolute completeness. There always remains the possibility of finding other minor qualities in the aesthetic fact or of dividing and subdividing and clarifying further those discovered. The only demand of this essay is that the ones discovered should be essential and sufficient to allow the philosophical problems connected with the aesthetic facts to be placed with sureness and clearness. If these characteristics show themselves such that upon their very presentation the philosophical problems of aesthetics become self-evident, then the end of the investigation shall have been attained.

Further, aesthetic experience will be examined primarily from the viewpoint of knowledge. The following plan will be followed: the mode of aesthetic knowledge will be examined first; then the formal content and the object of aesthetic knowledge; finally, the signification or meaning of aesthetic knowledge. The mode of aesthetic knowledge has been put in first place in our analysis because in our consciousness we usually distinguish different types of knowledge first of all by their mode. And from the viewpoint of evidence of consciousness, it is the modes of our cognitional experiences that are on an equal level. It is not the case with the content of our knowledge which presents itself with reflex clarity to our consciousness in abstract knowledge, while we are conscious of the content of aesthetic and sense knowledge in quite a different fashion. The content of aesthetic knowledge can be discussed much more easily after its mode has been pointed out.

The simple and general reflection upon man's knowledge shows that it is diverse and falls within a double pattern. It is realized between two polarities, the material and the spiritual. And these two polarities on the level of knowledge have their explanation in the material and spiritual principles at the source of man's being. So, in so far as our knowledge can be schematized, its division into sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge seem to characterize it adequately and fundamentally. And this is true especially with reference to the mode according to which our knowledge is realized. So aesthetic experience, in so far as it is cognitional, should follow one of the two patterns of this division. A rather general description of the mode of our intellectual knowledge and the mode of sense knowledge should be sufficient for determining under which of these two the modality of aesthetic knowledge falls.

The first general note of intellectual knowledge can be characterized by a certain transcendence with reference to the concrete individual environment or things in which it begins. And what differentiates this transcendence from any other intentional activity in relation to environment is that it has an absolute quality about it. There is an absolute transcendence of time and space. Intellectual knowledge escapes the materiality of the thing known. There is still a functional dependence upon the conditions of materiality, but in its essence it manifests characteristics that give it an absolute position with reference to the sensible and contingent world.

This transcendence is accomplished, as our consciousness testifies, by a mode of abstraction. Our intellectual knowledge abstracts from the existential totality of a thing and reaches the essence of the thing. This essence, which is the content of the intellectual knowledge as human, because of its abstract mode can be characterized as universal, necessary, immaterial, eternal, indivisible and immutable. Our intellect transcends the contingent and touches the thing in itself, the intelligible nature as such.

As a result of this absolute position, intellectual knowledge has a unique value. It knows the thing in itself with sufficient adequacy so that it can elucidate concepts. It lends itself to dis-

cursive development. It cannot be described adequately as an experience or a reaction. By intellectual knowledge we are said to understand. Abstract knowledge is said to be transparent in act. There is a clear-cut distinction and awareness between subject and object, something that is proper to experience on a spiritual level. Because of this immateriality, complete reflection is possible. We can turn back upon the object of intellectual knowledge. We know and we know that we know. We know and we know what we know.

Finally, the transcendence of the intellect must not only be viewed from the side of the objective environment to which it is related. There is also a transcendence on the subjective side too. While this is more evident from a consideration of the meaning or the end of intellectual knowledge, it must also be remembered here to complete the structural picture of speculative knowledge. For in its absolute position, it transcends in its essence, not only the time-space conditions of the object, but is also independent of an organ. It is anorganic. It also transcends the organism, the totality of the subject as rooted in the environment. As a result of this anorganic character, intellectual knowledge is endowed with a superior unity that is not present in knowledge that is dependent in its essence upon several sense organs.[9]

Sense knowledge, on the contrary, defies any attempt to characterize it as absolute. Its position in relation to the concrete world is in no way autonomous. Even in its structure it is essentially subordinated and bound to the world of time and space, and to the activity of the subject as a whole. "This activity (sensation) is essentially subordinated. Nowhere does it assume a final value. In man, the psyche is, partially at least, ordered to the acquisition of sensible data with which the intellect will work. In the animal it exists only for the sake of biological ends. The order of the sensible does not enjoy a perfect autonomy and it would be a very deceptive procedure to judge it in isolation from the activity of the whole subject. Sensitive life is a 'go-between.' And it is intelligible only in relation to the kinds of activity between which it is situated."[10]

This is not to deny a certain relative transcendence that is proper to sense knowledge, a certain abstraction of relation that remains very elementary. But essentially, the physical impression plays a part in every sensation, for it is always present. There is essential dependence. We even class sensations according to the varied physical activities. We get a different relation to our environment from a different physical activity. There is an intrinsic connection between the sensation and the physical impression. While sense knowledge cannot be explained by the materiality which is bound to time and space, it cannot be sufficiently explained without it. If there is no duration, there is no impression. If there is no extension, there is no color. The sense level is not abstract; to explain its structure we need to integrate into it the activity of an existentially existing thing. Sensation coincides with the action of the exterior object upon the senses; it is the psychic side of it.

As a result of this intrinsic bond with the material conditions of the world, sense knowledge can be characterized as temporal, spatial, concrete, contingent and relative. And, being rooted in the concrete, the relation to its object and the union between subject and object must be different than that of intellectual knowledge. There is a certain assimilation of object to subject, a union of object and subject. But this is not an identification of forms as in knowledge of essences on the level of interiority. It is neither a perfect identification nor an extrinsic possession. It is an imperfect identification. An interaction on the corporeal level of the physical object and the organic subject. There always remains a certain tension between the object and the subject. Sense knowledge is an action that holds together in one context subject and object. An activity that intrinsically involves a polarity in its structure, an identity with tension. It is not interiority and unity and stability that dominate it exclusively. Rather, it must also be expressed by notions of exteriority, diffusion, division and change.

Sense knowledge, then, necessarily remains bound by a certain obscurity and darkness. The interaction between subject and object never arises to that clear point of opposition where subject and object can be distinguished as on the intellectual level. Its

intelligible content remains an individual, particular realization on the level of space where part is outside of part and where reflection, properly speaking, is impossible. It is not discursively disponible. Sense knowledge, in itself, formally speaking, is not reflexive. It is not conceptual. As such it requires another power than itself to be reflexive. We are not aware of the other as such, but are aware of the other through the awareness of ourselves being affected. It is because of this aspect of sense knowledge that it is referred to as lived knowledge. It affects the soul, not as transcending, but as informing the whole organism. The ontological act of the sense organ and the intentional act of sense knowledge are the same thing.[11] The form of the object is "lived" by the subject. And sense knowledge enters as much under the catagory of action as that of knowledge.[12] And this action is the action of the whole organism in its practical functions to which the structure of sense knowledge remains bound.

If there is one fact of aesthetic experience, one of its characteristics, in which common sense, philosophers, critics and artists concur, it is on the intimate connection between aesthetic experience and the senses. Whatever the explanation of this connection, there is agreement as to the fact, from the sensualists who explain aesthetics on the very level of the physiological[13] to the idealists[14] who are at the other pole of possible explanations. That aesthetic experience in its most broad and general structure is patterned after sense knowledge seems beyond dispute.[15] Many of those who concern themselves with aesthetic problems state it clearly, but it is very often a fact taken for granted.

Without exaggerating the value and evidence of etymology, it is instructive and interesting to note the acceptance of the word "aesthetic" to designate the experience of beauty. A word that primarily refers to things material, to things perceptible by the senses, as opposed to things of thought. Kant used the word in this broad and original sense in his *Transcendental Aesthetics,* objecting to Baumgarten's restricting it to the experience of the beautiful. It was Baumgarten who first employed the term "aesthetics" in the general sense as accepted today, as referring to the

realm of art and beauty. And for Baumgarten, following the psychology of Mendelssohn in recognizing feelings as an independent state, beauty and art pertained to a certain perfection within the realm of feelings as opposed in intellect, to abstract knowledge. However the term may have evolved, it retains today that overtone of the sensible, a reference to sensation in its very meaning.

But the thing to point out immediately is the difference between the relation of aesthetic experience to sensation and the relation of intellectual knowledge to sensation. Between abstract ideas and the level of time-space the relation is functional. It is a knowledge that begins with things on the level of the concrete, but which takes on its particular character at the expense of time and space. As our ideas become abstract and perfect themselves on the absolute level, the conditions of time and space are abandoned. However the note of liberation or transcendence might characterize aesthetic knowledge, it is not in the sense of liberation from or transcendence of the level of the concrete, not a freedom from the structure of our sense experience. If there is a liberation, it must be explained on the very level of the sense and sentiment as Delacroix insists: "One could say of all art that which Hegel says of lyric poetry: that it is not its intention simply to release the spirit from the sentiment to which it is bound, but to free it (the spirit) on the very level of sentiment itself."[16] The sensible enters intrinsically and essentially into the structure of aesthetic knowledge. The painter paints what he sees, and it is the ear that feels music, remarks Pradines in underlining the part of the senses in aesthetic perception.[17]

Even Plotinus, whose explanations of aesthetic experience are utterly on the intellectual side, speaks in the *Enneads* of the beauty that is for the ears and of the beautiful objects that fill the eye with joy.[18] Darbellay, too, who is careful to guard the intellectual aspects of aesthetics insists upon its intrinsic connection with the sensible affective powers. "Note, nevertheless, that, even though it is above all spiritual, this experience remains intimately connected with the sensible affective powers. It spreads itself through them

— per modum diffusionis. It expresses itself and comes into play only with their concurrence."[19] "The human poet really does not take hold of his beauty except in and across matter. Because of which there is that primordial quickening of the sense faculties, that disturbance deep down within oneself, of which Claudel speaks."[20] "The satisfaction of the intellect confronted with the beautiful satisfies by that very fact the will and secondarily the sense powers, because it is impossible to separate in us the sensible from the spiritual. This is all the more understandable from the fact that beautiful things experienced by the poet or the esthete in this world are always immersed and rooted in the sensible."[21]

It is not difficult to multiply such testimonies of philosophers and artists. The proper work of art, writes Jolivet, it to take hold of sense qualities in their originality and freshness.[22] Spencer would limit aesthetic experience completely to the level of sensation.[23] Claudel at the opposite pole of intellectualism, without exaggerating, insists just as strongly that poetry cannot exist without emotion.[24] Those writers who insist that beauty is that which is pleasing to the eye or ear are bearing witness to the same fact, that aesthetic experience is intrinsically bound up with the senses and their manner of perceiving. For Santayana, aesthetics is on the side of sensibility and sentiment; otherwise, according to his thought, it would be simply mathematical. "We may note that however subordinate the beauty may be which a garment, a building or a poem derives from its sensuous material, yet the presence of this sensuous material is indispensible."[25] "Sensuous Beauty is not the greatest or most important element of effect, but it is the most primitive and fundamental, and the most universal."[26] The remark of Roger Caillois, "Some sensuous element is indispensible to art and it appears in even the most intellectual kind,"[27] seems to sum up the experience and observations of both philosophers and artists.

Common sense, too, seems in complete accord with the testimonies just cited. For the most simple examination of our aesthetic experience brings about the conviction that it is intimately bound up with sensation. As a result of aesthetic experience we are moved emotionally and affectively. As a result of hearing a symphony,

looking at a painting or assisting at a drama, we are sad or happy, we fear or rejoice. Even though it is more exact to say that we experience fear and anger and hate in such experience, rather than saying that we fear and that we are angry and hate, nevertheless, even the experience of these affective states must be explained on the level of the emotions themselves, and not exclusively on the intellectual plane. We are convinced that the knowledge of the affective world we derive from the realm of art is different than any abstract knowledge of the affections we have.

But even common experience does not limit aesthetic experience to the general realm of affectivity or emotions. We feel that it is the sense organs themselves that come into play. Just as in ordinary common sensations we diversify our artistic experience, too, according to the senses that we use. Our ears tell us something other of the world of beauty than our eyes. Excepting the opinion of a few materialistic and physiological aestheticians, it is by far the common opinion that at least touch and taste do not have aesthetic value. In our experience we differentiate aesthetic experience from ordinary sense experience on the very level of the sense organs themselves. And the common opinion is, that however it might be purified, changed or transfigured, aesthetic experience does not leave the world of the senses.

This conviction of common sense, that aesthetic experience is differentiated from other experience of sense on the very level of the sense organs, is an observation in accord with the conclusions that might be drawn from the foregoing quotations taken from philosophers and artists. For, while the evidence given up to now has been to point out that aesthetic knowledge in its general structure resembles that of sense more than intellect, one can be still more precise and state that it resembles the structure of sense experience not only in its synthetic form or as known in the interior senses, but also in its most fundamental organization, on the level of the sense organs themselves. Even those who do not limit aesthetic experience to certain senses do not militate against this evidence, for they are those who stress the physiological aspects of aesthetics, such as Fechner, Guyau and Allen. And more than

anyone else, they keep the aesthetic bound to the world of sensation. Perhaps this opinion of Delacroix is typical of this school of thought: for him beauty is a flowering of the sensual. The pleasure of aesthetics is the agreeable on the level of sensation. All the senses have an aesthetic value, the eye, ear and muscles of themselves in their ordinary functioning, the other senses by an increased vivacity or plentitude.[28] Outside this school of thought just mentioned, the evidence that aesthetic experience is not common to all the senses seems unanimously recognized. And it is limited for the most part to the eye and the ear. Now, regardless of the explanations given why some senses are aesthetic and others are a-aesthetic, the very fact of limiting this value to certain of the sense organs demands a recognition that the structure of aesthetic experience goes down to the very level of the senses themselves. And a satisfactory explanation of aesthetic experience must take this fact into account.[29]

If in its most general structure aesthetic knowledge is essentially rooted in the sensible, within the limits of time and space, then we can conclude that it is not abstract or reflexive, that in it there is not that clear distinction between subject and object that one finds on the level of intellectual knowledge. It is concrete, it is non-conceptual. Reflection upon the most fundamental experience on the aesthetic level shows the same thing. Whether we contemplate the beauty of nature or a work of art, the object of our experience is unique for us. It does not fit into a category. It cannot be classified from the formal side, as things of which we know the essence as such. It is this tableau. It is always this tree, this mountain. Formally, the object is unique. Any classification we make depends on the material side. We touch the individual in its integrity, in its existential operations.

By the same manner of simple reflection we are aware that we do not arrive at our aesthetic experience, at the term of it, by long rational processes. It does not lend inself to this. There is a certain immediacy and directness about it which we recognize as distinguishing it from abstract knowledge.[30] We do not establish an abstract relation with a thing, but rather an actual existential

relation. We take hold of a thing in its historical unity, to use the term of LeSenne.[31]

This kind of knowledge is described in terms of sympathy or presence.[32] The word "presence" would signify that the thing encountered has not been objectivized as in intellectual knowledge. It retains its existential value with reference to the subject. There is no identification of forms as on the abstract level. And the word "assimilation" can only be applied here with many reserves. The word "sympathy" which was particularly popularized by the German Romantic writers and the aesthetic theoristists of the *Einfuehlung*[33] expresses much the same reality. Arthur Howell summarizes this particular aspect of aesthetic experience in his book, *The Meaning and Purpose of Art.* Aesthetic perception is the apprehension of a presence. "The important factor in presential perceiving is that such knowledge is not unveiled to the mind in the form of image or ideas, it issues in the form of an affective activity which is termed, "felt," and is the intellectively indefinite or undefined."[34] All this "felt" knowledge is experienced as a discerning affection, and precedes the logical formation of any image or ideas characterizing its nature. As such it is literally fore-knowledge, pre-vision, and is intuitive activity, or, to distinguish it from the formulated intuitive image and idea — intuitive affection.[35] "The aesthetic perception then is reaction to form in its own right. It can be defined formally in this way."[36]

This, first of all, is a consideration of the content of our knowledge of the world and any consideration of the metaphysical structure of things will enter in only as necessary for our purpose. Our consciousness bears witness to the content of our ideas, to what we know about things. However, this is clear and precise only in intellectual or conceptual knowledge. So the comparison of the content of intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge respectively is not on an equal basis. Because, for the most part, we can determine the content of intellectual knowledge by an analysis of our consciousness, of our ideas, for we can reflect upon it. Our intellectual consciousness is consciousness of a thing in its objective position, consciousness of what it is in itself. On

the contrary, sense knowledge, because it is not intrinsically reflexive as to content, because it is non-conceptual, must find its intelligibility in its source or in its meaning. To characterize the content of intellectual knowledge is mostly a work of reflection upon our consciousness. To characterize the content of sense knowledge is already a work of elucidation and development in dependence upon its efficient or final cause. Its content is known indirectly. Consequently, it is less satisfactory as factual conscious data.

On the level of intellectual knowledge, the first conviction of our consciousness is that we know what is. We know things as they are. We touch the essences of things. Not necessarily in an exhaustive fashion, but what we know is of the essence of this thing. We touch what is intelligible in this thing itself. Our knowledge is objective and absolute in this sense, that we attain to the meaning of the thing as it is in itself. We do not simply touch an aspect of a thing or its relation to the subject; we attain to its absolute position. Our concept designates the thing in itself. We attain to the absolute value of a thing and we understand this thing.[37]

It is exactly this clear, reflexive assurance that we touch the essence of a thing that is lacking in sense knowledge. Our consciousness is not that of a spectator considering things in themselves; rather it is of a real and existing action which something exercises upon our sense organs. We are aware of things acting upon us and of our reaction to them, of being drawn into a vital inter-play of activity with our environment. The actual intellectual content of this experience escapes our direct consciousness. Still, in order to react to stimuli, to carry on mutual activity with our environment, we must in some way acquire a knowledge, however minimum, of the nature of that environment, of things. For our reactions are meaningful. Sense knowledge is best described by us in our consciousness as an interaction and a sort of union on the corporeal level. But for all that, it is still knowledge, an assimilation of something of the object; we are forced to admit that it has an intelligible content, despite the fact that we are unable

to elucidate it in clear concepts. We attain the thing, not as intelligible in act, but as manifesting itself in its existential act in time and space. And though it is not the form directly that we know in sense knowledge, to know the existential manifestation of a thing is impossible without knowing something, in some fashion, of the essence. To know the existence is not to know the essence; but to know the existence without knowing something of the essence is impossible. What we know is the object manifesting itself. "The sense not only fails to reach the whatness, the substantial form, the reason of being, but it does not even take hold of the proper nature of the qualities which affect it. Its domain is not being but appearance, the object in its external activity. But this action proceeds from being and manifests it, and thus being is given, in the very act of feeling in the appearances of passivity and spatial extraposition which bear witness, by their contrast with the unity and spontaneity of consciousness, to the presence of the object. But this presence remains veiled. Forbidden by matter to reflect perfectly upon itself, the sense is unable to know its own truth."[38] In intellectual knowledge we attain a being as it is in itself; in sense knowledge we attain it as it acts upon us.[39]

If we attain being as it acts upon us, then even the content of what we attain must be limited in some way by the subject, by the relation of the object to the subject or vice versa. The content of our sense knowledge is essentially relative and limited. We know something of the object, but only that which the physical energy and limits of our senses are capable of receiving, or that aspect of an object that is useful to serve one of our needs. While this subjective aspect of sense knowledge might exclude, to a large extent, anything of the object that does not fit into the pattern of the needs of the subject, it should be pointed out that this type of subjectivity does not rob sense knowledge of all its objective value. Intellectual knowledge can be characterized as objective and absolute. Still to call sense knowledge relative and subjective is not to remove it completely from the realm of objectivity. It does not know the object absolutely and in itself, but it knows

it partially and in an incomplete fashion. It is a relative vision — but of the thing. Its activity is not to find out what the object is in itself, but to use it. And the use of a thing demands some knowledge of the thing in adapting it to an end. What appears as subjectivism from the angle of intellectual knowledge is simply realism of the sense knowledge which by nature is relative and incomplete, destined for use. "However, one cannot suspect the senses, whose function is to adapt us to things, of being built along lines that would systematically close them to their reality. Surely, they make this reality relative to our own action. But the relative character of knowledge does not at all destroy its objectivity, if the center of reference is stable and is without arbitrariness. And such is the case with sense knowledge. If we admit that man and nature (in some way) have been created for each other, in directing all things to himself, the practical man, the "profane", uncovers the very meaning of creation."[40]

There is a necessary connection between the mode of human knowledge and its intelligible content. If we are to know the essence of a thing that is realized in time and space, under conditions of matter, it is necessary that that essential knowledge be modally abstract. Inversely, if the structure of our knowledge is bound to the framework of time and space, if it is essentially bound up with matter and the existential conditions of material things, then that knowledge does not yield an absolute concept, reflexively disponible, telling us what the thing is in itself. In addition to our conscious data, this much we can conclude as to the content of our sense knowledge. And in general the same negative conclusions are valid concerning aesthetic knowledge which modally follows the mode of sense knowledge. And this much, too, our experience would seem to confirm. A simple examination of aesthetic experience gives proof that it does not give us the knowledge of things that intellectual knowledge does. By direct experience it is much more difficult to know just how its content differs formally from that of sense knowledge. This is more a philosophical work, properly speaking, than a simple establishment of a fact. On this particular point, the testimony of artists

would seem to be of more weight than that of philosophers. For philosophers are more immediately bound to systems and principles peculiar to them, from which an artist is often singularly free.

Common aesthetic experience leaves us with the conviction that through it we know a thing in a very special way. It seems to give us a particular knowledge that is authentic and rather profound, reaching to the depths of the thing. It seems to establish some special bond between the knower and the thing. Howell points out that however we might consider knowledge as resembling sense knowledge in dealing with the thing as it appears and not as it is, that this appearance (in aesthetic knowledge) is not superficial. It is not mere recognition, either, but a real apprehension and possession of the thing. "This apprehension of presence is to be taken as literal apprehension and not mere recognition."[41] "The outward superficial aspects of a thing, e.g., face, clothes, gestures — are the appearances. The appearances with the inner self — behavior, etc., that may be intuited is its presence."[42] Presence is felt or intuited; appearance is literally seen. And it is the thing we experience, not just our own subjective states. The aesthetic emotion announces to us the nature of the object.[43]

Not only philosophers under the influence of Schopenhauer and Bergson have seen in aesthetic experience a superior knowledge and a better possession of things, but artists too, independently, have pointed out this conviction. This better possession can be considered either in relation to intellectual knowledge or in relation to sense knowledge. In relation to intellectual knowledge, it is relative. With reference to sense knowledge, it is without reservation. The aesthetic perception of a thing is simply superior to a schematized and practical sense knowledge at the service of the needs of the organism. For Bergson, the artist renounces the utilitarian conquest of being for a better possession, to reach that which is the most intimate in things.[44] For Schopenhauer before him it is the artist, the man of genius, who reaches to the depths of reality. "The man of genius, on the other hand, whose excessive power of knowledge frees it at times from the service of will, dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to

comprehend the Idea of each thing, not its relation to other things." "But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomena, that which is subject to no change, and therefore is known with equal truth for all time . . . we answer, Art, the work of genius."[45] The artist apprehends reality in its most profound and authentic essence. It is he who surpasses the empiric surface of things, it is he who goes beyond the interested knowledge that is superficial.

The opposition between intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge which has been pointed out with reference to their mode and their content is just as evident when one considers their end or meaning. Intellectual knowledge that is characterized by an absolute, transcendent position, by a particular independence from its environment, naturally finds its explanation or end on that same level of transcendence. If the intellect in its operations essentially transcends its time-space environment and even the totality of the subject in which it exists, its activity is essentially for the intellect itself. It is the perfection of the intellect itself that is the end of intellectual knowledge. The knowledge of the essence of things is independent of use. It is *in se.* It is not subsumed to the whole. The activity of the intellect terminates in the faculty. It is for the "to be" of the faculty and not for the activity of the whole.

Such knowledge which is its own end is called speculative or theoretical. The activity of the intellect is characterized as immanent. As such it is opposed to an activity essentially bound by the conditions of time and space, a transient activity that must produce or terminate in something other than itself. Immanent activity is for itself and the immanent activity of the intellect does not need any reason outside of the perfection of the intellect itself to explain it. To show the relation of intellectual knowledge to an end other than itself demands an explanation other than that of the knowledge itself. Intellectual knowledge is for itself and it is a whole new philosophical work to show how it is related to practical ends. A practical activity that has its source in speculative knowledge is spoken of as "propter finem" to show that it proceeds

from the universal to the particular, to show that it becomes practical.[46]

With reference to its end and meaning, sense knowledge shows other characteristics. It is spoken of as "ad finem" to point out that a practical end is necessarily incorporated in the very idea and elucidation of sense knowledge. Sense knowledge takes place in an organ, but the organ is integrated into the whole and is for the whole, not for itself. It is a communication with its milieu, but a communication that always remains bound to the conditions of time and space, and so has a terminus other than itself. It is functional. It is integrated into the whole organism, subsumed to the totality. It is pragmatic and adaptive. In the animal this functional character of the senses is limited to the biological needs of the organism with reference to its environment. In man, through the mediation of the psyche, the senses also serve the intelligence. However, from the viewpoint of sense knowledge itself, both these functions are pragmatic, the difference in the manner of instrumentality being introduced by the respective ends of the psyche and the intellect in their use of the senses.[47] From this point of view the subjective character of sense knowledge becomes clear.[48] In its organization and in its end sense knowledge is determined by the needs of the organism or the needs of a higher faculty which the organism serves. Sense knowledge has a practical or pragmatic function. If there is a representation element in sense knowledge, it is both known and explained with reference to the whole in which context and for which sense knowledge functions. It cannot be adequately separated from the practical ends for which it exists.

With reference to end or meaning, then, how does aesthetic knowledge and experience relate to intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge? Since as to content and mode it corresponds to sense knowledge, it would seem natural and logical to conclude simply that it shares the end and meaning of sense knowledge. This conclusion, however, we cannot make. It is forbidden to us by the facts and by the testimony of our consciousness of aesthetic experience. Unmistakably and with singular force aesthetic experience presents itself to us within the framework of revery or detach-

ment. It is accompanied by an awareness of liberation from the world we usually experience; by a sense of being freed from our environment and the world of action and practical adaptation we recognize an aesthetic experience, at least in part. On the level of aesthetic experience we are not aware of the weight of adapting and adjusting ourselves to our milieu. There is an escape from the world of need, from the burdens of practical living. Aesthetic knowledge is disinterested. It is for its own sake. It is considered a luxury when compared to practical life.

This testimony of the consciousness of common aesthetic experience is so clear and universal that the experience of artists or the theories of philosophers do little to elucidate it or to enhance its value as fundamental datum. They merely corroborate what is already evident enough to stand alone. From a most fundamental viewpoint, it is interesting to note how the notion and the word "play" enter into the discussion of aesthetic experience.[49] Whatever the nuances that give play a practical value, in its most broad outlines it is meant to be opposed to the practical and adaptive. Among modern philosophers, Spencer, following Schiller, has popularized the presentation of aesthetics within the framework of of play. To present aesthetics in this way is simply to stress the disinterested character of it, which, according to Paul Valéry, is the most manifest character of a work of art.[50] Spencer presents this aspect of aesthetic experience in the following manner: "The general nature and position of the aesthetic sentiments . . . will be made more clearly comprehensible by observing how we distinguish certain modes of feeling as aesthetic rather than others. Setting out with the simplest sensations, we shall find that the aesthetic character of a feeling is habitually associated with separateness from life-serving functions."[51] "The activities we call play are united with the aesthetic activities, by the trait that neither subserve, in any direct way, the processes conducive to life."[52] "A further proof that the aesthetic consciousness is essentially one in which the actions themselves, apart from ends, form the object-matter, is afforded by the conspicuous fact that many aesthetic feelings arise from the contemplation of the attributes and deeds

of persons, real or ideal. In these cases, the consciousness is remote from life-serving function, not simply as is the consciousness accompanying play or the enjoyment of a beautiful colour or tone, but also a direct action or affection of self at all, but is a secondary affection of self produced by contemplation of acts and characters and feelings known as objective, and present to self only by representation. Here the separateness from life-serving functions is extreme; since neither a beneficial end, nor an act conducive to that end, nor a sentiment prompting such acts, forms an element in the aesthetic feeling."[53]

Kant in his *Critique of Judgment* attributes four characteristics[54] to aesthetic experience, all of which demand that it is liberated from an orientation to practical ends. The satisfaction which it gives is necessary, an imperative note that is not known on the level of time-space. This satisfaction is, in addition, universal. There is harmony without an end; there is no perception of finality. It is simply end "in itself." Finally, Kant speaks of satisfaction that is simply disinterested. It is for itself, cut off from relation to other things or from practical interest.

Fechner refers to this disinterested characteristic as the mark of "immediacy" in aesthetic experience. The immediate for Fechner distinguishes aesthetic experience from the useful states of the organism that are directed toward the future. Even for Delacroix, for whom the aesthetic is simply the development of the sensual on its own level, the practical end of sense experience is surpassed. "Sensuousness becomes aesthetic only in retrenching and adding to itself . . . it is necessary that it shed its biological value, its vital meaning.[55]

Aesthetic knowledge, then, with reference to its end does not follow the pattern of sense knowledge, but rather that of intellectual knowledge. It is disinterested, it is for itself, it is not subsumed to the adaptation of the organism to its milieu or to the biological needs of the whole.

SUMMARY:

We should now be in a position to summarize the observa-

tions made up to this point. The foregoing has been concerned with facts. It has been an effort to determine and describe the data that our consciousness presents to us in our aesthetic experience or knowledge, and a comparison of this data with the idea of intellectual and sense knowledge. The meaning and interpretation of this data is yet to be determined. We must pass from description to an intellectual interpretation or rational consideration of the facts. They must be understood. We must give an account and a philosophical explanation of them. First of all, this demands a consideration and clarification of the problems that the facts of aesthetic knowledge impose upon us.

With reference to its end or meaning, aesthetic knowledge follows the pattern of intellectual knowledge. It is disinterested and for itself. Yet, this indifference and disinterestedness cannot be accounted for in the same manner as those same characteristics in intellectual knowledge. Intellectual knowledge terminates in a transcendent faculty and transcends the conditions imposed by time and space through abstraction. Aesthetic knowledge is bound to the conditions of existence of the whole organism, not only to a transcending faculty which would explain its disinterestedness and "for self." A philosophy of art must explain, then, the sufficient reason for the disinterested quality of aesthetic knowledge and explain how this is possible in the conditions in which it is realized.

It is in the light of the end that we can also view the problem of the mode of knowledge. The end of intellectual knowledge is in itself. It is a perfection of a transcendent faculty through the knowledge of things in themselves. A knowledge which has as its object things in themselves and essence as realized in matter must transcend that materiality. It demands a mode of abstraction and transcendence. It depends only functionally upon the conditions of time and space.

With sense knowledge the same schematic relation between end and mode is apparent. Sense knowledge has for its end to serve the organism in its relations to its milieu. It serves as a means of communication between an organism bound by the con-

ditions of time and space with an environment bound by those same conditions. Its end is to enable the organism to adapt itself to its environment or to profit from it. Its end is the activity of the organism in its milieu. It is subordinated to the whole organism. As a result of this its mode is concrete and bound to time-space, to the conditions of the organism as a whole. It serves the organism and it remains in the world of transient and predicamental action where the organism acts. Its content and mode are such so that they profit the whole. It exists according to the demands of the whole which it serves. Its mode is concrete. It can be noted that in man where sense knowledge also serves instrumentally the activities of the intellect as transcending, that in using the data of senses, in the very use, the intellect denies the conditions of time and space to which the data bound and frees or illumines the objective content of sense knowledge.

This contrast between the end and the functioning of intellectual knowledge and the end and functioning of sense knowledge brings into focus one of the most fundamental problems of a philosophy of art. Aesthetic knowledge as to its mode follows the pattern of sense knowledge, in so far as it is realized in the sensible. But as to its end, it follows the pattern of intellectual knowledge, its end is disinterested, it is freed from the transient and predicamental activity of sense knowledge. Intellectual knowledge uses sense data for a disinterested end by denying the conditions of time and space, by abstraction from the material. Aesthetic experience also uses sense data for a disinterested end, but at the same time remains in the sensible in its functions. One of the principal works of a philosophy of art is to explain and make intelligible this fact.

The clarification and resolution of this problem will be made by considering aesthetic knowledge in reference to intellectual knowledge and in reference to sense knowledge. It is concerning its disinterested character that it will be compared to intellectual knowledge. It appears from the facts that the reason for the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience and the reason for the disinterestedness of intellectual knowledge are not the same. We must discover the reason for this.

Concerning its mode, aesthetic knowledge must be studied, especially, with reference to sense knowledge. For as to mode, it is opposed to intellectual knowledge. But both sense knowledge and aesthetic knowledge share a relative transcendence on the level of the concrete. But the transcendent character of aesthetic knowledge is not the same as that of sense knowledge. Sense knowledge is more rigorously and in a somewhat different manner bound to time-space and the concrete conditions of matter than is aesthetic knowledge. A philosophy of art must elucidate and explain this difference.

Finally, with reference to its formal content, it would seem that aesthetic knowledge must be compared to sense knowledge. For both are non-conceptual and non-reflexive because of their essential connections with the conditions of matter. However, their contents cannot be simply equated. One and the other tell us something different about the object we experience. What is assimilated of reality is not the same, despite their similarity as to mode. Common aesthetic experience gives us the impression that aesthetic knowledge of an object is unique and possesses a superiority of its own, especially with reference to ordinary sensations. A philosophy of art will point out what of the object aesthetic knowledge touches and how this differs from sense knowledge as well as from intellectual knowledge.

The following chapters will be a consideration of the writings of DeWulf and Maritain in the light of the problems just elucidated and an examination of the responses they have given to them.

CHAPTER II

MAURICE DEWULF: ABSTRACT BEAUTY

In 1920 Maurice DeWulf first published his work *L'eouvre d'art et beauté.* M. DeWulf republished this same work under the title *Art et Beauté* in 1943. In this latter edition, which we shall use here, there are a few additional historical chapters but no significant changes in the text itself.[1]

In his first chapter M. DeWulf indicates his intention and his position. His study is to be a philosophy of art, neither artistic criticism nor a history of art.[2] He concerns himself not only with the work of art but also with the impression of art upon the subject, "that delightful trembling which we find in our experience of the work of art and whose nature we shall later study."[3] It is particularly this part of his philosophy that will be of interest to our investigation.[4]

M. DeWulf does not devote any special part of his work to a description of aesthetic facts or what might be considered his point of departure. However, it is not difficult to find expressions and attitudes throughout his book that reveal his position with reference to the aesthetic fact of experience.

Aesthetic experience is an experience of the whole man. It cannot be explained exclusively as intellectual experience or as objective. All man's faculties enter into play and the experience itself is not simply objective. "Since all the function of the conscious being, intellectual and otherwise, contribute to the taking hold of the work of art, the intellectual factor is not sufficient to explain the harmonious unity of the artistic impression. And on

the other hand, beauty is not a pure objective attribute, a simple mode of being of the work of art. For this attribute, this manner of being, is intimately dependent on the psychological event."[5] But if beauty is not an objective attribute that we touch in aesthetic experience, then that experience is not objective and abstract as to its mode. In abstract intellectual knowledge the intellective factor is sufficient to justify this knowledge. But in aesthetic experience there is a "unisson harmonieux" which demands an explanation outside the intellective factor itself. Further, DeWulf establishes a relativity between the mode of being in the object which is called beauty and the psychological activity of the subject. We must not conceive this mode of being as objective but in relation to the subject. The aesthetic experience, then, is to be conceived as a global reality consisting integrally of the subject and the object in their very interdependence and interaction. It is not a question of a subject knowing a quality or mode of being in an objective manner. Aesthetic experience is on the side of subjective knowledge.

But DeWulf is more specific and enumerates the subjective functions that enter into this integral experience. The contact between the subject and object is an aesthetic shock, "absorbing and filling to satiety all the activities of conscious being: sense, imagination, intelligence, emotions, tendencies, all the energies of the human being converge and confound themselves in a kind of intuition and the soul is immersed in an incomparable rapture."[6] This intuition which brings into play all the faculties does not have the discursive qualities of abstract intellection. "This taking hold (of beauty) is *spontaneous and direct*: it does not bring with it a reflective judgment concerning the value of the work."[7] It is exactly this direct, spontaneous, non-reflexive experience in which our intellect, imagination and senses integrally come into play that is our norm for aesthetic experience and aesthetic objects. "When then, under what conditions, does an ordered work clothe itself with the royal robe of beauty? We reply: when it can produce a strong impression on the subject which experiences it, when it speaks in a loud and clear voice to the senses, to the imag-

ination, to the intelligence; when every one of its elements calls forth and stimulates the pleasure of contemplation which is the real treasure of art."[8]

As to its mode, then, aesthetic experience for DeWulf can be summarized as follows: It is non-reflexive, direct and spontaneous, subjective and relative. It is the experience of the whole man, not to be explained by a single faculty. The senses, the imagination and the intellect in an harmonious intuition contact the object that is beautiful.

But what is the object of this experience? What of the thing do we know? Factually, DeWulf does not give an outright answer to this question. We might conclude from the text cited above, ". . . beauty is not a pure objective attribute, a simple mode of being of the work of art," that it is then impossible to think of the content of our experience as either the thing in itself or even a quality of the thing. For beauty itself is not such an objective mode of being. When DeWulf treats what he calls an "artistic idea" it is for the most part in relation to a work produced by an artist and according to the demands of the work produced. His viewpoint is the side of the idea facing the work produced and seldom does he explicitly treat it as being formed or from the side of the world experienced. When he asks how such an idea is formed, his answer is not strictly in the line of the formal relation between the term and its specific element. He merely discusses three factors — nature, race and social milieu — that influence the idea.[9] However, these external influences are not enough to account for the idea. The artist himself must be taken into consideration. In fact, that which is best in art comes from the artist himself. "That which is most noble and most charming in a work of art, man draws from his own self."[10] The artist does not produce the world as he sees it but as he imagines it and conceives it.[11] Aesthetic experience in relation to the thing from which it departs is styled and schematized.[12] It is an integration of the world and the personality of the subject. "Both in art's primitive stage and in its mature period man himself is joined with nature, to the race and to the environment, *homo additus naturae*. Even before realizing

a work outside himself the artist marks his idea with the seal of his own personality. The representative aspect — intellectual — of the ideal or artistic conception with which we are here concerned is the fundamental element but not the unique factor. For the representation arouses tendencies and enthusiasms, stirs up the emotions and profound sentiments, in such a way that the artist is the first to enjoy his own work, enjoying it while it is still imprisoned in his own psychic structure: he enjoys it by anticipation."[13]

Finally, DeWulf draws the objective cause of this content to the order in things. If beauty itself is not equated with order, we must at least touch the order in things, across which we arrive at what we might call an aesthetic experience. "One could add that, if objective beauty is made up of order, it is the intelligence alone that perceives it, and because of this there is no artistic impression unless the intelligence comes into play. At the moment when I perceive a bit of order spread out in nature, then nature reveals its beauty. And the aesthetic impression does not distinguish itself in any other way from the experience of well-being."[14]

From the above we might summarize by saying that the content of our experience is not objective in the sense of being abstract. We should speak of it in terms of order and recognize that what we know is neither simply something of the thing nor something of the subject but something that results from the integration of the two.

As to its end, aesthetic experience can be viewed from the activity of the intellectual element in it and from the side of the pleasure or affectivity that accompanies it, according to the remarks of DeWulf. Art and aesthetic experience are on a level of contemplation. This is the meaning of a work of art. "All artistic efforts have as their end to make the work of contemplation easy."[15] An object may be characterized as in the artistic order, for M. DeWulf, "when every one of its elements calls forth and stimulates the pleasure of contemplation which is the real treasure of art."[16] "The artistic order owes its beauty to a certain glittering which surrounds it and thanks to which is caused the contempla-

tive enjoyment of the subject which it fills (reaches)."[17]

This disinterested and contemplative character of art is evident in the emotions and affections we experience in art. They present themselves in a disinterested context, as free from the burdens and desires of our ordinary and practical activities. "What characteristic does this love of the work of art have?"[18] "It is not bound up with covetousness and does not spring from any utilitarian relation to the object. Love of beauty and pragmatic love are not to be confused."[19] DeWulf continues with a series of examples that leaves no doubt about his position concerning this fact. "A hungry man likes the food that is served him because of the good that it will do him. The worker likes his tool because of the service it renders. The property-owner who wants an adjoining piece of land finds joy in increasing his holdings. In every instance cited, the object is loved with a pragmatic love and that is not possible without a certain exclusive possession, and to the profit of the beneficiary. There is nothing like this in the love of a work of art."[20] When we speak of art as being disinterested and a "libre jeu," it is as contrasted to our activities that have an adaptive and practical end. "It is the disinterested character of the artistic emotion that gives it its purity, its nobility. And this too explains the calmness and the serenity which a work of art produces, the respect that it inspires and its atmosphere of reverence. It has a restful value because it is withdrawn from the tyrannies of the pragmatic world."[21]

Two facts, then, stand in DeWulf's attitude toward the end of aesthetic activity. It is removed and free from the level of utility and adaptation to practical ends. It is for itself. This level he characterizes as contemplative and states that the purposes of art are contemplative.

According to these few preliminary observations we can situate aesthetic experience as DeWulf conceives it in its broad outlines. Both as to its mode and content we can characterize it as subjective and concrete. It is a spontaneous and direct experience, non-reflexive. The order or beauty across which we perceive a thing must be known according to this subjective and concrete mode.

But this manner of knowing is not the only thing that forbids what we know from being objective. In the totality of our aesthetic experience something of a knowledge of the subject itself enters essentially into it, and not just as a necessary aftermath of our operations.[22] For a double reason we do not touch the thing in itself in our aesthetic experience.

As to its end, aesthetic experience is simply beyond the useful and the interested. It knows nothing of the tyrannies of adaptive demands. It is for itself, it is disinterested. It is for contemplation as our consciousness witnesses.

The problems, then, that presented themselves at the end of our first chapter, after locating aesthetic experiences with reference to the totality of our human experiences, also have an immediacy and a legitimacy for M. DeWulf. Aesthetic experience for him, too, is an experience with content and mode fashioned after our experience of the practical and subjective, while its meaning and end are disinterested and contemplative. In our further investigations of the manner in which DeWulf replies to this problem, we can block the first two questions as to mode and content, for mode and content as to their respective practical or speculative position are mutually inclusive. To point out a difference in content between aesthetic experience and other experience bound to the sense world is to demand a differentiation in their mode. And if we can point out that the mode of aesthetic experience and the mode of adaptive practical experience are not exactly the same, then we must conclude that the content of the experience has been changed in some fashion, for the modality is at the service of the content of our experience. The first problem we shall investigate, then, is just how aesthetic experience exists in the subject, without considering its meaning or end, how it differs from sense knowledge with its practical mode and content.

The second problem touches the meaning of aesthetic experience. As non-adaptive and non-practical in its meaning, it must distinguish itself in some way from other disinterested experience with which it cannot be identified, and its disinterested character will have a different explanation. This will be the second question

we put to M. DeWulf. And, finally, we must summarize and ask how he accounts for the diversity between the practical mode of aesthetic experience and its contemplative meaning. This latter will be summary, for accommodation of a practical mode with a contemplative meaning has its source in the manner in which aesthetic experience is respectively distinguished from intellectual and sense experience.

M. DeWulf's description and explanation of aesthetic experience is seldom presented after the fashion of a direct comparison with practical and adaptive experience. This comparison we must make ourselves.

Just as we speak of an intellectual order and an order of adaptive experience, so too there is an aesthetic or artistic order.[23] And our consciousness distinguishes this order as unique and distinct from all others. It is an artistic pleasure or enjoyment that distinguishes this order of experience. An enjoyment that is reducible to no other. The soul "immersed in an incomparable rapture."[24] Aesthetic perception results in a "charm that establishes a veritable holiday within the soul and which cannot be compared to anything else."[25] But what is the quality of this pleasure by which we distinguish it from every other? It can be spoken of, says DeWulf, as a contemplative enjoyment.[26] "It is a love of pure contemplation. We love the work to contemplate it."[27] "The good that is sought is the good of contemplation."[28] And because of this contemplative characteristic, our aesthetic affections are experienced as being particularly pure, noble, serene and calm. "It is the disinterested character of the artistic emotion that gives it its purity, its nobility. And this too explains the calmness and the serenity which a work of art produces."[29] Our experience of a work of art produces "a serene and profound union which moves the soul without agitating it, imposes silence upon the desires of the passions and brings to the soul the most exquisite hours of its life."[30] "The soul is captivated and fascinated in its most profound and noble regions."[31]

What, then, has this ultimate aesthetic state, our consciousness of adaptive experience in the practical sense world? The ulti-

mate categorical descriptions and awareness on a sense level are those of pleasure and pain or of pleasant and unpleasant. Pleasure and pain are the criteria by which we recognize in our consciousness the nature and value of sense experience. So, too, it would seem, for DeWulf, a particular state or consciousness of pleasure is the criterion of the artistic order, of the accomplishment of an aesthetic experience. However, there is a conscious and evident difference in the character of each pleasure. The pleasure of sense experience is unmistakably at the service of our vital needs. However profound and attractive it might prove, just as surely it participates in the precarious character of the world in which we struggle to fulfill the practical needs of our organism. It is often only a "bait" leading us on to the acquisition of what our needs demand, and often enough the fruition of possession does not fulfill the promise. Whatever its force, sense pleasure definitely shares the precariousness and urgency which surround the fulfillment of our vital needs.[32]

It is on this very point that DeWulf's description of the pleasure of aesthetic experience differentiates it from sense pleasure with a vital meaning. Aesthetic pleasure does not draw us toward our milieu, toward the acquisition or assimilation of something that would satisfy a vital need. Its direction seems other. It is a "ravissement." It is experienced more after the fashion of an ecstasy or a "going outside of oneself," more an experience of transcendence than being drawn to an environment. This "ravissement" is not the pleasure of our vital activity of every day, for it "met l'âme en fete." This pleasure has a certain purity and nobleness that distinguish it from the plebian and realistic activity by which we seek to fulfill our biological demands; it has a hint of ideality in it. It is calm and serene, without agitation, it knows nothing of the turbulance of the practical world. And because of all these characteristics, DeWulf calls it a disinterested pleasure, a contemplative enjoyment. It is for itself.

To push our investigation further, we must ask what is the source of this differentiation. This will lead to inquiries into the source of pleasure itself and into its meaning in our functions.

But before posing these ultimate questions, we must consider that for DeWulf there is a more immediate point, in the light of which the two above questions must be asked. Pleasure or affective experience is intimately bound up with perception. The most immediate explanation of pleasure is an account of the activity of our perceptive faculties. "Artistic perception and artistic emotion made up of love and accompanied by pleasure — these are, I know, only different moments of one and the same psychological reality. For there is mutual conpenetration of all the elements in the impression when beauty takes hold of us."[33] "The enjoyment of art is not something accesory that unfolds itself parallel to the perception of art. The two are integral parts of one unique phenomenon which is the impression itself, and they contribute to the constitution of this impression with equal right."[34] "The perception of art is joined to an affective state which is commonly called the emotion of art or the artistic sentiment or charm."[35]

From this intimate and rigorous connection established between perception and pleasure we might conclude, then, that the characteristics of the pleasure gives us some knowledge of the characteristic of the perception to which it is bound. If aesthetic pleasure is opposed to common sense pleasure, then to that extent aesthetic perception in differentiated from common sense perception. Aesthetic pleasure, according to DeWulf, is disinterested and contemplative, free from those qualities that characterize ordinary sense pleasure as being bound to the world of vital needs. Aesthetic perception too, then, must be disinterested and above this world of practical adaptation. We must now investigate how DeWulf describes this aesthetic perception and try to discover just what particular element differentiates it from the structure of common adaptive sense perception.

The aesthetic impression demands all our perceptive faculties. "Sense, imagination, intelligence, emotions, tendencies, all the energies of the human being converge and confound themselves in a kind of intuition."[36] The senses, the imagination and the intelligence explain the perceptive aspects of our experience.[37] But these three faculties are "blocked" in their activity. In the aesthetic

perception they confound themselves. And if this is so, then at least in our consciousness we cannot distinguish the activity of one from the other as it enters into the aesthetic experience as such. For DeWulf this seems true, for these three are fused, as if dissolved into one another in one intuition.[38] To maintain the rigor of this observation, DeWulf warns that although we can distinguish these three elements abstractly or show by philosophical reasoning that all three are necessary to account for the aesthetic experience, we must not let this falsify our notion of how they are related in the very perception itself. "One should not consider this three-fold perceptive activity as a sort of mosaic of conscious states. It is one harmonious whole, a contemplative unity and ends in a unique action."[39] There is only one act in which imagination, senses and intelligence are fused. "Our perception is not made up of three acts, each distinct and super-imposed one upon the other: the first in which we would see forms and colors; the second where the imagination would reveal the relief of the figure, the depths of the eyes, the perspective concerning the folds in the garments of the virgin[40] and those of the two persons who contemplate her; the third, finally, by which we take hold of the ideas of youth, gracefulness, seriousness and recognition."[41]

How, then, we can ask, does DeWulf conceive and explain the cooperation of the intelligence, imagination and senses, this "intimate union of the sensation and the concept in a unique act of contemplation."[42]

Aesthetic perception has its beginning in the sensations of sight and hearing.[43] The role of these senses in aesthetic perception is primordial.[44] DeWulf justifies the presence of the senses in aesthetic experience and enlarges upon it by an appeal to the experience of artists themselves. There is simply no painting that is not a caress for the eyes and there is no music that is not a pleasure for the ears.[45] "Just as painters, drawers, sculptures are visual types — their eyes enjoy nuances, of color, of detail, of form, finesse of outline that 'profane eyes' do not see — musicians are auditive types."[46] "Every artist is, from certain points of view, a sensist who responds to external impressions like the

eolian harp to the wind."[47] Without specifying, DeWulf implies that there is something different in the sense experience of artists that is not found in ordinary sense experience. Even on the sense level something of distinction is found that singles out sense experience of aesthetics from that of ordinary experience. However, despite M. DeWulf's insistence upon the unity and singularity of the aesthetic intuition, embracing in one act the coordination of the intelligence and imagination and senses, he remarks at the end of his discussion of the senses that their part in this experience is only a prelude. "The festivity of the exterior senses is only the prelude for the artistic perception itself — a necessary prelude but insufficient in itself."[48]

What then is the role of the imagination? For DeWulf the sense impressions which he has just described are incomplete and and weak. It is the imagination that completes them and intensifies them. "To the perceptive role of visual and auditive sensations is added that of the imagination which completes these and intensifies them."[49] It is the imagination as reproductive and constructive that enters into aesthetic experience.[50] Through associative and complementary images the imagination supplements our sense experience. DeWulf does not explain why the sensations must be intensified by the imagination, though this is the imagination's principal work. "Its principal function in the artistic perception is to intensify the colors, the lines, the forms and the sounds. Its power to magnify these things can be compared to the electric current entering a light bulb. The filament in the bulb is made of thin spirals, but as soon as the current touches them they fuse into a unity."[51]

The complementary and constructive function of the imagination is necessary because of the voluntary mutilations which the artists inflict upon their works. This constructive work constitutes part of the pleasure of aesthetic appreciation. "The artist leaves in his work, in the order established there, certain defects, because he knows that to interest the spectator or the one listening it is necessary to share with him his own creative activity. He obliges him (the spectator) to complete with his own senses, with his im-

agination, with his intellect, the intentional lacunae in the work."[52] This mutilation and suggestiveness is present in all the arts and it is a part of the imaginative activity of aesthetic experience to supply the integrity that is missing in the work.[53]

According to DeWulf, the senses and imagination have co-operated in the forming of a certain sense datum that is more intense and vivid than ordinary experience. In addition, with reference to the object, this datum is completed through the constructive operations of the imagination. Now what relation is there between this sense datum and the intelligence? The intellect takes hold of the idea that is in this datum. "Artistic perception takes place in these visual and auditive sensations that are completed and intensified by the imagination; and it is in this concrete data that the intelligence takes hold of the idea or ideas that the artist has placed there."[54] In just what manner the intelligence attains and takes hold of the idea in the work of art is clarified by considering what DeWulf has to say concerning the relation of these ideas to the artist who makes a work. The artist who has produced a work of art by his genius incorporated an abstract notion into it.[55] DeWulf stresses the abstractness of this notion. And the work of the intelligence in aesthetic experience is to take hold of this notion in its abstractness.[56] This ideal as conceived by DeWulf is only attainable by the abstracting intellect. It is not contacted in the sense data that result from the activity of the senses and the imagination as explained above. Intelligence is the sole factor in our aesthetic experience "which puts us in contact with the ideal that the artist has placed in the work."[57] If only the abstracting intellect is capable of taking hold of this ideal, then it is the ideal as abstract. DeWulf's clarification leave no doubt about this fact. "But the recalling of an architectural form and all that goes with it, of the motives that are related to it, furnishes the material for the spirit from which it abstracts this form."[58] The notions, he continues, which the artist has placed in his work and which our intellect attains — "Here are realities which speak to the abstractive faculty, to the intellect. This language the senses either do not understand at all or understand it in a completely different way.

Between concrete sensation and abstract thought there is a difference of nature that need not be pointed out here."[59] The fruit of the intellectual work on this side of aesthetic experience is an abstract idea similar to any other, as an abstract idea of motherhood, power or avarice.[60] To leave no doubt whatsoever of his meaning, DeWulf defines his use and meaning of the word "abstract" in the context: "Abstraction is a primordial function of the spirit by which we regard every element of reality, corporeal or non-corporeal, physical or moral, apart from all the singular conditions with which it is surrounded."[61]

After seeing this aspect of intellect in aesthetic experience, we ask immediately what has become of that one, intuitive aesthetic act in which the senses, the imagination and the intelligence were fused and dissolved into one another. If the intellect abstracts a form from the aesthetic sense data, what is there then that is distinctive in the relation between intellect and sense in aesthetic experience? For this seems to be the relation between intellect and the phantasm which we find in our ordinary intellectual experience of the essences of things. However, there is another aspect of aesthetic experience which would seem to be consequent upon the one just delineated. This aspect DeWulf describes in the following manner, and unfortunately in terms that are not always too satisfying.

From the side of the object which we know in aesthetic experience, a work of art is a realization of a universal type, just as the works of nature are individuals realizing a universal. "But does not the artist have the same power of creating diverse images of the same kind, of representing the oak or man under different forms each one clearly individualized, or realising a concrete whole where the intelligible element is intimately bound up with design and sound, conforming to the ideal that governs all artistic work?"[62] Poetry has to do with the universal. "One understands from this in the work of art the individual and the abstract, far from being mutually exclusive, co-exist or rather are fused one with the other."[63] Here DeWulf points out the second relation of the intellect to the sense data furnished to it by the senses and imagina-

tion. In this instance the activity of the intellect is not so much the activity of abstracting a form from the sense data as that of simple discovery or recognition of the form as concretized there. The abstract idea shines out in the concrete data furnished by the senses and imagination to the intellect. "Spontaneously the intelligence yields itself up to the work of art, it gives up its domination, it finds such delight in it that it forgets itself and the processes of its activity escape it."[64] The act of the intellect here can be called intuitive. The intellect intuits the abstract idea in the singular.[65] And as mentioned, there is something of simple recognition here, for we contemplate the content of our own idea: "We contemplate the content of our ideas — the notions of a happy and loving mother — in the garment of the sensible forms which envelop them."[66] In this relation the sense data are not simple experimental material upon which the intellect works. Such is the attitude of the scientist, DeWulf says. The aesthetic experience is not indifferent to which matter realizes its idea. And the aesthetic experience remains on the contemplative level of the concept as opposed to discursive activity.[67]

In addition to the foregoing demonstration of the part intellect plays in aesthetic experience, DeWulf gives two arguments that stress the place of the abstracting intellect in this experience. The first concerns the fact of useful or functional beauty. The beauty of a building or a chair or of any useful thing consists in its perfect adaptation to its useful end. To appreciate this beauty we must know the order that exists between the thing itself and the end for which it is destined. Now the end and its order in relation to the means are known only by abstract concepts.[68] The second argument is that certain works of art can produce effects that are infra-artistic or simply non-artistic. DeWulf mentions the sedative power of music or the power of certain types of music to incite to action. The only difference between such effects and a true artistic effect is that the latter is bound to the concept of order. In this latter there must be presented abstract ideas that will serve the experience as a principle of order.[69]

This notion of order plays a considerable role in DeWulf's

thought. In the light of what he says about order we can better understand his description of the part intellect plays in aesthetic experience. There is beauty where there is a particular type of order.[70] And until I perceive this order, I do not have an aesthetic experience.[71] "When a man perceives some little bit of this order, when he takes hold on a being or group of beings of the clear way in which nature realises variety in unity, then he enjoys its aesthetic value."[72] And it is the same with a work of art. The artist's work is to establish an order that will express his idea. "L'artiste, on l'a vu, s'ingenie a rendre resplendissant l'ordre qu'il a choisi."[73]

But what particular characteristic does this order have that distinguishes it from any other? It must be such that it impresses itself upon us. "In nature as in art, order is beautiful as soon as it is forcefully portrayed."[74] "More briefly, artistic order is forcefully expressed, strikingly set forth."[75] "But order is forcefully expressed: that is that the artist is preoccupied in adapting the order realized to the contemplative life that it must arouse. The more perfect this adaptation, the more beautiful the work."[76] But this order is not just for the sake of the intellectual element in aesthetic experience. It is it also that affects the sense and the imagination in aesthetic perception. For a work of art is beautiful when it is so ordered that it "will be capable of producing a strong impression on the subject which experiences it, when it speaks in a loud and clear voice to the senses, to the imagination, to the intelligence."[77] It is in the terms of order that DeWulf implies the difference between the beauty of nature and the beauty of a work of art. The order in a work of art is artificial and the work has no other end than to manifest this order in the most perfect way possible. The work of the artist is to adapt this order to the subject who will see the work. In nature, however, there are other ends. The natural object does not exist simply to manifest its order. The discovery of beauty in nature is a difficult and rare intellectual work. On the contrary, the artificial order of a work of art imposes itself upon us.[78]

We are now in a position to compare DeWulf's account of aesthetic perception with common perception in sense knowledge.

How do they differ? At the same time we shall see to what extent his explanation has maintained the over-all description he gave of aesthetic experience, non-reflexive, direct and spontaneous, subjective and relative, an experience in which the sense, the imagination and the intellect are joined together in an harmonious intuition.[79]

In our comparison of DeWulf's description with the perception of ordinary sense perception we should take into consideration the double relation or movement which he ascribes to the intellect in aesthetic experience. In the first movement of the intellect, the term is simply an abstract idea. The senses receive from the object an impression that is stronger than usual and the imagination contributes to the formation of the sense data by its constructive activity. In this ascending movement of the experience, however, the sense data as such, in their individuality, seem to have little significance, for the abstracting activity of the intellect relinquishes them. This aspect of aesthetic experience seems to have nothing in common with ordinary sense perception. Its term is independent, and essentially so, of the individual data and its specific activity is other in nature than sense activity. The intellect enters into this experience as transcending absolutely the conditions of time and space, as providing objective and abstract knowledge of the object.[80] This aspect of DeWulf's aesthetic experience is simply opposed to sense perception in every way. At best it can be considered a presupposition or a sine qua non for aesthetic perception strictly speaking.

We have now to consider the second movement of DeWulf's description, which description appears to be more properly in accord with the aesthetic experience he has described himself. It would seem to be in harmony with DeWulf's thought to look upon this second movement as a return to the sense data furnished by the imagination and the senses. It is a return to the individual work of art in its concrete conditions.[81] And if this second movement follows upon the first, then we must ask what part the abstract idea, which is the term of the first movement, plays in this return to the individual object. If it is simply relinquished, then we must find a new way in which the intellect enters into play with the

sense data, for we have simply a new experience beginning with the sense data. However, DeWulf makes it clear that this abstract idea plays an integral part in this second aspect of aesthetic experience. It is this abstract idea that provides the principle of order which distinguishes aesthetic experience from any other.[82] Further, it is the very content of this idea that we discover realized in the individual data when we return to it.[83] We recognize in the sense data the idea that we had previously abstracted. The individual work is known as referring itself essentially to the abstract idea.[84]

This is surely not to know the individual after the fashion of the senses. Still, even though there is not absolute coincidence, when DeWulf finishes distinguishing aesthetic experience, we find little, if anything, in it that resembles that immediate experience of the sense world which our aesthetic consciousness imposes upon us. His descriptions seem to be of an objective, intellectual knowledge of the individual. There is a clear knowledge of the essence of the thing and the object is held as exterior to ourselves.[85] The individual as concrete is not experienced, but rather known by connotation in the universal. The recognition of an abstract idea as realized in the concrete does not correspond to the single act in which the intellect, the senses and the imagination confound themselves and operate as indistinguishable. And though DeWulf speaks of this return to the individual as intuiting the abstract in the individual, as a simple intuition, and of the manner in which the intellect submits itself passively to the object,[86] it is difficult to harmonize this terminology with the structure of the operation as he describes it. The terms reflex, indirect and objective seem to impose themselves here instead. If we *recognize* our own abstract idea in the individual, then we know it again, and there must be something of reflection and comparison of the two terms. It seems impossible to conceive this recognition as we might the direct and spontaneous recognition of an object which presents itself to our sense organism and is recognized and reacted to simply as fulfilling a need based on our psychic structure. Here the terminus is an abstract idea of what a thing is in itself, and its recognition would

seem to demand an intellectual work of reflection and comparison.

Finally, according to DeWulf's exposition of the aesthetic act, there seems to be no reason why we should not recognize a thing in itself as beautiful without, or at least before, we experience what is called aesthetic enjoyment or ravissement. The recognition that our abstract idea is realized in the concrete in this fashion should result in a judgment that this thing is beautiful. However, it is common experience that the aesthetic experience, like every experience that integrates our imaginative and affective and sense functions, is not known so much in itself as in its effect. The judgment that this thing is beautiful is concomitant with the ravissement which we experience. "What we call beautiful is precisely that which takes us out of oursèlves, and we do not recognize any other criterion. Pleasure itself is here a part of the essence of the aesthetic sentiment."[87]

As in the first movement of the intellect as described by DeWulf, here too we must conclude that this second movement of the intellect places the aesthetic experience on a level that is too exclusively intellectual. While we cannot equate aesthetic and ordinary sense experience, yet neither can we simply oppose them in an absolute sense. Aesthetic experience must be explained in cooperation with the senses themselves, and not to their detriment, if we take into consideration all the data that aesthetic experience itself imposes upon us.

This conclusion, that DeWulf tends to over-objectivize and over-intellectualize aesthetic experience to the exclusion of the affective and sense elements, is strengthened by a consideration of what he has to say about the end of artistic experience. He is unmistakably clear that the artistic order transcends the order of adaptive and practical activity.[88] However, it is interesting to note that, in specifying and distinguishing this disinterested quality of aesthetic activity, DeWulf never compares it to intellectual knowledge as simply transcending the practical and adaptive, as simply being for itself. The tendency is rather to equate them than to distinguish them. The distinction that he makes between art and science, between science that concerns itself with laws and

art that is concerned with the whole individual thing, shows too that the intellectual activity that opposes itself to art is discursive. It is with discursive activity that art must not be confused. "There is nothing in its activity that resembles the work of analysis which is proper to the scientist."[89] As to its end, aesthetic activity is clearly distinguished from adaptive, useful activity, but DeWulf leaves unanswered the question as to how the disinterested quality of aesthetic activity is different from other activities that also transcend the adaptive level. Both appear to be disinterested for the same reason.

This tendency to over-objectivize and to draw aesthetic experience too exclusively to the level of abstract knowledge accounts for the fact that many problems concerning the integration of sense experience into aesthetic activity do not present themselves to M. DeWulf. The work of art speaks to the senses as well as to the intellect.[90] There is pleasure in the eye and in the ear when we behold a work of beauty.[91] But the problem of how there can be perception and pleasure in the senses that transcend the adaptive meaning and function of the senses does not present itself. To explain the special relation in aesthetic experience between the intellect and the senses in terms of an intuition of the universal in the concrete contingent is not sufficient. The perception of something of a universal in the singular must even be attributed to sense knowledge in its ordinary adaptive functions.[92]

We began our analysis of DeWulf's aesthetics with the data of consciousness, the aesthetic pleasure which is the norm by which we recognize a beautiful thing. This is an effect and we immediately had to seek its cause, the aesthetic perception which, together with aesthetic pleasure itself, forms one psychological reality that we call aesthetic experience.[93] Having analyzed DeWulf's presentation of aesthetic perception, we can now better appreciate what he has to say about the nature and source of aesthetic pleasure.

It is not necessary to repeat here DeWulf's statement that the aesthetic pleasure is unique.[94] And it is not only unique but also contemplative and disinterested.[95] We can immediately ask what is the source of this pleasure. How is it related to aesthetic per-

ception, together with which it makes one experience?

In explaining artistic emotion or sentiment DeWulf distinguishes the tendency that follows upon the aesthetic perception and the pleasure that comes from this tendency.[96] As our aesthetic knowledge is disinterested, so is the tendency that results from it.[97] It is disinterested, it is not to be confused with a tendency that seeks to possess something.[98] It is a "libre jeu," a "jouissance de luxe."[99] This is so because the object of this tendency and the pleasure that results from it is concerned, not with the good, but simple knowledge. The source of the pleasure is not a material good possessed but simple knowledge.[100]

But if the aesthetic pleasure is unique and its source is simple knowledge, then we can ask just what in this knowledge causes the uniqueness of the pleasure. We could simply return to DeWulf's presentation of aesthetic perception and what distinguishes it from other experiences. However, in addition, what he has to say about the difference between different types of loves or tendencies is also instructive in establishing his position. Aesthetic tendency, and consequently pleasure, is first of all to be distinguished from the desire for a good to be possessed or from the possession of a good.[101] Further, it is not the love of truth. The pleasure that comes from the love of truth is a pleasure of security.[102] "Certitude, on the contrary, brings security. We love truth because it tells us something about the real, in making us aware of the conformity of our thoughts, our judgments, of our scientific constructions with the real."[103] This is not the aesthetic pleasure. "Must one say the same of the beautiful? No. When we seek out a work of art we do not seek some assurance concerning the existence of laws which govern reality and the enjoyment of the satisfaction that this assurance brings us. And it is in this that the love of a work of art differs from the sentiment that is behind the ardor which the scientist manifests in his scientific research."[104] Nor is the aesthetic tendency the love of self. The data of consciousness furnishes sufficient proof to reject this possibility. "The love of art has for its immediate object the work loved and not the loving subject."[105] Opposed to all these is the love of pure contemplation which characterizes the aesthetic

tendency. "It is a love of pure contemplation. We love the work in order to contemplate it. Our whole being has given itself over to this forceful affirmation of an idea. It is a pure intuition of the abstract in the concrete."[106] From an act of serene contemplation flows artistic pleasure properly speaking.[107]

We might account for the uniqueness of the pleasure from the uniqueness of the perception. But why is there pleasure at all? Pleasure follows upon conscious activity that is in accordance with the nature of the subject. Pleasure follows naturally upon the "epanouissement des fonctions."[108] Pleasure demands the expense of energy in activity. And if this spending of energy is according to the laws of duration, intensity and harmony, according to a mean, it will result in pleasure and not in pain. "One must determine the conditions under which an activity is colored with pleasure or with pain and, since we know on the other hand from what conscious activities the artistic attitude arises, in what way we can apply this knowledge to artistic pleasure. These conditions can be formulated according to certain laws — the law of duration, the law of interest, the law of harmony."[109]

The remarks that impose themselves concerning DeWulf's treatment and explanation of aesthetic pleasure have been prefigured in the criticism that we have made of his presentation of aesthetic perception. The explanation of pleasure naturally follows that of perception, and if in the latter the tendency was to over-objectivize, it is the same here. There is not a sufficient distinction between the pleasure that accompanies intellectual contemplation and aesthetic contemplation. Everything DeWulf says tends to identify them. Again, there seems to be no awareness of the problem of disinterested pleasure on the sense level itself where pleasure has ordinarily biological or practical meaning. Further it seems insufficient to explain the aesthetic pleasure by the "epanouissement des fonctions."[110] This is proper to every level of activity; our organs and powers are active according to their natures. If a unique pleasure is the norm by which we recognize aesthetic experience, then to explain it, we must show how our powers and organs are fulfilling the demands of a unique function.

CHAPTER III

JACQUES MARITAIN: METAPHYSICAL BEAUTY

M. Maritain's first work in the field of art and aesthetics was *Art et Scolastique* which appeared in 1920. Since that time the book has gone through many editions, has been revised and augmented by the author.[1] In addition, Maritain has also ex professo treated of art and aesthetics in several small books and essays.[2] It should be pointed out at the beginning of this analysis that, although Maritain touches some of the most fundamental problems of aesthetics and often at some length, in his writings there is not to be found a systematic and complete philosophy of art properly speaking. By and large, the sum of the works mentioned here presents a series of essays in the field of aesthetics and art rather than an ordered development toward a philosophy of art.[3]

What is the aesthetic fact for Maritain? What particular qualities does our aesthetic experiences present to us? We shall see briefly, first of all, what are the mode, the content and the end of aesthetic experiences according to Maritain. We can discover then whether the aesthetic problem as presented at the beginning of this essay is a real problem within the categories of his thought, and if so, what solution he gives to it.

The manner in which Maritain most frequently expresses the mode of aesthetic experience is by opposing it to conceptual knowledge, to the abstract and discursive. "Intuition of artistic beauty is located at the opposite pole from abstraction of scientific truth."[4] "The intellect, then, abandoning every work of abstraction, delights without effort and without discourse."[5] If this experience is non-

abstractive, then too it is non-conceptual. "If, then, art manifests or expresses in matter a certain radiation of being, a certain form, a certain soul, a certain truth . . . it does not give to the soul a conceptual and discursive expression of it. It is thus that it suggests without properly making known, and that it expresses that which our ideas cannot signify."[6] "It is normal, because of the nature of the intellect, that the perception of beauty is accompanied by the presence or the beginning of a concept or idea, however confused it might be, and that ideas are suggested by the experience of beauty. Nevertheless, this is not the constitutive element of the experience. The splendor itself or the light of the form shining in the beautiful object is not presented to the intellect by a concept or by an idea but by the very sensible object taken hold of intuitively and which acts as an instrumental cause in the transmission of this light from the form."[7] . . . taking hold of an intelligible reality, 'sensible to the heart,' and without recourse to the concept as a formal means."[8] "One understands by that, that the intellect has no intention to abstract from the singular in its contemplation of beauty."[9] Poetic experience leaves the ordinary play of ideas and concepts.[10] "Here is a knowledge that is quite different from that which one ordinarily calls knowledge. A knowledge that cannot be expressed in ideas and in judgments, but which is rather experience than knowledge, and creative experience, for it wants to express itself and it can only be expressed in a work. This knowledge is not previous to, nor presupposed by, creative activity but is at the very heart of the latter; it is consubstantial to the movement toward the work, and this is what I call poetic knowledge properly speaking."[11] The poet in no way approaches an objective knowledge of things but knows everything as bound up and inseparable from his own subjectivity and sentiments. "From this results the complex character of the poet's position. If he understands the pass-words and secrets which things stammer forth, if he perceives realities, harmonies, ciphers indicating horror or beauty with very definite objectivity, if he contacts, like a water-diviner, the radiations of the transcendentals, it is not by extricating this objectivity for its own sake, it is by receiving all these

things within the folds of his own sentiments and his own passions — not as other than himself, according to the law of speculative knowledge, but on the contrary, as inseparable from himself, and indeed as himself. And thus he takes hold of his own being in an obscure manner, with a knowledge which will end only in being creative, which will conceptualize itself only in a work made with his hands. Connatural affective knowledge, knowledge which is like a subjective re-echoing, is nourished on an imprisoned intelligibility, and this is the reason why it is poetic knowledge by its very nature, ordered of itself to a work of sound or of color, of form or of words.[12]

At the end of the essays in *Situation de la Poésie* Maritain himself sums up the manner of our aesthetic experience: "In the first place: poetic knowledge is knowledge by affective connaturality of the operative type or tending to express itself in a work. It is not knowledge according to a cognitional mode, it is knowledge by way of instinct or inclination, by resonance in the subject, and which is headed toward the creation of a work."[13] And finally he compares this experience to the aspects of essence and existence of the thing. "But that which is not taken hold of after the manner of quiddity, essence or intelligibility. . . . But if poetic experience is not concerned with bare existence, in return its mode is completely existential. Applied to the mode, after the fashion of getting hold of the real, no expression is too strong to protect poetic intuition from the laws proper to the conceptual apprehension of essences. For just as we saw above, what the poetic experience possesses is non-conceptualizable. So it is the mode of this experience that is completely existential."[14]

Additional evidence as to the concrete and vital character of the mode of aesthetic experience can be seen by considering its relation to logical processes. Every work of art must be logical, but not with the logic of demonstration; with the logic of living things. "This is to say with the Ancient Philosophers, that the truth of art holds per ordinem et conformitatem ad regulas artis, and this means that every work of art must be logical. But not with the pseudo-logic of clear ideas, and not with the logic of

knowledge and demonstration, but with operative logic, always mysterious and disconcerting, that logic of the structure of living things and of the intimate geometry of nature."[15]

Finally, one of the strongest evidences for aesthetic experience being bound to the world of the concrete is the manner in which the senses themselves come into play in this experience. "Beauty that is connatural to man is that which delights the intellect by the senses and their intuition."[16] "It should be noted, however, that in the beauty which we have spoken of as connatural to man, and which is proper to human art, this glittering of the form, however purely intelligible it might be in itself, is taken hold of *in the sensible and by the sensible,* and not separately from it."[17] The beauty of aesthetic experience is apprehended in an intuition of the senses, in the very sensible itself.[18] As opposed to an absolute, abstract mode of knowledge, poetry "catches a glimpse of the spiritual in the flesh and by the very pin-point of the senses which the intellect sharpens . . . finds the spiritual at every crossroad of the singular and the contingent."[19]

Aesthetic experience as to its mode can be summarized as being non-abstractive and non-discursive. It is bound up with the subjectivity and the sentiments of the subject. It is connatural and affective. It can be called instinctive as to its mode. It achieves itself in the sensible particular, in the sensible and by the sensible.

From the foregoing as to the mode of aesthetic experience, it follows that we do not know the thing as it is in itself in aesthetic experience.

We do not know that which is. We have an experienced-intelligibility, but not a known-intelligibility.[20] We have not the notions of things but the experience of them.[21] We do not know form as such but rather experience as a manifestation or expression of form across matter.[22] Metaphysics seeks essences and definitions, poetry, every form glittering by the way, every reflection of an invisible order.[23]

In aesthetic experience, then, we do not have evidence that we touch the thing in itself. Any clear intellectual content escapes our consciousness. We experience and feel things in their existen-

tial action upon us. However, in this experience, Maritain notes, the artist touches the object more deeply than other men.[24] In poetic experience we know the interior of things.[25]

As to its end, aesthetic experience has a world of its own, it is disinterested and for its own sake. It is not a means, but an end in itself. It is a contemplative experience. "There is a very striking analogy between the beaux-arts and wisdom. They are, like wisdom, ordered to an object that surpasses man and has value for its own sake, and whose amplitude is without limit, for beauty is infinite like being. . . . They are disinterested, desired for their own sake, truly noble because their work considered in itself is not made to be used as a means, but to be enjoyed as an end, being a real fruit, something ultimate and delectable. Their whole value is spiritual and their mode of being is contemplative."[26] "The work with which the beaux-arts are concerned is ordered to beauty. In so far as this work is beautiful it is an end, an absolute, and sufficient to itself. And if, in so far as it is a work to be done, it is material and enclosed in a genus, in so far as it is beautiful it pertains to the realm of spirit, and is plunged in the transcendental and in the infinity of being."[27] Beauty is loved for its own sake. Aesthetic experience introduces us into a world that is self-sufficient and finds in itself its own justification. "The poem will be a world sufficient to itself with no need to signify anything but itself."[28] "But if contemplation is not their act, as it is the act of wisdom, nevertheless they tend to produce an intellectual delight, a sort of contemplation, and they presuppose in the artist a kind of contemplation."[29]

Aesthetic experience, then, is not pragmatic and adaptive. It escapes any adaptive function. It has its own reason of existence. It is disinterested and for contemplation.

From the foregoing evidence we can conclude that the aesthetic problems we have proposed in the first part of this essay also present themselves for Maritain. For Maritain, too, aesthetic experience is non-abstractive, subjective and rooted in the sentiments of the subject. It is effective, bound to the sensible particular. Yet it has its own reason of existence, it is realized on a level of disin-

terestedness and contemplation. This disinterested quality must be distinguished from other types of disinterested knowledge and its cause must be explained. Because of its disinterested character aesthetic knowledge must be distinguished in some fashion as to its mode from ordinary sense experience rooted in time and space. And since aesthetic experience is not commensurate with ordinary sense experience as to its mode and end, we can inquire in what way the content of each differs. There is no doubt that these problems present themselves within the framework of Maritain's aesthetics and with their full force.

Our first interest here will be to discover the characteristics of Maritain's aesthetic experience that will explain both its concrete mode and its disinterested meaning. When and where does aesthetic experience acquire its specific character and differentiate itself from the adaptive and pragmatic world of the senses. Martain's first interest is not always exactly at this point of inquiry. Some of his essays are concerned, first of all, with the work of art and the conditions of its production. However, even though with different emphasis, the specific differentiation of aesthetic experience as posed here must present itself from that point of view too. For he sees artistic activity as a circuit from the things in the world, through the experience of the artist, to the work produced. The point of departure is the world of concrete individual things, rooted in time and space, part of the practical and biologically meaningful for the subject. A world to which the subject must adapt itself vitally or explain why not. The work produced is still in the world of singular and concrete but with a new meaning, for it is considered to be contemplative and disinterested in value. The problem of the passage from one level of meaning to another presents itself here too. It is the why of this we shall try to discover in the following exposition of Maritain's aesthetics.

What is the initial data of aesthetic experience that presents itself to our consciousness. This experience is characterized as affective. It appears to us on the level of the emotions.[30] It is an emotional shock that introduces us to our aesthetic knowledge of the world. Our experience is "just barely made known to consciousness

by a shock that is emotional and intellectual at the same time, or by a sort of enchanting melody which makes its presence known but does not express anything."[31] We know the world of things and our own self at the same time in aesthetic experience and these two are presented to our consciousness as an intuitive emotion: "at the same moment when a reality of the universe is taken hold of by way of affective connaturality, in an intuitive emotion, the whole universe and the subject reveal themselves to the subject as a ray of darkness."[32] It is an emotional and affective tone which imposes itself first of all on our consciousness. [33]

The emotion that is connected and bound to aesthetic experience is that of delight, joy or pleasure. We call beautiful that which gives us pleasure. Our conscious norm of a beautiful thing is delight. "Beauty is that which gives joy. If a thing delights and exalts the soul by the very fact that it is given in an intuition, it is good to apprehend, it is beautiful."[34] "Beauty is less a kind of knowledge than a kind of delight... the good is essentially delightful."[35] Beauty is apprehended "sub ratione delectabilis."[36] And Maritain, viewing the work made by the artist, remarks that the end of any work of art is this delight. "The beaux-arts are interested in producing, by the work which they make, joy and delight in the intellect through a sensible intuition. "[37]

What, we can now ask, is the particular note of this effective delight which distinguishes it from other pleasurable experiences in the world of the affections, whether sensible or spiritual. The one characteristic in aesthetic emotion which Maritain insists upon over and over again is its connection with the intelligence. Speaking from the viewpoint of the creative idea of the artist, he remarks: "The creative idea appears to consciousness above all as a determined emotion shot through with intelligence... and if the affective tone, in our knowledge of self, imposes itself above all other things, really it is the invisible intentional trait in this intellectualized emotion that is of first importance."[38]

Beauty, says Maritain, must procure not only delight of the senses but also of the mind. [39] "Without a doubt every sensible beauty supposes a certain delight of the eye itself and of the ear or

of the imagination; but there is beauty only if the intellect enjoys itself in some manner."[40] Not only is the intellectual element in our aesthetic delight present but it is the principal element. Aesthetic delight is joy in knowledge.[41] Beauty can be defined as that which delights the intellect. The three qualities which tradition has assigned to objects as the objective foundations on account of which an object is beautiful are those qualities which can delight the intellect. "Integrity because the intellect loves order and unity; finally, and above all, a glittering or clarity because the intellect loves light and intelligibility."[42]

The first and essential fact in aesthetic experience is the joy of the intellect. That of the senses is secondary.[43] The intellect rejoices as a principal, the senses as instruments.[44] However necessary the delight of the senses, it is required merely "ministerialiter."[45] There is question in aesthetic delight of a very special emotion. But it is a joy and fullness procured first of all for the intellect by the senses. "Emotion in the ordinary sense of the word, biological emotion, the development of the passions and sentiments other than this intellectual joy, is thus only an effect — perfectly normal — of this joy. It is posterior, if not in time at least in nature, to the perception of beauty, and it remains extrinsic to that which constitutes beauty formally."[46]

Aesthetic delight, then, is neither the enjoyment of things in themselves, nor the joy that is proper to the intellect as such. It is a delight that comes from a particular functioning of both the intellect and the senses in relation to one another. If the mind rejoices in a special fashion, it is the intuition of the senses. If the senses can rejoice aesthetically, it is because they have been "intellectualized." "To understand this, let us understand that the intellect and the senses make a unity, or, if one can so speak, an intellectualized sense, which resolves itself into aesthetic joy. By this we can understand that the intellect does not think of — except after the fact and reflectively — abstracting from the sensible singular while it is contemplating the intelligible elements of its joy."[47]

To here we have seen the particular characteristic of aesthetic experience in its effect — as a special kind of joy bound to the intel-

lect. There remains to examine the aesthetic perception itself, which is the source of this delight, and to discover in just what way Maritain describes and explains this special relation between the senses and the intellect. The first thing to note, perhaps, is the insistence of Maritain upon the necessary and essential role that the senses play in our perception of the beautiful. Not only does aesthetic experience begin with the senses, but the senses are not relinquished as the experience is completed and developed. Beauty, Maritain explains, is that which delights us by the mere sight or knowledge. When it is a question of beauty of sensible things this sight must be an intuition of the senses. "The part that the senses play in our perception of beauty is rendered enormous and almost indispensible by the fact that our intellect is not intuitive like the angels'. It sees without a doubt, but only on the condition of abstracting and discoursing. In man only sense knowledge possesses perfectly that intuitive-character demanded for the perception of beauty."[48] An affective knowledge of sensible things is bound to an intuition of the senses. "Beauty that is connatural to man — that is, that which delights the intellect by the senses and by their intuition."[49] A non-conceptional, non-abstractive knowledge of sensible things demands an intuition of the senses to explain it. Maritain repeats with insistence the necessity of the senses: "Just the same it should be noted that this beauty which we have named as connatural to man, and which is proper to human art, this glittering of form, however purely intelligible it might be in itself, is taken hold of *in the sensible and by the sensible,* and not separate from it. Intuition of artistic beauty is, then, at the opposite pole from the abstraction of scientific knowledge. For it is by the apprehension of the sense itself that the light of being penetrates to the intellect."[50] In his very definition of poetry Maritain retains this role of the senses: "This divinisation of the spiritual in the sensible, and which will be expressed in the sensible, this is exactly what we call poetry."[51]

When Maritain speaks of the senses entering into aesthetic experience, it is not of the internal senses where a synthesis of our sensations is found that he is speaking. Nor is it of general sensi-

bility, or even of all the external senses indiscriminately. Among the external senses themselves he distinguishes between those that have aesthetic value and those that are non-aesthetic. Beauty falls within the grasp of the senses because the senses also know, they can rejoice in knowing, but above all because they serve the intellect.[52] Since the eye and the ear are "most intellectual" and capable of disinterested knowledge, it is they that enter into our aesthetic experience.[53] "Without a doubt all sensible beauty supposes a certain delight of the eye itself and of the ear of the imagination... A beautiful color clarifies the eye just like a strong perfume dilates the nostrils. But of these two forms or qualities only color is called beautiful because, being received, as the perfume is not, in a sense capable of dinterested knowledge, it can be, in its very sensible shining forth, an object of joy for the intellect."[54]

In aesthetic perception, then, the intellect uses the senses as instruments, that is, sight and hearing.[55] "The splendor or the light of the form shining in the object is not presented to the mind by a concept or idea, but by a sensible object which has been taken hold of intuitively and across which passes, like across an instrumental cause, the light of the form."[56]

From the side of the external senses themselves, how might we express this new relation with the intellect, what change takes place in them when the intellect uses them in its perception of the beautiful. Is there anything that distinguishes their functioning from their role in ordinary sense knowledge? The intellect and sense are joined in such fashion that we can say that the sense has been intellectualized.[57] In addition they function within a framework of new relations, with reference to the intellect. "We say that the eye and ear adjust themselves to new relations. Really it is rather the intellect that accepts what they bring, as soon as it understand toward what end and toward what kind of beauty they are ordered, and the intellect prepares itself to enjoy the work that it allows the senses to do."[58]

It is the intellect and the sense combined that make and explain aesthetic experience. A " 'intellectualized sense' and an 'imprisoned intellect'. "[59] We have seen which of the senses and in just which

way they enter into this experience. We can now ask in what way the intellect enters into aesthetic experience and particularly what characteristics aesthetic experience has because of it.

With reference to aesthetic pleasure we have already pointed out the necessary and important place that Maritain assigns to the intellectual element. Here we propose to examine more in detail the role of the intellect directly in aesthetic perception itself. Briefly we shall point out the predominent place given to intellect, then show what particular characteristics of aesthetic perception are due to the manner in which intellect comes into play.

For Maritain beauty is among the transcendental notions that equate themselves with the concept of being.[60] The experience of beauty is a cognitional experience.[61] "Beauty is essentially the object of intellect, for that which knows in the full sense of the word is intellect which alone is open to the infinity of being. The natural place of beauty is the intelligible world."[62] This transcendental character of beauty, how will it manifest itself in the poetic state[63] which results from our aesthetic experience? All the energies of poetry pertain to the transcendental order.[64] There is a sense in which the poetic state is above the sensible and material. "This in no way forbids that in another sense, just as first philosophy is called meta-physics, poetry can be called super-natural in so far as it is above, not the whole order of created and creatable nature, but sensible nature and all the laws of the material universe and that its value are the transcendental order."[65] The intellect, then, as related to beauty and as perceiving beauty, is a transcending intellect. What happens to our ordinary experience of things in relation to this transcending intellectual activity? What is the effect upon the world of things of this aesthetic-intellect? This intellect can transfigure the "végétations d'images" that are as matter for it."[66] The poetic state is the result of a transfiguration or a transposition of things as we ordinarily experience them. In speaking of the essence of the poetic state, Maritain says that is is a question of leaving "words, with all their burden of lying and 'almost,' (of leaving) the associative parasitical connotations which words bring with them. It is to leave words or to create new words, or to transubstantiate

the old words. It is to leave the ordinary play of ideas and concepts, rational life, social and human life; it is to enter into an uncivilized world where there is no longer anyone to protect us, and finally in some way it is to leave humankind."[67] All our ordinary experiences are transfigured to a level where they seem to have a new value, a new existence. "Logic, everything rational, all acquired knowledge have been drawn to the secret source of refreshment and peace... to be transfigured and vivified and raised, if I might so speak, to the creative state, because they have all become poetic knowledge."[68]

The work made, as having its point of departure in this poetic state, participates in its transcendence. The work signifies more than itself. The activity itself which produces the work of art is transfigured.[69] And the creative idea which is the model of the work to be made and pertains to this poetic state is transcendent and unlimited with reference to the work. "The creative idea, as such, is in our thought as an intellectual element, completely spiritual and simple, that is transcendent and unlimited with reference to the work."[70]

However Maritain may speak of this aesthetic perception as being transcendent and transfigured, when it exists in the artist it is subordinated to the production of the work. Its end is not to know the thing, even in an existential manner.[71] The subject in no way becomes the thing.[72] "Of the poet we have to say: at the beginning of his creative movement he knew as unknown the communion of things (among themselves and with him) along the pathways of the spirit where this mysterious communication arose. And let us not say that the poet fails to know, to know as known, because according to the order of nature he does not seek in any way to take hold of things and to know them as known. Hidden in his spiritual unconscious his experience is a knowledge that is not for knowing but from its origin and in its very essence, it is for producing and creating."[73]

The fact is, for the artist, this aesthetic knowledge is in the subconscious and arrives at the level of consciousness only simultaneously with the production of the work.[74] It is something of an

intuitive light, without contour and unexpressed. It is knowledge by mode of instinct, resonance or inclination.[75] It is consubstantial with the movement toward the work. In fact, this knowledge is the vital power of the creative idea itself to which we refer the work produced.[76]

Poetic or aesthetic knowledge as it exists in the artist is subordinated essentially to production. "I want to say — by a connaturalness to reality by which it is at the very heart of subjectivity itself as existence intellectually productive and according to which it reaches, in its concrete and existential harmony, the subject as subject. This is poetic knowledge."[77] The end of poetic knowledge is to express the subject.[78] The substance of the creative intuition is the artist himself. "It is the self of the artist as hidden substance and person in the act of spiritual communication that is the content of this creative emotion."[79] The artist perceives obscurely his own being and this knowledge terminates in a work.[80] Poetic knowledge for the artist is not to know the world but to reveal the subject to itself in its spiritual sources and as subject. "Really you do not have an idea of things, but rather the experience of them in you and of yourself in them. They do not become eternal in you, it is rather you who become visible in them."[81]

At least with reference to the artist, whatever activity of transcendence or transfiguration intellection brings to our aesthetic activity, it is subordinated essentially to the production of a work of art.

Before beginning an evaluation of the foregoing exposition of Maritain's aesthetic position it will be of use to consider what he says concerning aesthetic pleasure and its fundamental cause. For aesthetic pleasure is dependent on aesthetic perception. In examining the reasons for aesthetic pleasure, we shall see more precisely, perhaps, the exact manner in which the senses and the intellect cooperate in aesthetic experience. But what will be more valuable with reference to an ultimate evaluation is that Maritain's consideration of aesthetic pleasure shows very clearly the viewpoint from which he presents his aesthetics and the manner in which aesthetic problems present themselves within the framework of his thought.

We have seen that aesthetic pleasure is the result of the particular way in which the intellect and the senses are coordinated and cooperate. It is neither the joy of the intellect in its formal functioning, nor the joy of the appetite in seeking and attaining things in themselves. We are going to inquire here just how this aesthetic pleasure relates to the elements that make up aesthetic perception.

In beauty that is proportioned to man's existential condition, what man touches is a splendor in the object.[82] This splendor signifies the form as manifesting a particular clarity, an integrity and a proportion. This clarity, integrity and proportion have a capacity to please the intellect. That is why they are called the beautiful.[83]

How is this delight to be explained? What is the relation to the appetite of the intellect which, in and by the senses, touches the clarity, integrity and proportion of the form of a thing? For without the appetite there is no delight. This relation is not from the side of the object, i.e., the thing, but must be from the side of the subject experiencing the beautiful, if the good and beautiful are to be distinguished.[84] For on the part of the object there is material identification between the good and the beautiful. The beautiful is subsumed into the specific concept of the good and becomes the object of the will. Beauty is a good for the will. And in the object the beautiful is desirable only in so far as it assumes the aspect of the good. This material coincidence of the beautiful and the good is nothing special. In the same way the true can be called good. This distinction is one of reason only.

However, this material identification of the beautiful and the good is not sufficient to explain the fact that beauty is formally and essentially delightful. And still it is only the good that delights. If beauty is formally pleasing, it must have a formal relation to appetite and not merely material coincidence. Beauty must formally implicate appetite. The intellect intuiting the beautiful through the senses and in the senses must be formally related to appetite. How?

There is a pleasure in intellectual activity which can be called the well-being of the faculty operating according to its own nature. This is the delight proper to knowing itself and is not to be confused with the delight proper to beauty. This is the satisfaction of

intellect as a nature attaining its proper end. And although we call the aesthetic pleasure a pleasure in knowledge, these two must be distinguished. Aesthetic pleasure is not simply the feeling of the well-being of the intellect.

This well-being can be seen as an accidental consequence of an action in harmony with the nature of the faculty. However, it can also be considered as pertaining to the faculty in its essential functioning, to the act of knowledge in its essential notes. Now aesthetic delight, Maritain says, has the characteristics of "superabounding and overflowing." And this because of the object known.[85] Beauty is a certain added excellence or perfection in the object as it is related to intellect. Now this added excellence in the relation between the object and the intellect permits the intellect, over and above knowing the thing, to discover and experience itself in this very knowing.[86] This discovery of the intellect of itself in the beatiful thing is related to ordinary knowledge of things by way of addition.[87] Quoting Aristotle, Maritain applies here the idea that the perception of the beautiful is related to ordinary knowledge "as its bloom is an addition to youth."[88] And it is this "plus" quality of the perception of the beautiful that makes the difference between a material and a formal relation to appetite. The well-being that accompanies simple knowledge is not properly pleasure when considered in itself. Its relation to appetite is only material. When there is this "plus" quality, then the intellect is immediately gathered "by the appetitive faculty of the subject, by the elicited appetite, which finds there its term and rest."[89] Truth is not essentially delightful but illuminating. Beauty is essentially delightful.[90]

The manner in which beauty is related to appetite is indirect but essential and necessary. Despite the indirectness of the relation beauty can truly be called a kind of good. If it is essentially delightful, it must be essentially good.[91] Beauty is not so much a kind of truth as a kind of good.[92]

However, just as beauty cannot be reduced to simple knowledge, so it cannot be reduced to the formal concept of the good. It is a special kind of knowledge, so too it is a special kind of good.[93] It is a good delighting the appetitive faculty in the faculty of knowledge

and satisfying the latter's natural desire.[94] It is of the essence of the beautiful to obtain that special good which is delight in knowing. From this point of view, there is no parity between the concept of the true and the concept of the beautiful.[95] The intellect apprehends being as intelligible, sub ratione veri. It apprehends being as beautiful, sub ratione delectabilis.[96]

Beauty, then, belongs to the domain of formal causality, yet of its very nature gives pleasure or essentially relates to appetite.[97] "In such a way that beauty, while directly confronting the faculty of knowing, also interests indirectly, by its very essence, the appetitive faculty, just as we mentioned above, ad rationem. . . ."[98]

To here Maritain has explained the aesthetic pleasure by the relation between intellect and appetite. If the intellect is a very special intellect, bound in and through the senses, then we can ask if the appetite that comes into play must not also have a very special relation to the senses. Is what Maritain has explained to be understood of both the intellectual appetite and sense appetite at the same time or only of the intellectual appetite? What part does the sense appetite play in aesthetic pleasure? This question is in place, not only because we are dealing with beauty that is connatural to man but also because Maritain has joined the intellect and sense in a very special way in aesthetic experience.

Just as the senses enter into the perception of beauty, so too they enter into the aesthetic pleasure. The senses are capable of aesthetic pleasure for two reasons. The first is because they serve the intellect as instruments and so share in the activity of the intellect. Beauty falls within their grasp "to the extent that in man they serve the intellect and can themselves enjoy knowing."[99] The second reason why the senses offer us pleasure in relation to beauty is parallel to that given for the intellectual pleasure. "The sense enjoys things agreeably proportioned to it only because it is itself measure and proportion and finds in them something similar to its own nature."[100] As the intellect recognizes its own self in the beautiful, so the senses in their fashion do the same thing.

However, Maritain insists upon the subordinate and instrumental role of the senses in aesthetic pleasure, just as he did in the

role of the senses in aesthetic perception. The aesthetic pleasure is first and above all intellectual.[101] The sense becomes through its sensible brilliance an object of joy to the mind.[102] The intellect rejoices as a principle, the senses as an instrument.[103] The delight of the senses is required merely ministerialiter,[104] however necessary it may be. The aesthetic delight is a joy obtained for the intellect. Emotion as the development of feelings and passion, other than pure intellectual joy, is but a result of the intellectual joy.[105] And anything except the intellectual joy is posterior to the rejoicing of the intellect and as such remains extrinsic to what formally constitutes the beautiful.[106]

Maritain's resolution of the aesthetic problems which we have proposed here are first of all significant for their general character. In some instances the resolution of the problem is on a transcendental level, in so far as it pertains to metaphysics, such as the consideration of beauty in its relation to intelligence. Another instance of this is the consideration of the problem of aesthetic pleasure in terms of the relation between intellect and will, metaphysically considered. This criticism is not a denial of the worth or the ultimate value of Maritain's development. But it is to point out that, for the most part, the answers we have discovered in Maritain's essays to the problems proposed are not on the same level as that on which the problems presented themselves. The problems that arise from the consideration of the realization of aesthetic experience or the perception of a beautiful thing are such that they demand an immediate solution that is neither in terms of a metaphysics of beauty nor of a general theory of art, even of the Beaux-Arts. Maritain's brief consideration of this point seems to imply that a confrontation of a metaphysics of beauty and a theory of art would be a treatise on the philosophy of art. After remarking that there was no philosophy of art ex professo in tradition but only a metaphysics of beauty and a theory of art, he remarks: "One must go to the Ancient Philosophers and ask what they think of Beauty and then ask what they think of art, finally seeing what comes from a confrontation of these two terms. . . . One would be able, then, if he would gather together and work over the material prepared by the scholastics, to build up a

rich and complete theory of Art."[107] Without putting too much weight on these remarks from the introduction to *Art et Scholastique*, they do seem to sum up the atmosphere and tendency of Maritain's essays on aesthetics.

A philosophical consideration of the data presented in our aesthetic experience gives rise to problems that are neither strictly metaphysical nor do they simply fall within the domain of art considered as an intellectual virtue, of the intellect as maker. These problems are found upon a level that is proper to them and they cannot be reduced either to metaphysics or to art as technic.[108] In this sense, our aesthetic knowledge or aesthetic experience has a proper object. In this sense there is properly a philosophy of art.[109] There is an aesthetics with a proper object. Its object is not the beauty in itself of metaphysics. Its object is not the well-making of a thing to be made of art as technic. Aesthetics in this sense is a part of human philosophy as opposed to that knowledge and those sciences that are related to the intellect as abstracting and as transcending the human composite as specifically human and essentially bound to matter or the senses in its operation. It is a philosophy that is human as opposed to the divine as applied to metaphysics by Aristotle. The object of aesthetics, then, as thus understood, is the beauty of things proportioned to man as made up of body-soul. Its object is the beauty of sensible things.[110]

In this sense aesthetics is to be distinguished from a metaphysics of beauty in somewhat the same fashion as a moral philosophy distinguishes itself from the metaphysics of the good. And in this sense traditional scholasticism has no aesthetics, surely not elaborated and, one might say, not even attempted. Its speculation on beauty has been exclusively occupied with metaphysical beauty, and above all with the question of beauty and the transcendentals. Its speculation on art has been on art as an intellectual habitus, of art of the intellect in realizing an idea. And in Maritain's writings on aesthetics it is difficult to find any other point of view than that of tradition. Which means that, by and large, there is no aesthetic viewpoint properly speaking. A notable exception is

perhaps the essay "De la Connaissance Poétique" in *Situation de la Poésie,*[111] where he specifically considers why the artist produces a work at all and the relation of this production to his aesthetic knowledge.

From the foregoing remarks we do not pretend that a philosophy of art with a proper object is completely independent of a metaphysics of beauty. And we add immediately that art as a habitus of making is intimately bound up with a philosophy of art and any adequate consideration of either includes one and the other mutually. But we are insisting upon that narrow and proper sense in which a philosophy of art with its own proper object is independent and must be seen and developed according to its own principles and on its own level. Its unity, its method and its end are to be seen in the light of this proper object: the beauty of sensible things. Only from this point of view do the problems raised by aesthetic experience find their full intelligibility and their immediate and adequate solutions.

Orientated in this manner, a philosophy of art does not immediately oppose itself to speculative knowledge without any nuances or reservations whatsoever. Nor can it simply and adequately be characterized as opposed to prudence or doing on the level of practical knowledge or philosophy. The specification of aesthetics as having a proper object is not from the viewpoint of the end pursued or strictly of mode, as practical or speculative. It is rather from the viewpoint of its specific character, of its formal object. And keeping this formal orientation, aesthetics belongs to a philosophy of man or, in more ultimate terms, to a philosophy of nature embracing man. It includes both epistemological and psychological elements in its development. The viewpoint here as to aesthetics might be considered as analogous to one of John of Saint Thomas from which viewpoint he noted that moral, as formally specified, could be considered as belonging to a philosophy of nature.[112]

Aesthetics, then, is first of all concerned with the nature and result of that act by which we perceive beauty and establish an aesthetic state within the hierarchy of our knowledge or experience.

It was stated above that from our aesthetic experience arises problems that are proper to that particular realm of experience. It should be added that an aesthetics orientated in any other fashion does not adequately bring into focus problems that are specifically aesthetical. Once aesthetics is limited and specified by its proper object, then the problems of aesthetics present themselves adequately and, in addition, other new and legitimate problems appear. An example of this is the problem of transportation or transfiguration of aesthetic experience with reference to the thing experienced or point of departure. Only an aesthetics on its proper level has to explain an experience in the sensible that is deprived of its pragmatic value that is normally a part of the functioning of our senses. A metaphysics of beauty is, in a sense, beyond the problem of potency and act and is concerned with the transcendental relation of being as beautiful with reference to intellect and will. From this orientation only, one does not encounter the problem of a quality of a sensible object that is realized on an intentional level. The same might be pointed out with reference to an exclusive theory of art concerned with the production of the work. It gives an account, even though partial, of why the work is produced, but it does not bring into focus as should be done the "contemplative" level on which the work is produced.

We have pointed out the above, for we feel that if the aesthetical essays of Maritain have scarcely answered, or only answered in general terms, the problems which aesthetic facts present spontaneously, it is because the orientation of these essays has been too exclusively toward a metaphysics of beauty or simply toward a theory of art.

An aesthetics with a proper object and a field proper to it will establish a common point of departure for all aesthetic experience in so far as it distinguishes itself from other types of knowledge or perception. However aesthetic experience might diversify itself in its development, there will be a common point of departure and common problems for all aesthetic activity. Perhaps nowhere is the divergence between what we have called the proper and formal aesthetic viewpoint and the point of view from

which Maritain approaches his aesthetics more clear than in his discussion of the aesthetic experience or the artist and the production of a work of art. The production of a work for Maritain is the end and the whole intelligibility of the aesthetic experience of the artist. The whole specification of the experience is from the work produced. The development is from the side of efficient causality almost to the neglect of the proper object of the aesthetic experience, the thing known, and the viewpoint of objective formal causality.

The possibility of an aesthetic contemplative vision of things or an objective union with things for the artists does not exist for Maritain — in so far as it would precede in any fashion the work produced. From the existing thing to the work produced is one movement for Maritain. It is a movement of knowledge, of knowledge consubstantially bound to the movement toward production, essentially operative. It is a knowledge of things that is unformed, without contour, even subconscious, until the work itself is produced. The knowledge of the artist takes its point of departure in real existing things[113] and from this very beginning is completely orientated toward production. Poetic knowledge from the beginning "with its whole living weight heads toward making and producing."[114]

Any of the texts where Maritain treats of artistic production leave little doubt about the absoluteness of his position.[115] And there is none whatsoever when he compares and opposes poetic knowledge to other affective experience that can be and is contemplative in some fashion, that has a term of objective union. "Knowledge that is connatural, either intellectually or affectively, with reality as non-conceptualizable and at the same time contemplated, otherwise as non-objectivizable in notions and just the same the term of an objective union. . . . This is contemplative knowledge: let it be natural contemplation touching, if possible, by supra- or para-conceptual intellection a transcendent reality, which in itself cannot be expressed in a human mental word. . . ." To this sort of knowledge and experience Maritain opposes poetic knowledge: "A knowledge that is connatural affectively with re-

ality that is non-conceptualizable because it awakens the subject to its own creative depths. I want to say connatural with reality in such way that it is at the very heart of subjectivity as existence intellectually productive and according to which it reaches, in its concrete and existential harmony, the subject as subject. This is poetic knowledge radically operative, since it is inseparable from the productivity of spirit (due to the fact that the connaturalness that it stirs up actuates the subject as subject or as the center of vital productivity and spiritual emanation) and still not able to terminate in a concept within the subject, it can only terminate in a work outside."[116] The texts themselves are unmistakably and sufficiently clear as to the opposition between these two types of experience. Between the existing thing and the work produced there is no question of a contemplative moment or of a vision of things.[117]

It is not our intention nor our need at the moment to examine this position of Maritain according to his own assumed principles and according to other aspects of his aesthetics. However, we want to point out that such a concept of the artist's experience places an opposition between what we have referred to as common aesthetic experience and the creative experience of the artist. Which two experiences would seem to have a common masis and point of departure in an aesthetic conceived from the viewpoint of a proper object.

If from the very first contact with existing things the artist's experience is essentially directed to the production of a work and takes all its meaning from this, then from the very first moment it differentiates itself from any aesthetic experience that finds its term and meaning in a contemplative regard or vision of the beauty of things. His creative experience begins its development independently and, we might say, parallel to the common aesthetic experience; in no way does it realize itself at the interior of this latter. For there is no question of the artist's experience having its point of departure in a previous aesthetic experience or knowledge, but it is in existing things and from that moment that it is consubstantial with a movement toward the work.[118]

We feel that here is a particular instance of what we have

pointed out in general, of a problem that has a direct relation to aesthetics but which is not placed within the framework of all the aesthetic data which facts present to us. The first concern is with the production of the work and everything is subordinated to that and interpreted in the light of a theory of production. However, to let the work produced command and interpret all of aesthetic experience seems to be a rather restricted point of view. And accordingly, right at the point of departure the data admitted for consideration are restricted.

There may be no doubt that artistic production is the privileged instant of aesthetic experience and that it represents its most perfect development. But as long as the making of a work of art or the expression of beauty is not the only data that confront us when we examine aesthetic experience, then the other aesthetic experience must be considered in relation to this making or shown to be irrelevant. The appreciation of beauty or aesthetic experience of the common man is accepted as the ordinary experience and normal, belonging by nature to intelligent creatures. The simple enjoyment of beautiful things. This is the first fact that confronts us in the sphere of aesthetics. And it is incontestable. However this activity might vary in its restriction or perfections, aesthetic enjoyment is common to intelligent creatures. We would stress that this fact is the fact of the simple enjoyment of beauty. As it presents itself to us as the common data, there is no question of a work to be made or a tendency to active expression. These facts should be considered formally by any theory that would explain the production of a work of art. For they are the more fundamental, the first element of any aesthetic experience.

The artist is the exception. From the earliest times when the poet was looked upon as a prophet and oracle and poetry as a gift from the gods, the philosophers have sought the special reason for artistic production. And this special reason for production is to be found at the interior of the sphere of aesthetics. But if a philosophy of art explains the whole end and intelligibility of aesthetic experience of the artist as coming from the work produced, then there seems to be implied a specific difference between the aes-

thetic experience of the artist and the aesthetic experience of the common man who produces nothing, from the very point of departure. The facts seem to preclude any such conclusion.[119] Descriptions of common aesthetic experience and artistic experience, in their passive phases, coincide in too many points to admit only an accidental resemblance.

Here we can particularly see how this change of viewpoint, which arises from considering aesthetics from the point of view of a proper object, shifts the way in which aesthetic problems present themselves and even gives rise to new problems. For Maritain, the problem of the artist's production takes all its specification from the work produced. The problem is to explain just how his knowledge is productive and tends completely to the production of the work. But once we admit the coincidence of the artistic and common aesthetic experience at their point of departure, then there is the problem of pointing out at what point and for what reason the experience of the artist distinguishes itself from the common aesthetic perception and tends toward active expression. The common problem is to explain an experience in the sensible that is disinterested and escapes the pragmatic significance of sense experience. Then at the interior of this experience we see the expression of the artist as a specific differentiation and a perfection of the common experience. And immediately it is evident that all the meaning and intelligibility of aesthetic experience, even of the artist, is not commanded by the work produced. The simple enjoyment of beauty has an intelligibility of its own, has a value of termination, even for the artist's production. And however the artist's expression may change and perfect this fundamental experience, its meaning and value are never entirely dissipated. The result is, then, that even the explanation of the artist's experience is not to be sought entirely from the side of the work produced. The work itself has an aspect of subordination and part of its meaning is to be sought and explained from the side of the fundamental and common aesthetic experience that preceded it. And an evaluation and understanding of the problems of the common aesthetic experience becomes a pre-requisite for further speculation about

artistic production. In fact, the latter has its full meaning only with reference to the former.

After these preliminary remarks concerning viewpoint and orientation, we can examine more closely the solution Maritain has given to the aesthetic problems we have proposed. If one blocks, at the beginning at least, the common aesthetic experience and the experience of the artist, it is only too evident that these problems present themselves for Maritain too. But even retaining the viewpoint that the artist's experience is unique from its very inception, the problems still have validity. The problem of the passage from the pragmatic level of sense experience to the "contemplative" level of art remains. The movement of the artist to produce is not to be confused with transitive action, such as we find on the pragmatic level of the senses. It is other. This production of an artistic work is according to spirit and liberty, it flows from the intellect as being disinterested in comparison with the pragmatic and adaptive.[120] There is a transfiguration when things become poetic knowledge.[121] There is a transcendent element in this movement.[122] The intuitive emotion which identifies itself with poetic knowledge is an émotion-intentionelle and not an émotion-chose.[123] And together with all this, poetic knowledge is bound up with the senses and sense perception as indispensible.[124] The experience of the poet is an experience in the sensible and by the sensible, yet developed on a transcendent and transfigured level that surpasses the pragmatic function of the sensible. The problem of explaining this passage from the pragmatic to the transcendent presents itself in all its force.

The problem of the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience is the foremost problem that our examination of aesthetic data presented. Aesthetic experience is in the sensible, yet it is disinterested. Here there is question of evaluating Maritain's consideration of this problem. We find the particular character of the disinterestedness of Maritain's aesthetics by considering what he says about the nature of the work produced by the artist. The work of art is not made to be used as a means. It is to be enjoyed. It is ultimate.[125] The work of art has a value in itself, in the sense that it transcends

man. We must understand man here as meaning the composite in its relation to time-space environment, and so transcendence here is used in the sense that we say the intellect as a faculty essentially transcends the organism in its activity. The value of a work of art is spiritual, that is, it has a reference to intelligence.[126] Its manner of being is contemplative because its object is to produce contemplation.[127] A work of art has its meaning in itself, for its intelligibility it has need of nothing but itself.[128]

Now these characteristics coincide with those we attribute to any activity that transcends the conditions of time and space and find their explanation in the intellect which is a faculty of transcendence. And, too, in Maritain's aesthetics we can attribute the reason for the disinterested character of aesthetic experience to the role of the intellect which plays a large part in his exposition.[129] It is the intellect that places poetic knowledge above all laws of the material world.[130] It is the intellect that transfigures sense images.[131] It is the intellect that is the cause of that new transfigured world that is the poetic state.[132] It is the intellect that gives new value and new existence to our experience.[133]

Since the intellect is normally the principle of transcendence in our activity, it is natural to attribute to it whatever transcending character we find in aesthetic experience that cannot be explained by other functions. And Maritain attributes the transcendence of aesthetic experience to intellect, implying at least, that it is such that it cannot be explained in terms of the relative transcendence of sense perception. As to the intellect as the transcendent principle of aesthetic experience, the fact is clear from the above reference. However, it is the fact that is clear and not the reasons in Maritain's exposition. The why and the how of this transcendence is not evident.

Aesthetic experience, however, is complex, as evidenced both by philosophical analysis and our consciousness. It is only disinterested, which character we attribute to the intervention of intellect, but it takes place in the sensible.[134] Now the characteristics of transcendence which follow the activity of intellect are explained as to the sensible in which intellectual knowledge begins by a denial,

through some form of abstraction, of the very sensible. This sensible, however, remains throughout aesthetic experience, it is not relinquished. To attribute the transcendence of aesthetic experience to the intellect is only to clarify one element of the experience. The problem of explaining how this takes place in the very sensible remains, for the two are not to be separated.[135] The problem is resolved when one finds the explanation and the intelligibility of this transcendence without denying the sensible itself.

The relation that Maritain finds between the senses and the intellect in aesthetic experience is that of principal cause and instrument.[136] We might point out here the way in which Maritain speaks of the necessity of considering the senses in aesthetic experience. It verifies and clarifies what we have said above about the general orientation of his aesthetics. Beauty, Maritain tells us, is essentially the object of the intelligence. It falls within the grasp of the senses *because* the senses serve the intellect. Sense plays a role in the perception of the beautiful for man *because* his intellect is not intuitive like the angels. The senses are necessary to explain the intuitive character of aesthetic experience.[137] This tendency to conclude to the sensible in aesthetic experience probably explains too why Maritain frequently gives arguments to establish the affective and nonconceptual character of aesthetic experience. A characteristic which is self-evident to our consciousness, at least from the most simple analysis of aesthetic data.

The sense is the instrument which transmits the beauty of the thing to the intellect.[138] The sense is used by the intellect. However, we ask immediately how this is realized. And especially, what change takes place in the sensible so that an experience that is disinterested can be realized there. The sense is intellectualized, Maritain tells us.[139] It is related to the intellect in a new way.[140] This really says nothing more than what necessarily follows from the use of the senses as instruments by the intellect. But, if the sense is not simply a medium through which the intellect operates, we have to explain in just what manner the sense plays an instrumental role with reference to the intellect.

However, even though the sense is not merely a means through

which the intellect operates, when we examine closely just how the sense operates as an instrument with reference to the intellect, this manner of designating the relation between sense and intellect in aesthetic perception seems inadequate. That there is something of principal cause and instrumental cause in the relation between intellect and sense would seem to be a priori the case, from the very fact of the presence of both in the activity and of the superiority of the intellect over the sense. We must, though, either supplement this explanation or find another, for aesthetic data points first of all to cooperation rather than to subordination between intellect and sense.[141] The testimony of consciousness witnesses to this harmony between intellect and sense and if there should be a question of subordination, from the viewpoint of consciousness it seems that the intellect has capitulated in favor of the sensible.

If we conceive the instrumental relation between the sense and the intellect as affecting only as a material cause the mode of the activity of the intellect, then we have a schema of relations similar to those between the intellectus agens and the phantasm.[142] This schema of relations seems to be inadmissable for two reasons. First, it would be difficult to explain why aesthetic knowledge would not then be abstract and absolute as intellectual knowledge, for the sense would be participating in the power of the intellect in such a way that it would be raised to that level.[143] Secondly, in this type of instrumentality, the instrument affects only the manner of activity of the intellect and as such does not touch the result of the activity. Gredt points out the difference we have in mind here: "Inter instrumenta haec est differentia: quaedam operantur aliquid dispositive ad actionem principalis agentis in materia, circa quam operatur artifex... alia vero instrumenta virtute propria non operantur aliquid dispositive in materia seu in subjecto, circa quod operatur agens principale, sed modificant tantum actionem principalis agentis per modum causae materialis, quaetenus materiam seu potentiam determinatam praebent ei, ex qua determinatam educat vim instrumentariam ad affectum determinatum attingendum."[144] The sense, however, is present and plays a role in the very term of the aesthetic activity. However it might be purified or transfigured, it is the sense that is

there. To say even with Maritain that the sense has been intellectualized cannot mean that is has been elevated by the intellect to an abstract, intellectual level, intelligible in act, where it can give an ultimate specific determination. Aesthetic experience takes place in the sensible, and in such fashion that we could never analogously say that intellection takes place in the phantasm as aesthetic experience takes place in the sense.

What then of the instrumental relation between the sense and the intellect in such manner that the sense manifests its own proper activity in the effect of the action? In this way the instrumental cause modifies the activity of the principal cause only accidentally or materialiter.[145] The sense, however, does not enter only accidentally and materially into aesthetic experience. The sense enters formally into aesthetic experience. The sense enters formally into aesthetic perception. As Maritain himself remarks, it takes place *in* the sense. But when one considers what Maritain says about the pleasure of the sense and its relation to the aesthetic experience, it is difficult not to conclude that it is this type of instrumental relation that he has in mind for the senses in relation to intellect. The pleasure of art is primarily in the intellect, in the sense "a titre secondaire et instrumental."[146] And with reference to the experience, this delight is only supplementary. "The delight of the sense itself is demanded by art only instrumentally."[147] Emotion that is bound to the sense element in aesthetic experience is even exterior to what formally constitutes the beautiful: "Emotion in the ordinary sense of the word, biological emotion, the development of the passions and sentiments other than this intellectual joy, is thus only an effect — perfectly normal — of this joy. It is posterior, if not in time at least in nature, to the perception of beauty, and it remains extrinsic to that which constitutes beauty formally.[148]

It might be pointed out that it is possible for emotions and sense pleasure to follow or accompany aesthetic experience, such pleasures as have nothing but an accidental and exterior relation to aesthetic experience. These can be the pleasures of the psyche in its biological functioning, which pleasures can accompany the aesthetic experience by whatever laws of association or imperfection in the

aesthetic experience itself we wish to attribute to their appearance. But they are not to be identified with the pleasure in the sense as it relates to aesthetic perception. And in no way could it be said that they are "un effet — absolument normal,"[149] even as following the intellectual aesthetic pleasure. So it seems certain that it is not of these emotions that Maritain is speaking in the passage we have cited above. For the most part, experience presents the sense pleasure of aesthetic experience as distinguishable from the vital pleasures of our pragmatic functions. However, an inadequate account of the passage from the pragmatic level of the thing or terminus a quo to the disinterested level of aesthetic experience does not bring into sharp enough focus the difference between these two types of sense pleasure and their source.

While the expression of the relation between sense and intellect here seems not only inadequate according to philosophical reasons, on the contrary, some explanation in terms of coordination would be more in harmony with the testimony of consciousness and the opinions of artists and philosophers. An explanation in terms of coordination explains much better the way in which the characteristic harmony in our aesthetic experience is spoken of. The order established between the sense and the intellect is similar to that between the different elements in the beautiful things perceived.[150] Listowel expresses what we are pointing out here, though one might wish that his terminology were more precise: "And when we asked of beauty the supreme and ultimate question addressed to circumstances by man, that it should illuminate from its own peculiar angle, with however feeble and flickering light, the imponderable mystery of existence, we discover that its unique and almost miraculous achievement was to create harmony out of discord, to reconcile the bitterest antagonisms and to convert conflict into peace, to resolve contradictions and to unify what in the length and breadth of human experience appears most diverse and most stubbornly opposed; for nowhere else does the sharp boundary vanish between the realms of the organic and the inorganic, nowhere else does the seemingly insuperable barrier between subject and object collapse, nowhere else does matter raise itself to the level of mind and mind descend

humbly to the level of inert substance, nowhere else do the sensuous and the spiritual in the human soul, its instinctive, intellectual, and moral faculties, co-operate as naturally and harmoniously as the separate voice in a single jubilant choir."[151]

There is another difficulty that flows as something as a corollary from the above rejection of the relation of instrument and principal cause as being an adequate expression of the cooperation of sense and intellect in aesthetic experience. However, it is a problem which presents itself within the framework of Maritain's aesthetics too, for he speaks of the intellectualized sense and of aesthetic experience as taking place in the sensible. This presents a unique problem for aesthetics. The intellect, which uses the sensible phantasm as an instrument, terminates its act on a level that is free from the conditions of the senses. We speak of this characteristic of the intellectual process in terms of the abstracting activity of the *intellectus agens*. And once this has been accomplished, we are no longer constrained to consider the specific activity of the senses. Intellectual knowledge, we say, in so far as it is abstract, takes place at the expense of the senses, in so far as they are rooted in matter and bound to time and space. This is not so with aesthetic experience. It takes place in the sensible. The sensible enters formally into it. Here since we do not abstract from the sensible, since the experience is not liberated from the sensible, we must take into account that the experience is on the level of the sensible. We must take into account all the elements of the sense experience as such and explain, since they are not transcended by abstraction strictly speaking, why they are not present in aesthetic experience; or if they are present and changed, why and how they have been modified; and if they are absent, for what reason. The most striking example of such an element of sense activity is the pragmatic or biological value of sense knowledge which is demanded to give a full intelligible account of sense knowledge. If this element is not present in aesthetic experience which takes place in the sensible, then we must give an account of its absence. This problem which appears central to us, at least for an aesthetic with a proper object and proceeding accordingly, is nowhere found resolved in Maritain's

essays. Further, the problem itself scarcely arises in his aesthetics because of its orientation. Another confirmation of this criticism is had in considering what Maritain says of the intuitive nature of aesthetic perception. Only sensitive knowledge, he says, possesses the intuitivity necessary for aesthetic perception and this experience takes place by the intuition of the senses. "Only sense knowledge, in man, possesses the intuitive character that is demanded for the perception of beauty."[152] "Le beau connaturel . . . qui vient délecter meme le sens. . ."[153] "By the apprehension of the sense itself."[154] There is the problem here of explaining a change in the very senses themselves, for the intuition spoken of here is not the ordinary intuition of the senses bound to the pragmatic functioning of the organism. The question is not placed by Maritain.

In the beginning of our survey of Maritain's aesthetics we spoke of the general orientation of his thought which seemed directed other than toward a precise development of an aesthetics with a proper object, existing on its own level and proceeding according to its own principles. We wish to make a bit more precise here our efforts concerning the proper object of aesthetics which we have sought throughout his essays.

If aesthetics is an independent discipline, as we have suggested in an analogy with moral philosophy, then it is of utmost importance to determine its proper object which in turn will determine its development and limit its field of activity. A search for the object of aesthetic experience in Maritain is quite unsatisfying. The artist touches a certain radiation of being, a certain form, a certain soul, a certain truth.[155] Further — "It contacts like a water-diviner the radiations of the transcendentals."[156] "Thus it perceives in things and gives us a sign, however weak it may be, of the spirituality which they contain."[157] "This divinization of the spiritual in the sensible . . . this is exactly what we call poetry."[158] "Poetic knowledge, I want to say knowledge of reality and of the interior of things, of their inner side, knowledge that is proper to poetry and the poetic spirit."[159] Finally, poetry "bound to the most inner recesses of the concrete, the intimate side of essences, whatness, quali-

ties, suchness, thisness, selfness with which the real and the singular are stuffed."[160]

In commenting upon what Maritain has to say of the object of aesthetic experience, it should be remembered that this experience takes place in the sensible. Then to speak of the object of aesthetic perception in terms of the spiritual, of a transcendental shining forth, of quiddity and qualities that abound in the singular seems too vague and general. Aesthetic perception is in the sensible, we repeat, for this is a limiting norm in determining just what its proper object is. While Maritain does not insist upon this, he does in a few places state it unambiguously and in other places argues with this fact taken for granted. Aesthetic knowledge is a better knowledge and goes more deeply in taking hold of things than ordinary perception.[161] But aesthetics is a superior knowledge on the level of the sensible itself; superior to other knowledge on this level. For aesthetic knowledge is not to be spoken of as being more intimately bound up with the nature of things than rational knowledge.[162]

Aesthetic knowledge is sensible as to its mode; aesthetic knowledge is in the sensible. Then the proper and immediate object of this knowledge must be proportioned to the sense. It must be a sensible accident or sense quality. And in this immediate object, in this sense quality, we must find aesthetic value, for it is impossible to use as instrument a sensible accident that is charged with biological and pragmatic value, as an instrument for experiencing the aesthetic quality of the thing in which it inheres. Concretized essence, qualities and transcendentals may be touched accidentally, implicitly or indirectly, but it is not these that aesthetic activity in the sense touches by reason of itself immediately and properly. The proper object of aesthetic knowledge must necessarily be an accident. Perhaps a modified accident. Perhaps a very special accident. But still a sensible accident. To describe it in terms of substance and quiddity, however concretized, is a secondary and mediate task which takes its meaning and direction from the determination of the proper and immediate object and is understood with reference to the proper object.

CHAPTER IV

A RECONSIDERATION: HUMAN BEAUTY

This final chapter is to be a justification and positive presentation of the approach to aesthetics implied or referred to in the foregoing criticism of DeWulf and Maritain. There will be no pretense of completeness in every detail. Rather, the effect desired is a synthetic and orderly presentation of that approach to aesthetic problems that we have continually used in our criticisms. It is in the light of this synthesis, too, that the foregoing criticisms can and should be judged as to their ultimate value. And although this chapter will make no claims to a full and elaborated philosophy of art, it should help to bring into focus just what problems are imposed by an adequate consideration of the facts of aesthetic experience and just where these problems lie.

When we summarize and synthesize the data of aesthetic experience, we find that we are concerned, in general terms, with a certain perfection on the level of the sensible. And this perfection is foreign to what we know of the meaning and nature and functioning of ordinary sensation. With reference to ordinary sense experience there is a change that we characterize in devious ways. And it should be pointed out that it is in reference to ordinary sense experience, by and large, that the terms we use to describe aesthetic experience have their meaning. We use such terms as glorification and exaltation of the senses, a liberation of the senses, a transfiguration and purification, originality and freshness. We say that aesthetic experience is a superior and better relation to things. It is common to all philosophers to call aesthetic experience dis-

interested. It is characterized as play, as escape from the demands of our biological needs, as freedom from the vital functionings of the organism.[1] It is a luxury. We experience with it a certain revery and detachment.

Now if aesthetic experience is to be reduced to the level of the abstraction of intellectual knowledge in its explanation, there is no problem. For all the above-mentioned characteristics, in their fashion, can be applied to intellectual knowledge as opposed to sense knowledge. And they are explained through abstraction and the work of the intellectus agens. However, we find these characteristics in an experience that takes place on the level of the sensible, in the very sensible. And we describe the functioning of our senses in terms just the opposite of these characteristics enumerated; in fact, these terms find part of their meaning in this very opposition to ordinary sense experience. The fundamental aesthetic task, then, is to resolve this opposition, either by discovering a transcendent position in the sensible itself that explains these opposing terms or by accounting for a change in the sensible that explains the transition from ordinary sense experience to aesthetic experience.

It is ordinary sense experience that is the primitive experience. And the problem is to show how this is transcended, how there is liberation from this experience, to show what takes place here so we can say that the senses have been transfigured. But, if it is ordinary sense experience that is changed, then we must first take into consideration its structure and meaning to understand this perfection. Only when we shall have understood the structure and meaning of ordinary sense experience, at least in its broad and essential outline, can we compare it to aesthetic experience. And then only can we determine what is new in aesthetic experience and what of ordinary sense experience has disappeared. For the problem is not to point out what is common to the two experiences. Rather, it is to give a philosophical justification of the appearance of new characteristics and disappearance of old characteristics.

Sensation is essentially a complex phenomenon. A representation-

al element and a pragmatic element combine to make up its complex reality. These two elements together give us the meaning and intelligibility of sensation. Neither one nor the other would give a sufficient account of sensation; they are complementary. From the most general viewpoint, we can consider these two elements as referring to the formality and the finality of sensation. The representational of cognitional aspect is the aspect of unity, of being considered as the form of the data. In a broad sense this aspect can be called "speculative" in opposition to the practical point of view of the finality of sensation. This pragmatic aspect can be "being considered as last end — and consequently as original movables — actions," as expressed by Marfichal.[2] And situating these two aspects of sensibility in the scheme of being, he further remarks: "These two points of view show themselves to the empirical consciousness as two progressive and correlative series capable of being developed indefinitely, whose limit would be absolute being, as two tendencies of which the common term, which would betray itself in their convergence, would be however heterogeneous to each one of them."[3]

These two elements of sensation can be seen, also, as simply the consequence of the duality of the constitutive principles that make up the human composite, the principle of passivity and the principle of activity. And this in a general fashion, without considering the special way in which these two laws of passivity and activity realize themselves in sensation. There is the law of passivity that binds sensation to the realm of matter and multiplicity. And there is a law of spontaneity or activity that accounts for the particular unity according to which sensation takes place.[4] Marc also points out the connection between the duality of sensation and the complexity of the subject in which it inheres. "Since sensation is 'an act without matter but in the conditions of matter,' an undivided act, which by this double aspect is constituted as a whole, it is necessary that its source be in another structure than itself and that it owe its complexity to this source. This source must also be complex, join in itself the unity and duality of distinct but correlative principles, consciousness and extension, body and soul. Sensation is the act of these two in so far as it con-

stitutes a unique composite. The Middle-Ages expressed this truth with — sensatio est actus conjuncti."[5]

In addition to these general arguments for the essential duality of sensation, we can also establish individually the existence of each element. As to the pragmatic or biological aspect of sensation, observation of the animal kingdom or reflection upon our own experience gives us quite clear evidence. Sensation is an activity of the subject in its environment and with reference to this environment. Sense experience has as its end and explanation the adjustment of the subject to its environment. It is not completely intelligible without this practical end. Spencer bases his argument for the vital signification of sensation on just such observations. The bodily power, instincts and appetites have as their immediate or remote ends "the maintenance of the organic equilibrium of the individual or else maintenance of the species. . . . Arrest one of the viscera, and the vital actions quickly cease; prevent a limb from moving, and the ability to meet surrounding circumstances is seriously interfered with; destroy a sense-organ, paralyze a perceptive power, derange the reason, and there comes more or less failure in that adjustment of conduct to conditions by which life is preserved."[6]

Marc establishes the biological character of sensation from this same point of view of the life of the organism and the manner in which a living thing maintains being and perfects itself. We quote him at length because his argument is all of one piece: "But just because sensation is the act of the whole being, it can be said that it is its own 'for self.' As it appears to us, it is the organization of extension by a consciousness, organization by a soul from which it receives its structure. It is, then, life in the biological sense of the word. It is the act of a feeling being because it is the act of a living being, and because in a living thing that which animates the sense also animates the body. Sentient being is still an animal. From this comes the role of sensation in the totality of the vital system. Very legitimately Maurice Pradines introduces biological perspectives into the problems of sensation. Facts and reason demand it. But life maintains itself, defends itself, trans-

mits itself. The living being is not sufficient by itself to accomplish these functions. It needs the exterior. And if sensation, which is in itself movement, implies in the sentient subject locomotion and the possibility of moving itself from one place to another, then this last faculty has no other meaning than to permit these functions of maintenance, defence or transmission of life. While the vegetable finds its nourishment right on the spot where it is and need not search for it, the animal does not have his food at his immediate disposition. He has to seek it, to chase it down. He is only remotely dependent upon his environment. But this seeing must be directed. And from the side of things it is directed by the signals that these things send out concerning their position in space and concerning their value as food; from the side of the hunter by the apparatus destined to capture these signals. The signals are the sensible qualities and the apparatus is the senses and their organs, and progress in precision, in motor-ability, is intimately bound up with progress in sensitiveness."[7]

Saint Thomas, with the same reasons, points out the biological and pragmatic character of sensation. The senses are necessary in order to maintain the equilibrium of the organism and as a means of nutrition. "Est autem animali aliquod sensibile necessarium dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum corpus est mixtum ex quatuor elementis; et sic necessarium est animali debita commensuratio calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, et aliorum hujusmodi, quae sunt differentiae corporum mixtorum. Alius autem est necessarium animali, inquantum corpus ejus est vivum nutribile; et sic necessarius est ei cibus conveniens. . . . Ad hoc igitur quod cognoscat ea, quae sibi sunt necessaria vel contraria secundum rationem corporis mixti, ordinatur sensus tactus, quid est cognoscitivus praedictarum differentiarum. Ad hoc autem quod cognoscat conveniens nutrimentum, necessarius est ei gustus, per quem cognoscitur sapidum et insipidum, quod est signum nutrimenti convenientis vel inconvenientis."[8] We find the same aspect of sensation mentioned more succinctly in the *Summa Theologica*: "Respondeo dicendum quod cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo: uno enim modo tam in hominibus quam in aliis animalibus ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem; quia per

hujusmodi congitionem homines et alia animalia vitant nociva, et conquirunt ea quae sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem."[9]

But sensation is not uniquely biological or pragmatic. If the representational or cognitional aspect must be established indirectly, it is still no less certain than the pragmatic aspect of sensation. Sensation, from the pragmatic viewpoint, can be viewed as an activity, as an interaction of the subject with its milieu. This interaction is seen in terms of a stimulus and a response. This response, however, has a meaning. It is intelligible, not only with reference to the subject and its activity, but also in relation to the stimulus that was at its source. We must conclude, then, that in the schema of sense activity there is a representation of the object in the subject. The reception of the stimulus of the object is not absolutely passive but representational. The object is expressed in the subject. For it is only through the meditation of such a representation that the activity of the subject upon the environment would have a meaning with reference to the stimulus.

Similar observations might be made from the viewpoint of multiplicity and unity. Sensation begins on the level of essential multiplicity which is quantitative and ends in a multiplicity of concrete acts. However, it evidently does not exist according to the minimum degree of unity that is proper to matter and the realm of quantity. The multiplicity of the stimulus in its very reception by the subject is reduced to a superior unity, in such way that we say that the whole activity is for the subject. The sense qualities of the object begin to exist according to the superior and active unity of the sensing subject. And this existence of the sense qualities of the object according to the unity of the subject can be referred to as the cognitional aspect of sensation. The subject is actively open to an influence from the outside, to the influence of a form of another being. The form of the object is actively incorporated into the living structure of the subject. Maréchal comments on this aspect of sense knowledge as follows: "But human matter is living. And let us go a step further. A living thing reacts as a totality. And there already, thanks to the or-

ganic reactions which man has in common with plants and animals, man finds his constitutive multiplicity unified and orientated in each one of his reactions to the exterior milieu: the human biological reaction, like that of every living thing, superimposes upon the lowest kind of unity of pure physical quality — the simple element of a diversified multiplicity — a superior unity which includes within itself this lower type of unity. This superior unity is the unity of a type (style of life) to be maintained, that is, to be perpetually realized."[10] This new unity itself is purposive and we see it manifested in the activity or the reaction of the subject. Even the multiplicity of the acts by which the subject adjusts itself to its milieu tends to disappear in view of the formal unity of the representation on which the acts depend or the end toward which they are directed. Sensation, while remaining bound to the conditions of time and space, has characteristics that enable us to refer to it as something more than just corporal or material activity. One can characterize it with Maréchal as "connaissance corporelle,"[11] who likewise remarks the evidence of this superior unity in the reactions of the subject: "We admit that it constitutes, by the formal characteristics of the unity which it supposes and the reaction that it brings in its wake, a first hint, based on organic finality, of a superior finality which is individual and conscious. We willingly admit with Bergson that sensation has no meaning if it is not a beginning of freedom. In fact, to the extent that sensation escapes from pure quantity, to that extent the action that it makes possible gets away from pure mechanism."[12]

Although we have presented these two elements of sensation as having a certain opposition, as being pragmatic and representational, it should immediately be pointed out that this distinction is one made at the interior of sensation itself. Both aspects or elements of sensation are subordinated to the needs of the subject. Sensation is essentially subordinated, and so consequently its parts. It finds justification, not in itself, but in something outside of itself. The term of reference to which we look to find the signification of sensation is the subject itself. More specifically, perhaps, the psychic structure of the subject in so far as we can speak of it in terms

of the needs of the organism, either the need to maintain itself in being or the need to acquire new perfections.

Now the representational element of sensation is subordinated to the needs of the subject as a whole in so far as these determine what of the object is known. On the level of sense knowledge itself, what does not have pragmatic value for the subject is not known. An aspect of a thing which neither presents a threat to the organism nor an opportunity for the organism to perfect itself does not fall within the limited orbit determined by the psychic structure of the organism. The needs of the subject, from one point of view, explain the limitation of sense knowledge and why in sense knowledge we do not know all of reality. But not only the content of sense knowledge, also its mode is determined by the subject to whose needs it is subordinated. The subject defends itself through the interaction between itself and its milieu. To serve the subject efficaciously, then, the representation of sense knowledge must in some way remain bound to the time and space level on which transitive action takes place. The representation must remain bound to the conditions of time and space in order to meditate efficaciously between the stimulus and the response upon the milieu.

It is evident that what we have characterized as the biological or pragmatic element of sensation is likewise subordinated. If the cognitional aspect of sensation is subordinated, then e fortiori the aspect of movement or activity. It might be pointed out, however, that it is the representation that meditates between the activity and the needs of the subject to which the latter is subordinated. The needs of the subject determine the direction of sense activity. Secondly, as has been remarked, the activity or reaction of the subject in sensation is subordinated in this sense, that its meaning and intelligibility is found only by referring it to the relation between the stimulus received from the object and the needs of the subject.

To here we have presented a justification of the two elements of sensation and the fact that both of these elements are subordinated to the needs of the subject. To understand better these two elements in their very functioning and to understand better

sensation itself, we can further consider these two elements in their relations to one another.

From what has been said above as to the relation of sensation to the subject, one can infer that there is a mutual dependence of the two elements of sensation, one upon the other. We must examine here whether there is a priority of one element of sensation over the other. Are the relations between the pragmatic value of sensation and the representational value absolutely mutual or are there certain relations between these two elements that are only unilateral? Just in what way does one depend upon the other?

The biological value of sensation is evident when we consider sensation as activity, as an interaction with the milieu of the subject. However, there is no activity without structure and direction. The response of the subject in its milieu has a meaning only with reference to the end accomplished. This end, however, must somehow be equated with the stimulus as elaborated in dependence upon the subjective needs of the animal. For it is this stimulus elaborated and received in the light of the need of the subject that "informs" or directs the activity of the subject. The biological element, then, is immediately dependent upon the representational element. The biological element does not only not explain itself but depends upon the representational element for its actualization. Its whole existence depends upon the biological functioning of the organism and its adequate and complete intelligibility is referred immediately to the representational element and ultimately to the stimulus and the needs of the subject. Its dependence and subordination to the representational aspect seems to be absolute. To understand sensation in terms of biological signification we have to recur to the notion of representation and a cognitional element in sensation.

But if the biological element of sensation has its meaning and only exists with reference to a representation, it seems that we cannot relate the representation to the biological element in the same fashion or with the same rigor. It is true that the representation is limited by the biological demands of the subject with reference

to the milieu. Its very mode too is determined by this. The representation exists first of all to orientate the activity of the organism. And so, since this activity is on the level of time and space, the being of the representation is not present in an absolutely objective sense. The being of the sensation is present, rather, under the species of passivity and spatial extra-position. The unity and the spontaneity of the cognitional aspect of sensation is submitted to the structure of time and space.[13] The consciousness of spontaneity of sensation, its representation, is extended and in the conditions of matter, for it mediates between two material terms, the activity that takes place through its mediation is transitive action.[14]

However, the representational element escapes in a sense the multiplicity and pragmatic character of this transitive action. Its total intelligibility does not depend upon the pragmatic element of sensation as the understanding of the pragmatic activity depends upon the representation. There is, in the representation, a certain relative independence with reference to the rigorous materiality of the pragmatic activity of the subject. However bound to time and space, sensations transcend in a certain relative sense the very milieu in which they exist. And this greater amplitude must be ascribed to the representational element of sensation which enjoys a superior unity and so, consequently, a superior being in reference to the milieu. There is a certain surplus. The reaction of the subject to the milieu does not completely exhaust the being of the representation.

This certain amplitude and independence from the rigorous characteristics of matter can be spoken of in terms of abstraction or liberation too. Already in sense knowledge there is something of abstraction. This fact is verified by the most simple observations. The conduct of an animal in a particular situation is not absolutely and rigorously determined in every detail. There is some generalization of experience. For we find the same reactions to stimuli that are not rigorously the same in every detail but only similar. And it is understood that this margin of liberation takes place within the framework of time and space. But just the same,

it is a true liberation from the most rigid conditions of the quantitative world.

In the light of these facts, we can understand what Aristotle and Saint Thomas wrote of the manner in which universals enter into sense experience. For both, there is in sensation more than the perception of the individual in rigid terms of materiality. "We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determined form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. Let us now restate the account given already, though with insufficient clearness. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the earliest universal is present in the soul: for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal — is man, for example, not the man Callias. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts, the true universals, are established: e.g., such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal, which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive."[15] We find the same thought in the commentary of Saint Thomas: "Manifestum est enim quod singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo etiam ipsius universalis."[16]

But, however, this liberation of sensation, even though indirectly or mediately, can still be referred to the needs of the subject. We find reasons already in terms of the biological for a certain transcendence of sensation in relation to the environment. The nature of the animal is such that this amplitude and liberation contributes and is often necessary to maintain and perfect itself with reference to the world in which it lives. We see this especially in considering the part that imagination and memory play in the level of the biological, and the two characteristics of

animal life demand this amplitude of which we have been speaking. The fact is that we can evaluate the senses themselves in terms of this liberation and it is common to consider the perfection of animals according to this same norm.

Pradines traces the differentiation of the senses according to this principle of liberation or play with reference to their pragmatic functions. "Every work of sensorial differentiation by life is in reality an undertaking of play. There is question of 'playing' in some fashion with states that were originally very serious, since they were direct stimulations from the activities of essential relations, appropriation and defense. . . . It is a matter of 'playing' with them in such a way as to lower their affective value to the point where they simply represent to us, at a 'safe' distance, the excitant."[17] Bergson remarks the same thing with reference to detachment and distraction: "By distraction nature brings forth conscious beings more and more detached from life. I am not speaking of that detachment that is willed, reasoned, systematized, which is the work of reflection and philosophy. I am speaking of a natural detachment, innate to the structure of sense and consciousness."[18] Spencer observes the animal kingdom according to this norm of liberation: "Inferior kinds of animals have in common the trait, that all their forces are expended in fulfilling functions essential to the maintenance of life. They are unceasingly occupied in searching for food, in escaping from enemies, in forming places of shelter, and in making preparations for progeny. But as we ascend to animals of high types, having faculties more efficient and more numerous, we begin to find that time and strength are not wholly absorbed in providing for immediate needs."[19]

This liberated sensation, however, as it continues to objectivize itself or perfect its representational characteristics, places more and more distance between itself and the vital functioning of the organism. Since its act, however, is ultimately rooted in the act of the subject, of the composite, its tendency toward objectivity cannot surpass the value of the subject. It is ultimately limited as to its perfection, as in other ways, by the subject in which it exists. It is essentially subordinated to the subject. The ultimate

limitation, then, of this tendency of liberation and independence is going to be determined by the subject and the level of being it enjoys.

Now with reference to sensation in animals, this limit is reached in the following way. According to the vital needs of the animal, a stimulus has a meaning for the animal. The animal has a certain interest in the stimulus. This interest creates attention. This attention, in turn, is concomitant with consciousness.[20] And this attention of the animal to a stimulus is in proportion to the immediacy of the biological significance of the stimulus, either as a good to be acquired or a danger to be fled. The norm of this immediacy is the affectivity of the stimulus in its reception by the animal. So it follows that the more the representative and objective aspect of a sensation predominates, the more there is a temptation to distraction in the animal. "It would be impossible that a non-affective and detached knowledge, of an imaginative character, should not create for the living being, in the very structure of perception itself, a temptation to distraction with reference to its own proper object."[21]

As this objectivity of sensation increases, vital interest and attention decrease. The distraction eventually dominates the attention, so that the sensation no longer serves the vital needs of the subject, not even indirectly or mediately. And since the animal has no other needs than biological ones, the sensation thus dominated has lost its raison d'être. It is natural, then, that it fall outside the range of attention, which attention is governed by the animal's vital needs, or disappear into the subconscious.[22] Pradines calls this distraction a "distraction obnubilante." It "takes the animal out of himself and causes its activity to disappear into the subconscious."[23] For the activity reaches the limit of the biological needs that exhaust the scope of the animal's being.

The above shows us how the vital needs of the animal control its sense experience from the very inception to its disappearance in the subconscious. For the animal, there is no possibility of a disinterested experience on the level of sensation. In the animal sense experience loses its intelligibility before it reaches any level

where it might be characterized as aesthetic or disinterested. What, however, is the case with man? Must we say the same thing? Must we equate in terms of equal value the sensation in man and sensation in animals? Right here is where the first problem of aesthetic experience lies. Sensation in animals cannot be separated from life-giving functions without losing itself in the subconscious. If we cannot discover in human sense experience a characteristic that differentiates it from the sense experience of animals, then aesthetic experience as a disinterested experience on the level of the senses themselves is impossible. However negative this problem might appear, it is a sine qua non for aesthetic experience. The possibility of experience on the level of the senses and still separable from vital meaning is a pre-requisite for aesthetic experience. "I do not mean that wherever a faculty of sensation has a sphere of exercise beyond the sphere of useful application, the sensations brought by non-useful exercise have necessarily the aesthetic character. . . . I mean simply that this separableness from life-serving function, is one of the conditions to the acquirement of the aesthetic character."[24]

There is an aspect of sensation as realized in man that corresponds to the sensation of the animal, and this is because, like the animal, man has biological needs that are served by his sense structures. Sensation in so far as it is conceived as activity on the level of time and space, serving the organism in its interaction with the milieu, coincides in man and in animals. From this restricted viewpoint, we can give sensation in man and sensation in animals the same value. We cannot look for any characteristic difference here; for a difference we must consider sensation as representation.[25]

We have seen that already in the animal the representative aspect of sensation enjoys a certain independence and transcendence with reference to the actual pragmatic activity of sensation. It ultimately finds its limitation only in the level of being enjoyed by the compositum in which it inheres. In the animal, as it attains an objectivity that would destroy its biological usefulness, it loses its raison d'être, for it reaches the limits of the being of

the subject in which it inheres. The animal's needs are biological and are limited to the biological world. Such is not the case with man. Possessing intellect and existing according to a spiritual principle, his needs cannot be limited to the biological and pragmatic level. We do not find a subject existing solely on the biological level, limiting the objective tendency of sensation as representational. Negatively, at least, we find no reason why sensation as representation should dissolve into the subconscious when it reaches the limits of strict biological utility.

It is true that human sensation, like that of the animal, has as its immediate subject the compositum, composed of matter and form. However, in speaking of this compositum, there are nuances to be considered as to the way it exists in man and the animal. In the animal the compositum is the ultimate value. It is the compositum that exists, and from this point of view, everything in the animal is ultimately for the compositum. The form and the body of the animal exist through the compositum. But in man the compositum cannot be considered the ultimate value. The facts impose an inconsequence upon us here in the mutual relations between matter and form. The soul of man is not only the form of the physical body, it also manifests a power that transcends the materiality of the compositum. The transcendence of this power of the human soul is of such preponderance that it is absolute and has a meaning outside the compositum. The compositum loses the position of having the highest value in the structure of the human being. Because of this transcendent characteristic of the form, it is the form that has being and exists and not the compositum. The form is not in the compositum as in animals. Rather, the compositum exists in the form or through the form.[26]

The form of man, then, as spiritual, is the ultimate value in man. And if this spiritual form influences the whole man, there is no reason why sensation in its every aspect must be absolutely limited by the biological needs of the composite. If the composite is in turn subordinated to the higher value of the spiritual form, then it is not completely closed on the biological level and cannot absolutely limit the sensation that is subordinated to it. Here in this

difference between the way in which form exists in man and in the animal with reference to the compositum, we find the possibility of an experience for man on the sense level that escapes biological significance.

In a negative fashion, this already characterizes in part the aesthetic experience, for there is necessarily implied for such an experience a relation to an animating principle that itself escapes the pragmatic and biological. And here, too, in this possibility of a disinterested experience on the very level of the sensible is the resolution of the fundamental aspect of the aesthetic problem. We have the very conditions that make an aesthetic experience possible.

Although the aesthetic problem, as we have placed it, finds its resolution here, there is still the positive aspect that follows the resolution of this problem — in just what way do the intellect and sense function together in their realization of the aesthetic experience and what are the implications of this cooperation. A brief discussion of this positive aspect not only should have value in itself, but should serve also to verify the approach to aesthetic experience we have followed to this point.

To understand this particular cooperation, we must go further than simply pointing out a cooperation between intellect and sense. Already in human sense experience, before the biological significance is dissipated, the influence of the intellect can be seen. A consideration of the way tradition has considered this intervention of the intellect in the pragmatic functioning of the senses will help us to clarify the manner of the intervention of the intellect in aesthetic experience. Not only because it will help us to delimit the aesthetic experience, but also because it will show us the common basis for both these activities — the subordination of the composite to the higher spiritual faculty.

Wébert in his notes to the *Summa Theologica* points out why an intimate cooperation between the intellect and the senses is natural and in harmony with man's ontological structure: "It is always the same subject that is active or passive, under different aspects, and according to diverse processes. The faculties are dis-

tinct from the subject, but not any more than qualities are from the substance, and with this further precision, that psychic qualities are from the substance, and with this further precision, that psychic qualities being themselves inextended are in immediate relation with one another. It is this ontological relation that gives to the cogitative power, the imagination and sense-affectivity greater perfection in man than in the animals: This "refluentia" of the spiritual faculties of intellect and will gives to the concrete powers a greater capacity, a greater "susceptibility." This affinity makes them capable of collaborating with the spiritual faculties and of submitting to their influence."[27]

Saint Thomas simply remarks this influence of the intellect already on the level of the senses and attributes to it the superior perfection of the functioning of the senses in man in relation to animal sense experience. "Vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in quo sensus intellectui conjungitur."[28] We find the same thought in the *Summa Theologica*: "Ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi junguntur."[29]

This particular relation between the intellect and the senses is well brought out in the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure, who is much concerned with pointing out the formal harmony between man's faculties. The sense faculty of man, in reacting to the impressions of material things, never becomes intellect, to be sure. But if one considers the whole amplitude of man's sense activity, it will reveal itself as the sensible faculty of a reasonable soul. There is an aspect that enables us to say that it is specifically different from the sense experience of animals, even though we must say that it remains properly sensible and is not to be attributed to the act of intellection. The composite is the immediate subject of sensation and the sense judgment. But this impression is judged and unified as should be judged and unified the sensation of a reasonable being.[30]

Among contemporary Scholastics, Peillaube, in considering this relation, remarks strongly and simply that "la perception est l'ordre

concret et sensible, mais elle commence a s'intellectualiser."[31] Brennan remarks as follows: "Although all of man's senses are influenced by his intellect, as I think, yet the degree of this influence varies with the remoteness of the sensitive power from the intellectual power. . . . Despite the overflow of reason into man's sensitive channels of activity, there are no grounds for making human senses distinct in kind from the corresponding cognitive powers of the animal. The difference here, according to Aquinas, are not differences of nature or species, but of excellence or nobility."[32]

In this cooperation between the intellect and the sense, it is clear that the specific nature of sensation has not been changed, as to its meaning. However the intellect might intervene here, the activity remains within the biological realm. Indeed, it is directed according to the biological needs of a rational being; but the point to note is that its meaning is still in terms of pragmatic needs and functions. Whenever a transcendent principle intervenes in a function, there is always the double play, the elevation of the function in some way and the limitation of the principle by the milieu in which it is functioning. Here it is the functioning of the intellect on the level of the biological that seems to be important.

In aesthetic experience it is the contrary. The whole importance of the experience seems to be on the side of the elevation of the function, on the side of the transfiguration of the sense, of the exaltation. The limitation of the intellect seems to follow as a consequence. Further, if aesthetic experience is possible only where the pragmatic end of the organism has been transcended, then the sensation itself has been fundamentally changed. For sensation, essentially subordinated, is determined in its very structure by the end which it serves. If the end is changed, so must be the fundamental organization of the sensation itself. Although Pradines discusses the affective differences in these two types of experience, the weight of his remarks has its full force with reference to the differentiation of ends we have just pointed out: "For one cannot understand how a sense could produce affective effects

contrary to its nature if it had not undergone a profound modification in its very make-up."[33]

The role of the intellect in aesthetic experience, then, is not simply that of organizing or synthesizing the elements of sensation. We have seen that the end of such a synthetic activity does not really transcend the biological, but is more the extension of the limits of the biological, since it is existing in a rational creature. If aesthetic experience is a specifically distinct function, then its very elements themselves must be changed, not just their organization. Organization in itself does not change the level of being; the elements themselves must be transfigured and elevated. The work of the intellect here "is not in any degree a combination, a gathering together of materials. It consists, not in making something new, or apparently new, by redistribution or fusion of unchanged sensorial elements, but in bringing to birth, in these very elements, by causing there a kind of interior germination, something new as a result of the maturation of these elements. Thus the new does not result from an amalgamation of the old. It is the old itself that becomes new."[34]

But even here the sensation is transfigured and not annihilated. Both the intellect and the sense are there, both functioning formally. And though sensation is transfigured in its very passing beyond the limits of the biological, we have not completely escaped the limits of the sensible. Aesthetic experience does not attain the absolute position of intellectual knowledge. To whatever extent the aspect of unity and interiority predominates, however we might speak of transfiguration, it is still the organization and elevation of the sense impression of a material thing. It remains essentially bound in some way to the relative demands of quantity. Sensation as pragmatic is limited not only by the needs of the organism, but also by the very physical structure of the sense faculties. In its development toward unity it tends to escape the former, but it cannot surpass the latter without losing its very existence as sensation. Beyond the pragmatic it continues to exist in our consciousness, but still limited by its own structure. It is this essential limitation that limits the transcendence of aesthetic

experience, for it determines the way in which the intellect functions with reference to the sense.

Even though here we have not tried in any detailed way to delineate the cooperation of intellect and sense in aesthetic experience, it is evident that we are confronted with a function that does not yield readily to investigation. We are in an area of reality that is essentially obscure. The mystery that surrounds the positive aspect of aesthetic functions is that obscurity we find wherever we investigate the union of matter and spirit beyond its superficial manifestations. We are faced with "obscurities that maintain everywhere their mystery in relation to the processes by which life changes its level."[35] The fact of the formal cooperation of sense and intellect is imposed upon us both by the data of consciousness and philosophical reasoning. A denial of such cooperation can only be based on a failure to consider the ultimate relations between the soul and body in man.

We are going to terminate our investigation by a confrontation of some of the implications of our explanations with the data of our aesthetic consciousness. This should give some indication whether the approach we have followed here is capable of furnishing the elements of an explanation for aesthetic data beyond the limited aspect we have assumed for our essay.

One of the most striking and undeniable characteristics of aesthetic experience is its disinterestedness. Now this disinterestedness can be explained by reference to the interested biological level that is transcended. We can, however, examine the data more closely and find more detailed reasons for this more objective orientation of sensation, for disinterestedness always implies objectivity. It is not so much in the mode of the sensation, which is still limited by the physical structure of the senses themselves, but rather in the content where the liberation is most evident. In ordinary sensation the content is restricted to our biological needs. "Perception is a practical function, destined to present things in their more or less stable relations to our own tendencies which are themselves stable."[36] "The law of perception is that of retouching. The grass-eating animal that recognizes grass in general,

his grass, across a particular kind of grass and from a particular aspect, retouches this grass in a particular way, a sort of "animalization," imposed upon it by the laws of his stomach and the higher interest of the regularity of its conservative reactions with reference to food. What we call nature is *our* nature, and the generic things in it are assessed, divided and recognized, in brief, they are retouched in the light of our needs and conveniences."[37] When we surpass the biological needs of the subject in aesthetic experience, there is no limitation to our perception except the physical structure of the senses and the physical energies of the sense qualities themselves. They are presented to us no longer with this subjective reference. We experience them in their sensible expression. We can find here not only a certain disinterestedness, but also a certain absolute position in comparison with our pragmatic functions. For in the thing itself, the end of a sensible accident is to actualize and express the substance. And here we experience this accident, not as having a value for us, but in its expression and actualizing of the substance, according to its own limited capacity. We touch the substance as accidentally expressed in the sensible quality. And we experience the sensible quality in its relation to the substance and not in its relation to us. This is not an absolute position as in intellectual knowledge, but it is relative objectivity in so far as the senses can experience objectivity. And it is a sensed-objectivity. It can in no way be confused with an intellectual knowledge of what the sense quality is in itself. Here too we find reason why we can speak of aesthetic experience as contemplative. It is the experience of a sense quality as it is and not an interpretation of pragmatic signals. It is a vision.

Aesthetic experience is always accompanied by a certain charm or revery or ecstasy. In fact, a certain ecstatic pleasure is the norm by which we recognize a thing as beautiful. But not only the norm, the very end of the experience itself. This fact itself is not surprising. For if the value to which all of man's activities are ultimately referred is a spiritual principle of such nature that it has value in and for itself, then we might expect that even the lower functions of man participate in this absolute value in so far

as their natures allow. It is, however, more immediate reasons we are looking for here. And the first we might see in the distraction which is proportionate to the objectivization of the representation in sense knowledge. We have seen how this ultimately results in the representation passing into the subconscious in animals. In man, however, this distraction has a different result since the representation itself does not pass into the subconscious. This distraction "in man, on the contrary, exercises an amazing stimulating effect. The greatest of his pleasures are just those which he calls distractions, and there is nothing that charms him so much as to be taken out of himself. We should not doubt that we touch here the very source of artistic pleasure."[38] Pradines also finds a reason for aesthetic rapture in the change that takes place in sensation itself: "But this breaking away from one condition of existence by assumption to a level of higher life can be the source of an intense pleasure, and this not only if the first condition was one of pain, but even if one would suppose that it was one of pleasure."[39] "One must admit that the purely psychological and incontestable fact of the pleasure bound up with aesthetic charm (experience) is rather disturbing to the sincere convictions concerning what we thought were our essential attachments. Surely the exigencies of life, despite all the compensations they bring us, must weigh very heavily on our shoulders, if we experience such joy when we are relieved of them."[40] "The sense of sight acquires, in its aesthetic purification, its fullness of spirituality, since the soul, taken up with itself, finds itself free from any obsession with things: sensation no longer brings with it fears, hopes, desires or any of those states which make up our life of practical needs — but indifferent things."[41] "If this pleasure that it gives is essentially in pure sensation, then this sensation can only be in us as a purified sensation. And it is from this purification, from which our feeling is intrinsically inseparable, that it draws its specific charm. Both the common-man and the connaisseurs agree, we have seen, in speaking of charm. But this characteristic consists in a joy of which the senses are only the material . . . necessary indeed . . . sense and spirit confound themselves."[42]

In this transfiguration and elevation of the sense we also find the reason why aesthetic experience presents itself as a certain full and enriched experience. For in this liberation from ordinary sense experience we are not deprived, even artificially, of any of the positive values of sensation. Rather they are transfigured. "Life goes beyond itself, not by the painful way of renouncement, but by the activity that sacrifices only the pains and the burdens."[43]

It is this liberation, too, that results in that freshness and originality that Bergson, amongst most all philosophers, finds in aesthetic experience. "I am speaking of a natural detachment, innate in the very structure of the sense or consciousness, and which manifests itself at once by a new way, in some sort, of seeing, hearing and thinking."[44] Aesthetic perception has originality and uniqueness for us, for it is a perception cut off from our pragmatic memory. "There is a way in which man is moved sensorially by things without fears or desires . . . and this defines the aesthetic sense or quality; and it is a quality without memory. Ordinary sensations "interest us first of all only because of the agreeable or disagreeable past with which they clothe themselves and recall to us."[45] "In aesthetic perception "a sensation results in our knowing that which it presents to us effectively and not that which we are accustomed to expect or have need of."[46]

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

We saw at the beginning of our inquiry, in our examination of aesthetic facts, that the fundamental problem of aesthetic experience results from the presence of disinterested characteristics in an experience that does not transcend the conditions of the sensible. The first task of an aesthetics, properly speaking, should be to give an account of the concomitance of these two elements while still respecting both of them, denying neither one nor the other.

DeWulf in his explanation of aesthetic experience reduces it to the level of the intellectually objective and abstract. For him our experience of the aesthetic object is reflex knowledge of an individual, after the fashion of intellectual knowledge of particulars. It possesses naturally a disinterested character. The fact that aesthetic experience takes place in the very sensible is at least ignored in DeWulf's ultimate explanations.

Maritain, while insisting upon the sensible character of aesthetic experience, accounts for the fact of its disinterestedness by the part intellect plays in the experience. The problem we have presented, though, does not really show up in Maritain's thought in its full meaning. One reason is that the place he assigns to the senses in aesthetic experience tends to minimize them: they are pure instruments playing a material role with reference to the experience formally considered. Further, his thought is never fully orientated to the level of aesthetics properly considered, but tends toward a metaphysics of the beautiful and its problems.

Following an orientation of thought which we believe respects all the data of the problem in a more complete fashion than either the resolution of DeWulf or Maritain, we have discovered the fundamental possibility of aesthetic experience on the very level of the sensible itself, as it is realized in man. The element of unity and interiority in sensation possesses a certain superior being with reference to the pragmatic functions of sensation. In man this representational element of sensation continues to have a raison d'être even after his biological needs have been satisfied. This is due to the fact that the compositum in which sense experience is realized, in the unique case of man, exists through the form and not the form through the compositum. Sense experience in man, then, is not absolutely circumscribed by the biological as in animals. As its physical structure permits, it participates in the scope of the being of the spiritual form in which it inheres. This experience we call aesthetic experience. It is an experience that is at the same time sensible and spiritual. Its disinterestedness is explained on the very level of the sensible with reference to the pragmatic function which it has surpassed. And there is reason to admit what the fact of aesthetic experience seems to impose on us, that the intervention of intellect is not at the expense of the sense but rather perfects it, due to the formal unity of the human composite itself.

In the light of this explanation the proper object of aesthetic experience is clarified and limited. We are not forced to speak of it in terms of the spiritual or as a concretized essence as is Maritain. Nor must we reduce it to the particular as known reflexively by the intellect as does DeWulf. As a result of our investigation, it is clear that the aesthetic experience, remaining in the sensible, has as its proper and immediate object a sense quality. Aesthetic perception touches a sensible accident that is proportioned to the sense faculty. And this object is distinguished from both the object of intellectual knowledge and the object of sensation in its biological manner in aesthetic experience. And we do not experience it in its pragmatic relation to our subjective biological needs. Rather, we experience it, in the sensible, as it is in

itself, in its relation to the substance which it expresses and for which it exists objectively. The substance of a sensible thing implies parts. The ordering of these sensible parts is a sensible perfection. And in this objective relation between the sense quality and its substance, we find the order, the harmony and the proportion which tradition has always referred to as the objective support of aesthetic experience.

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NOTES

TO INTRODUCTION

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1. When we speak of the problems of aesthetics or aesthetic perception, then, we will mean the problems that present themselves on this level or from this point of view.
2. An almost singular example of a scholastic thinker who has not followed either Maritain or DeWulf in his approach to aesthetics is Edgar DeBruyne. See, for example, his *Esquisse d'un philosophie de l'art* (Bruxelles, 1930). The purpose of this work, however, excludes it from a detailed and formal consideration in our essay, for M. DeBruyne remarks: "Notre but est avant tout de donner une synthèse des principes qui chez tous les hommes et dans n'importe quelles circonstances, sont à la base de la jouissance et de la création artistiques." p. 8. Léon Wencelius develops in detail the diverse trends in Scholastic aesthetics in his work, *La Philosophie de l'art chez les néo-scholastiques de langue française.* (Paris: Alcan, 1932).

TO CHAPTER ONE

1. "Et il est facile d'en faire saisir tout de suite la spécificité et l'originalité en comparant les sensations esthéthiques les plus élémentaires aux sensations perceptives de l'ordre commun, c'est-à-dire adaptif, L'irréducibilité des premières aux secondes se révèle dés l'abord à quelques caractères frappant." *Traité de Psychologie Générale,* Vol. II*, p. 202. Paris: PUF, 1946.
2. "Emotion esthétique — un certain état sui generis, analogue au plaisir, à l'agrément, au sentiment moral, mais qui ne se confond avec aucun de ceux-ci." *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* by André Lalande. Paris: PUF, 5th edition, 1947. Baldwin, also, in the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,* New York: Macmillan, 1901, specifies aesthetics in the same fashion as Lalande. See the rubric "Aesthetics."

3. "L'art . . . jaillit de toute forme d'activité. . . . Mais à chacune il ajoute et toutes il les compose en un ensemble irreductible et nouveau. C'est assez dire qu'il consiste en une forme originale d'activité, qui oriente des activités subalternes et les fait conspirer à une oeuvre imprevue. Ce n'est pas assez de dire que s'exerce en lui la totalité de la personne humaine, ce qui est le cas de toutes les oeuvres spirituelles." George Dumas, *Nouveau Traité de Psychologie,* Tome VI, Fasc. 2, "Les Sentiments Esthétiques et l'art" by Henri Delacroix, p. 253. Paris: Alcan, 1939.
4. Jacques Maritain remarks that the present moment should prove especially propitious for an examination of the experience of artists by philosophers, in view of the acute self-consciousness of the artists during the past century. Cf. "De la Connaissance poétique" in *Situation de la Poésie,* pp. 80 ff.
5. DeWulf, in his book *Art et Beauté,* has taken pains to point this out. "Les diverses critiques artistiques, l'histoire de l'art et les disciplines qui s'y rapportent sont une préparation à la philosophie de l'art et lui fournissent ses materiaux. . . . Les philosophes qui sont demeurés étrangers aux choses de l'art n'ont construit que des esthétiques factices et à priori." pp. 22-3.
6. It would be stressing the all-too-obvious to insist further upon this point. It is particularly with reference to aesthetics that Maritain reiterates this fact: "Le devoir d'état d'un philosophe n'est-il pas de se tenir dans le ciel métaphysique, seul azur qui ne passe pas, d'ou il voit à envers les nuées changeantes et les diversités de l'atmosphère des plaines? . . . A un travail philosophique il suffit au contraire d'une information limitée à l'essentiel, aux exemples les plus accessibles et les plus significatifs." *Frontières de la Poésie et Autres Essais,* pp. 3 and 5. We understand these remarks as referring to the general orientation of philosophy toward aesthetics and not necessarily as rigid theory or a rule of procedure.
7. The above appeal to experience and the testimony of consciousness to show the relation between common aesthetic experience and artistic creation is sufficiently general to be valid regardless of the reason one might attribute to the very fact of the artist's expression of his experience. The elucidation of the reason for this expression would further specify the exact relation between these two experiences.
8. Georges Mottier in *Art et Conscience,* pp. 18-19 (Genève: Editions de Mont-Blanc, 1944) remarks on this point: "Jamais l'artiste lui-même n'arrive à contempler dans sa totalité l'éblouissant spectacle qui s'ordonne autour de nous et en nous, car jamais il n'arrive à rompre tous les liens dont l'intérêt charge l'homme. . . . La person-

nalité de l'artiste, même parvenue à son plus vaste épanouissement, ne saurait soustraire que l'une de ses faces à l'esclavage dans lequel la necessité biologique nous maintient. Il lui est impossible de disposer librement de plus d'un de ses sens pour découvrir les qualités nouvelles qui, de chaque lieu comme de chaque instant, jaillissent à profusion." Cf. also Bergson, *Le Rire,* pp. 118-19. Paris: PUF, 67th edition, 1946.

9. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Unitate Intellectus,* C 3, where he speaks of this particular characteristic of the rational soul that facts impose upon us. One of the cognitional powers of the soul is more extensive in its operation and its extent than the soul itself viewed simply informing the whole organism.
10. "C'est que cette activité (sensation) est essentiellement subordonnée; nullepart elle ne revêt une valeur finale. Dans l'homme, le psychisme est, partiellement du moins, ordonné à l'acquisition des données sensibles sur lesquelles l'intellect travaillera; chez l'animal, il n'existe qu'en vue de fins biologiques. L'ordre du sensible ne jouit donc pas d'une autonomie parfaite et ce serait une méthode décevante que de le juger en l'isolant de l'activité du sujet total; la vie sensitive est un entre-deux, qui n'est intelligible que par son rapport aux types d'activité entre lesquels elle se situe." Joseph de Finance, *Etre et Agir,* pp. 265-6. Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils, 1945. Cf. also Saint Thomas, *Summ. Theol.,* II-II, p clxvii, a 2, where he points out the double role of sense knowledge in man, one as an instrument of the organism as related to its vital functions and the other as the instrument of the intellectual activities of man. An adequate consideration of sensation demands that both of these functions be considered. "Respondeo dicendum quod cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo: uno enim modo tam in hominibus quam in aliis animalibus ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem; quia per hujusmodi cognitionem homines et alia animalia vitant nociva, et conquirunt ea quae sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem; alio modo specialiter in homine ordinatur ad cognitionem intellectivam, vel speculativam, vel practivam."
11. A.-D. Sertillanges, *La Philosophie de Saint Thomas,* Vol. II, pp. 105 ff., "La Connaissance Sensible." Paris: Aubier, 1940.
12. See Saint Augustine, *De Libro Arbitro,* Lec. II, C. 4, No. 10: "Non enim aliter bestia moveret se, vel appetendo aliquid, vel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret; non ad sciendum, nam hoc rationis est, sed tantum ad movendum, quod non utique aliquo aliorum quinque sentit."
13. Feldman in *L'Esthétique française contemporaine,* pp. 19-32, gives a brief account of the theories of some of the more outstanding

physiological aestheticians: Spencer, Grant Allen, Guyau, Bray and Lalo. Paris: Alcan, 1936.

14. See, for example, Berkeley, *Alciphron,* III, 8.
15. If sense knowledge is understood here in its most proper and strict sense, then this comparison might seem to give little account of some aesthetic experience, such as reading a novel or assisting at the theater. We would only be considering, then, that joy which comes to the ear from the rhythm of the prose and the lines, from the language itself. However, taking a larger view, even the content of these two means of aesthetic experience is expressed and transmitted to us in a different manner than we use for the expression of abstract ideas. It is not the same thing to define justice and to portray it in a novel. Yet in the latter, however different the manner, something of justice is expressed and given. And it is this manner of expression, bound to the affective and the sensible, that here too patterns the aesthetic experience after the sensible rather than the abstract. Sir Philip Sidney in his *Defence of Poesie* points out at length, from the poet's point of view, these two manners of expression. (*Complete Works,* Vol. III, pp. 13 ff.) "Let but Sophocles bring you Ajax on the stage, killing and whipping sheepe and oxen, thinking them the Army of Greeks, with their Chieftaines Agamemnon, and Menelaus: and tell me if you have not a more familiar insight into Anger, then finding in the schoolmen his Genus and Difference. See whether the wisdom and temperance in Ulisses and Diomedes, valure in Achilles, friendship in Nisus and Euialus, even to an ignorant man carry not an apparent shining." (pp. 14-15) A remark of LeSenne also clarifies this point: "La littérature est l'art dont le langage est le moyen technique d'expression; elle se distingue de la science et de la philosophie, dès que les rapports entre les mots, les idées, ne sont plus considérés comme des rapports objectifs, mais comme des rapports qualitatifs, dont l'écrivain ou le dramaturge utilise la puissance de suggestion ou d'émotion." (*Introduction à la Philosophie,* pp. 317-8).
16. "On pourrait dire de tout art ce que Hegel dit de la poésie lyrique, qui ne vise pas à délivrer simplement l'esprit du sentiment qui l'oppresse, mais bien à l'affranchir dans la sphère même du sentiment." Dumas-Delacroix, op. cit., p. 225.
17. *Op. cit.,* pp. 202-5. If art dominates matter, it is on the same level with nature. "On a défini l'art homo additus naturae; c'est encore céder au dualisme; mieux vaut dire homo immixtus naturae." LeSenne, op. cit., p. 320. For LeSenne, too, art reaches the qualities of things in the sensible and in the individual: "Partout la science

remplace la qualité par les conditions qui en médiatisent l'émergence dans l'expérience, et encore en ne considérant de ces qualités que ces qualités que ce qu'elles ont de général ou de local. L'artiste au contraire veut les obtenir elles-mêmes dans leur actualité et leur interaction. . . . Il est en effet impossible de couper entre la qualité et la sensibilité. Penser la qualité, comme le savant, c'est en sortir, mais aussi sortir de soi ou plutôt de l'intimaté de soi; éprouver la qualité (as the artist) c'est s'y faire ramener, y rentrer par introversion. Pp. 317-18.

18. Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight; but there is a beauty for the hearing too, as in certain combinations of words and in all kinds of music, for melodies and cadences are beautiful. . . . What, then, is it that gives comeliness to material forms and draws the ear to the sweetness perceived in sounds? . . . . What is it that attracts the eyes of those to whom a beautiful object is presented, and calls them, lures them, towards it, and fills them with joy at the sight?" *Enneads,* I-vi-1. Mackenna Translation. Boston: Charles T. Branford Company, n.d.
19. "Remarquons toutefois que bien qu'elle soit avant tout spirituelle, cette expérience demeurs en connexion étroite avec les puissances affectives sensibles, elle s'étend en elles, per modum diffusionis. Elle ne s'exprime et s'active qu'avec leur concours." *Op. cit.,* pp. 144-5: *Le Poète et la Connaissance Poétique.*
20. "Le poète humain ne conçoit véritablement sa beauté que dans et à travers la matière; d'ou cette excitation primordiale de facultés sensibles, cette commotion de la base, dont parle Claudel." *Op. cit.,* p. 236.
21. "La complètude de l'intelligence en face du beau satisfait par lè même la volonté et secondairement les puissances sensibles, parce qu'il est impossible de disjoindre en nous le sensible du spirituel. Ceci est d'autant plus compréhensible que les beautés saisies par le poète ou l'esthète sur cette terre sont toujours plongées elles-mêmes dans le sensible et invicérées en lui." *Op. cit.,* p. 235.
22. *Traité de Philosophie,* Vol. II, p. 121. Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, 1944.
23. *Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, pp. 627 ff. London: Williams and Norgate, 1872.
24. *Positions et Propositions,* Vol. I, p. 97. Paris: Gallimard, 1928.
25. *The Sense of Beauty,* p. 77. New York: Scribners and Sons, 1896.
26. *Ibid.,* p. 78.
27. "Quelque élément sensuel est indispensable à l'art, qui apparait même dans le plus intellectuel de tous." *Vocabulaire Esthétique,* p. 43. Paris: Fontaine, 1946.

28. Dumas-Delacroix, op. cit., pp. 253-4.
29. This problem of the limitation of aesthetic experience to certain senses is mostly of philosophical interest and it not of great interest to artists themselves. For discussions of the aesthetic and a-aesthetic senses, confer as typical: Caillois, *Op. cit.,* pp. 44-5; Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* I-II, p xxvii, a 3; Pradines, op. cit., pp. 208-13; Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,* pp. 235-6; Santayana, op. cit., pp. 65-76.
30. See Bergson, op. cit., pp. 115 and 120.
31. *Introduction à la Philosophie,* pp. 318-26.
32. Sympathy, for Feldman, is what gives sensation its aesthetic value. *Op. cit.,* p. 26. The object of aesthetics is experienced as lived rather than as known in itself or as classified and ordered, remarks Challaye, *Esthétique,* p. 61.
33. Here there is no question of evaluating the Einfühlung theory as introduced into aesthetics by Vokelt and Lipps. The Einfühlung theory is an attempt to explain a fact of aesthetic experience. It is the fact that has value here, the fact observed by the German aestheticians, that in the structure of aesthetic experience there is a note which can be described as a lived emotion or a sympathetic union with the object.
34. Pp. 42. London: A. Zwemmer, 1945.
35. *Ibid.,* pp. 44-5.
36. *Ibid.,* p. 45.
37. The traditional distinction between the *objectum formale commune* and the *objectum formale proprium* of our intellect, based on the distinction between the whatness and the being of things, does not affect the above analysis of intellectual knowledge in its relation to sense knowledge. For the *objectum commune* and the *objectum proprium* are but two moments of the same intellectual possession of being as realized with reference to the senses.
38. "Non seulement le sens n'atteint pas la quiddité, la forme substantielle, la ratio entis, mais il ne saisit même pas la nature propre des qualités qui l'affectent. Son domaine n'est pas l'être, mais le paraître, l'objet dans son agir au dehors. Mais cet agir procède de l'être et le manifeste, et ainsi l'être est donné, dans l'acte de sentir, sous les espèces de la passivité, et de l'extraposition spatiale, qui attestent, par leur contraste avec l'unité et la spontanéité de la conscience, la présence de l'objet. Seulement, cette présence reste voilée. Empêché, par la matière de reflechir parfaitement sur soi, le sens est incapable de connaître sa verité." de Finance, *Etre et Agir,* p. 266.

39. Saint Thomas, *Summa Theol.,* I, q lvii, a 1, ad 2; I q lxxviii, a 3, *Contra Gentiles,* IV, c 11.
40. "On ne peut cependant suspecter les sens, dont le role est de nous adapter aux choses, de s'être construits en se fermant systématiquement à leur réalité. Assurément, ils rendent cette réalité relative à notre action. Mais la relativité d'une connaissance n'en ruine pour autant l'objectivité, si le centre de référence est stable et n'a rien d'arbitraire. Or, tel est bien le cas pour la connaissance sensible. Si l'on admet que la nature et l'homme ont été créés (de quelques manière) l'un pour l'autre, en tournant toutes choses à lui, l'homme pratique, le 'profane', retrouve le sens même de la création." Pradines, *op. cit.,* pp. 314-5.
41. *The Meaning and Purpose of Art,* p. 46.
42. *Ibid.,* p. 52.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 53.
44. *Le Rire,* pp. 115-19.
45. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,* pp. 217 and 222. *The World as Will and Idea,* pp. 238-9 and p. 243 (Holdone and Kemp translation).
46. This absolute position which we have attributed to the intellect here must not be understood too absolutely. It must be understood with reference to the time and space world which is the terminus a quo of its operations and with reference to the subject, in so far as it is bound to the conditions of the material world. The transcendence of the intellect from this point of view in no way prejudices the fact that it in turn is a function of the human person. Rather, this is the reason for its transcendence. Being the typical function of a subject with a transcendent value, by its very nature it must share this transcendence and independence.
47. "Dans l'homme le psychisme est, partiellement du moins, ordonné à l'acquisition des données sensibles sur lesquelles l'intellect travaillera; chez l'animal il n'existe qu'en vue de fins biologiques. L'ordre du sensible ne jouit donc pas d'une autonomie parfaite et ce serait une methode décevante que de la juger en l'isolant de l'activité du sujet total." de Finance, *Op. cit.,* p. 265. The same thought is expressed by Marc, *Psychologie Refléxive,* Vol. I, p. 158. With reference to the biological value of sensation in Saint Thomas, see *De Sensu et Sensato,* L. 2, 21-25.
48. We have pointed out above how, despite this subjective characteristic of sense knowledge, the objective value is retained. The word "subjective" need not be understood in a pejorative sense at all.

49. One might note, too, how in the common, non-technical language the word "play" serves to express certain aesthetic activities: A play is presented at the theater. A man plays a musical instrument. The play of the imagination.
50. *Encyclopédie française,* 16.04.2.
51. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Psychology,* Vol. II, p. 632.
52. *Ibid.,* p. 627.
53. *Ibid.,* p. 634.
54. Edition of Barni, Paris, 1846: pp. 78 ff.
55. "La sensualité ne devient esthétique qu'en retranchant et en ajoutant à soi-même . . . il faut qu'elle se dépouille de sa valeur biologique, de sa signification vitale." *Op. cit.,* p. 254.

TO CHAPTER TWO

1. "Cette nouvelle édition reproduit, sans changements importants, le texte de la première." *Art et Beauté,* p. 5.
2. P. 10.
3. ". . . ce délicieux frémissement qui se produit en nous au contact de l'oeuvre d'art et dont plus loin nous étudierons la nature." p. 10.
4. A philosophy of art "a pour objet l'étude des facteurs qui dans toute oeuvre constituent la valeur de beauté." p. 17. In view of this definition we might expect a complete consideration of the impression of the work of art upon the subject, for the impression of the work enters into the very definition of beauty for M. DeWulf. Cf. p. 7. It might be pointed out here, too, that what DeWulf will say about the perception and enjoyment of a work of art is to be considered as common to both artist and the man who simply enjoys a work without producing a work of art. p. 10.
5. "Comme tous les fonctions de l'être conscient, intellectualistes et autres, contribuent à la prise de possession de l'oeuvre d'art, le facteur intellectif ne suffit pas à expliquer l'unisson harmonieux de l'impression artistique. D'autre part, la beauté n'est pas un pur attribut objectif, une simple manière d'être de l'oeuvre d'art, car cet attribut, cette manière d'être sont étroitement dependants de l'événement psychologique." p. 7.
6. ". . . absorbant et saturant, de toutes les activités de l'être conscient: sens, imagination, intelligence, émotions, amours, toutes les énergies de l'être humain viennent converger et se fondre dans une sorte d'intuition, et l'âme est plongée dans une ivresse à nulle autre comparable." p. 10.

7. "Cette prise de possession est *spontanée et directe;* elle ne comporte pas de *jugement réfléchi* sur la valeur de l'oeuvre." p. 10.
8. "Quand donc, moyennant quelles conditions, une oeuvre ordonnée se recouvre-t-elle du manteau royal de la beauté? Nous repondrons: lorsqu'elle sera susceptible de provoquer une impression puissante sur le sujet qui prend contact avec elle; lorsqu'elle parlera haut et clair à ses sens, à son imagination, à son intelligence; lorsque tous ses éléments appelleront et stimuleront ce plaisir de contempler qui constitue le fin régal artistique." p. 62.
9. P. 62.
10. Ce qu'il y a de plus élevé et de plus ravissant dans l'art, l'homme le tire du lui-même." p. 36.
11. P. 36.
12. P. 37.
13. "Dans l'enfance de l'art comme dans sa maturité, l'homme se surajoute à la nature, à la race en au milieu, homo additus naturae: même avant de l'extérioriser, l'artiste marque sa conception du sceau de sa personalité. L'aspect représentatif — intellectualiste — de l'idéal ou de la conception artistique, sur lequel nous nous sommes arrêtés, en constitue l'élement fondamental, mais non unique. Car la représentation suscite des amours et des enthousiasmes, provoque des émotions et des sentiments profonds, si bien que l'artiste est le premier à jouir de son oeuvre, alors que celle-ci est encore emprisonnée dans son enveloppe psychique: il en jouit anticipativement." p. 40.
14. "On pourrait ajouter que, si la beauté objective est faite d'ordre, c'est de l'intelligence seule que sa perception relève, et dès lors, sans l'entrée en scène de l'intelligence, point d'impression artistique. C'est au moment où je perçois une parcelle de l'ordre repandu dans la nature que celle-ci revèle sa beauté; et l'impression esthétique ne se distingue pas autrement de l'impression de bienfaissance." p. 97.
15. "Tous les efforts artistiques visent à faciliter le travail de contemplation." p. 63
16. ". . . lorsque tous ses éléments appeleront et stimuleront ce plaisir de contempler qui constitute le fin régal artistique." p. 62.
17. "L'ordre artistique est redevable de sa beauté à l'éclat dont il se pare, et grâce auquel il provoque la jouissance contemplative du sujet qu'il imprègne." p. 79.
18. "De quelle qualité est cet amour de l'oeuvre d'art?" p. 105.
19. "Il n'est pas fait de convoitise et ne s'inspire pas de l'utilité de l'objet. Amour du beau et amour de l'utile ne se confondent pas." p. 105.

20. "L'affamé aime les mets qu-on lui sert, à cause du bien qu'ils lui procurent; l'ouvrier aime un bon outil à cause des services qu'il lui rend; le propriétaire qui convoite un champ contigu à son bien trouve de la jouissance à s'arrondir. Dans tous ces cas, l'objet est aimé d'un amour d'utilité, et celle-ci ne va pas sans une possession plus ou moins exclusive, au profit de celui qui en est le bénéficiaire. Rien de semblable dans l'amour de l'oeuvre d'art." p. 105.
21. "C'est le désintéressement de l'émotion d'art qui lui confère sa pureté, sa noblesse, et voila ce qui explique le calme et la sérénité que l'oeuvre d'art engendre, le respect qu'elle inspire, la vénération dont on l'entoure. Elle possède une valeur sedative parce qu'elle est soustraite aux tyrannies de l'utile." p. 107.
22. P. 36 and p. 40.
23. P. 79.
24. ". . . est plongée dans une ivresse à nulle autre comparable." p. 10.
25. ". . . ravissement qui met l'âme en fête et qui n'est à nul autre comparable." p. 103.
26. P. 79.
27. "C'est un amour de pure contemplation. Nous aimons l'oeuvre pour la contempler." p. 110.
28. "Le bien poursuivi est un bien de contemplation." p. 111.
29. "C'est le désintéressment de l'émotion d'art qui lui confère sa pureté, sa noblesse, et voilà ce qui explique le calme et la sérénité qui l'oeuvre d'art engendre." p. 107.
30. ". . . union sereine et profonde qui remue l'âme sans l'agiter, impose silence à la cupidité des passions et fait vivre à l'âme les heures le plus exquises de la vie." p. 111.
31. ". . . est captivée, séduite dans le plus intime et le meilleur d'elle-même p. 82.
32. Cf. Pradines, *op. cit.,* pp. 242-8.
33. Perception d'art, èmotion d'art faite d'amour et accompagnée de plaisir, ce sont là, je le sais, des moments d'une même réalité psychologique. Car toute se compénètre dans l'impression quand la beauté nous saisit." DeWulf, *op. cit.,* pp. 82-3.
34. "La jouissance d'art n'est pas un phénomène accessoire qui se déroule parallélement à la perception de l'oeuvre: les deux sont partie integrante d'un phénomène unique, qui est l'impression, et la constituent au même titre." p. 113.
35. "La perception d'art se double d'un état affectif qu'on appelle communément émotion d'art, ou sentiment artistique, ravissement. . . ." p. 103.

36. "Sens, imagination, intelligence, émotions, amours, toutes les énergies de l'être humain viennent converger et se fondre dans une sorte d'intuition." p. 10.
37. Pp. 81-98.
38. P. 10.
39. "Il ne faudrait pas considérer cette triple activité perceptrice comme une sorte de mosaïque d'états conscients. Elle constitue un tout harmonieux, un ensemble contemplatif et aboutit à une action unique." p. 98.
40. DeWulf is making a reference here to the painting of Raphaël, The Ansedei Madonna.
41. Notre perception n'est pas faite de trois actes distincts et superposés: le premier dans lequel nous voyons des formes et des couleurs, le second ou l'imagination accuse les reliefs de la figure, la profondeur des yeux, la perspective de la draperie sur laquelle se détachent le corps de la vierge (40) et ceux personnages qui la contemplent, le troisième enfin, grâce auquel nous saisissons dans ces contours les idées de jeunesse, de grâce, de gravité, de reconnaissance." p. 99.
42. ". . . étroite union de la sensation et du concept dans un acte de contemplation unique?" p. 101.
43. P. 98.
44. P. 85.
45. P. 85.
46. "Aussi bien les peintres, les dessinateurs, les sculpteurs, sont des types de visuels, leurs yeux jouissent de nuances, de couleurs, de détails, de formes, de délicatesses, de reliefs que des profanes ne perçoivent pas; les musciens sont tous des types d'auditifs." pp. 85-6.
47. "Tout artiste est par certains côtés un sensuel, qui obéit à l'excitation extérieure, comme la harpe éolienne au vent." p. 86.
48. "La fête des sens extérieurs n'est que le prélude de la perception d'art — prélude obligatoire mais insuffisant." p. 87.
49. "Au rôle perceptif des sensations visuelles et auditives s'ajoute celui de l'imagination qui les complète et les intensifie." p. 87.
50. P. 87.
51. Sa fonction principale dans la perception d'art est d'intensifier les déssins, les formes et les sons. On a pu comparer son pouvoir de grossir les choses au courant électrique qui traverse les ampoules d'éclairage: le fil de platine est forme de minces spirales — mais, dés que le contact leur donne l'incandescence, elles s'épaississent à la vue." p. 88.

52. "L'artiste se livera à des mutilations voulues de l'ordre étalé dans son oeuvre, car il sait bien que pour intéresser le spectateur ou l'auditeur il faut l'associer à l'activité créatrice; il faut l'obliger à parfaire par ses sens, par son imagination, par son intelligence, des lacunes intentionnellement établies dans l'oeuvre et à cet effet amorcer certains éléments, en suggérer d'autres." p. 56.
53. Pp. 66-8.
54. "La perception d'art prend naissance dans ces sensations visuelles et auditives dont les données sont completées et intensifiées par l'imagination; c'est dans ces données concrètes que l'intelligence saisit l'idée ou les idées que l'artiste y a déposées." p. 98.
55. P. 89.
56. P. 89.
57. ". . . qui . . . nous met en contact avec l'ideal que l'artiste a déposé dans l'oeuvre." p. 88.
58. "Or, le rappel d'une fome architecturale, de ses succédanés, des motifs qui lui sont apparentés fournit à l'esprit des materiaux *dont il abstrait cette forme.*" p. 92.
59. "Ce sont là réalités qui parlent à la faculté abstractive, à l'intelligence. Ce langage, les sensations ne le comprennent pas ou le comprennent autrement: entre la sensation concrète et la pensée abstraite, il y a une différence de nature que nous n'avons pas à démontrer ici." pp. 89-90.
60. P. 93.
61. "L'abstraction est une fonction primordiale de l'esprit par laquelle nous envisageons n'importe quel élément de réalité, corporel ou incorporel, physique ou moral, à part de toutes les conditions de particularité dont il est enveloppé." p. 93.
62. "Or, l'artiste n'a-t-il pas ce même pouvoir de créer diverses images d'un même type, de représenter le chene ou l'homme sous des formes variées et nettement individualisées, de réaliser un tout concret ou l'élément intelligible est intimmement soudé aux dessins et aux sons, conformément à l'idéal qui préside à toute exécution artistique?" p. 91.
63. "On comprend dès lors que dans l'oeuvre d'art l'individuel et l'abstrait, bien loin de s'exclure, coexistent, ou plutôt se fusionnent." p. 92.
64. "Spontanément l'intelligence céde à l'oeuvre, elle subit sa domination, elle s'y complaît à tel point qu'elle s'oublie elle-même et que le processus de son activité lui échappe." p. 100.
65. P. 99.

66. "Nous contemplons le contenu de nos idées — les notions de mère animante et heureuse — dans le vêtement des formes sensibles ou elles sont enveloppées." p. 99.
67. Pp. 99-100.
68. Pp. 94-6.
69. Pp. 97-8.
70. P. 62.
71. P. 97.
72. "Quand l'homme perçoit quelque parcelle de cet ordre, quand il saisit dans un être ou un groupe d'êtres les voies éclatantes par lesquelles la nature réalise la variété dans l'unité, il jouit de sa valeur esthétique." p. 156.
73. P. 144.
74. "Dans la nature comme dans l'art l'ordre est beau qu'il est puissamment rendu." p. 159.
75. "Plus brièvement, l'ordre artistique est un ordre puissamment exprimé, rendu éclatant." p. 62.
76. "Mais l'ordre est puissamment exprimé: cela veut dire que l'artiste se préoccupe sans cesse d'adapter l'ordre réalisé au travail de vive contemplation qu'il doit susciter. Plus cette adaptation est parfaite, plus l'oeuvre est belle." p. 63.
77. ". . . sera susceptible de provoquer une impression puissante sur le sujet qui prend contact avec elle; lorsqu'elle parlera haut et clair à ses sens, à son imagination, à son intelligence." p. 62.
78. Pp. 144 ff.
79. See above, p. 36.
80. DeWulf, pp. 98-99.
81. P. 99.
82. Pp. 97-8.
83. P. 99.
84. P. 99.
85. P. 85.
86. Pp. 99-100.
87. "Nous appelons beau précisément ce qui nous ravit, et nous n'en reconnaissons point d'autre critère. Le plaisir même fait ici partie de l'essence du sentiment esthétique." Pradines, *op. cit.*, II*, p. 269.
88. DeWulf, pp. 105-7.
89. "Rien dans son activité ne ressemble au travail de décomposition qui est le propre du savent." p. 100.
90. P. 100.
91. P. 62.
92. Pp. 85-6.

93. Cf. Aristotle, *II Posteriorum Analyticorum,* in finem. Also St. Thomas, commentary on same, Lectio 20.
94. Pp. 82-3; 103; 113.
95. Pp. 10; 103.
96. Pp. 79; 107; 111.
97. "J'y trouve ces deux facteurs; un élan d'amour vers l'oeuvre perçue —un frisson de plaisir dont cet élan d'amour s'accompagne." p. 104.
98. P. 105.
99. P. 105.
100. Pp. 106-7.
101. "Le plaisir de l'utile . . . est rivé à la possession materielle de la chose, c'est le id quod placet . . . tandis que le plaisir du beau découle d'une simple connaissance de la chose, id cujus apprehensio placet." p. 107.
102. P. 107.
103. P. 108.
104. "La certitude, par contre, amène la sécurité; nous aimons le vrai parce qu'il nous renseigne sur le réel, en nous donnant conscience de l'accord de nos pensées, de nos jugements, de nos constructions scientifiques avec la réalité." p. 108.
105. "Faut-il en dire autant du beau? Non. Quand nous nous portons vers l'oeuvre d'art, nous ne voulons pas nous assurer de l'existence de lois qui régissent le réel et jouir de l'apaisement que cette assurance procure, et par ce côté l'amour de l'oeuvre d'art diffère du sentiment qui soutient le savant dans l'ardeur de ses recherches scientifiques." p. 108.
106. "L'amour d'art a pour objet direct l'oeuvre aimée et non le sujet aimant." p. 109.
107. "C'est un amour de pure contemplation. Nous aimons l'oeuvre pour la contempler. . . . Tout notre être est suspendu à l'affirmation puissante de l'idée. C'est intuition pure de l'abstrait dans le concret." p. 110.
108. P. 111.
109. P. 114.
110. "Il faut déterminer moyennant quelles conditions la dépense d'activité se teinte de plaisir et de douleur, et, comme nous savons d'autre part de quelles activités conscientes l'attitude d'art est faite, les applications au plaisir artistique s'offriront d'elles-mêmes. Ces conditions peuvent être formulées en lois . . . loi de durée, loi d'intensité, loi d'harmonie." p. 115.

TO CHAPTER THREE

1. It is the latest edition that will be referred to in this essay: Paris: Louis Rouart et Fils, 3me édition, 1935.
2. *Réponse à Jean Cocteau,* Paris: Stock, 1926. *Frontières de la Poésie,* Paris: Louis Rouart et Fils, 1935. *Situation de la Poésie,* Paris: Désclee, 1938; (References here are to the Swiss reprint in which the paging is different).
3. "On pourrait donc, si l'on rassemblait et travaillait à nouveau les matériaux préparés par les scolastiques, en composer une riche et complète théorie de l'Art. Nous voudrions seulement indiquer ici quelques-uns des traits d'une telle théorie." As, pp. 2-3.
4. "L'intuition du beau artistique se tient ainsi à l'extrême opposé de l'abstraction du vrai scientifique." AS, p. 40.
5. "L'intelligence, alors, détournée de tout effort d'abstraction, jouit sans travail et sans discours." AS, p. 40.
6. "Si donc l'art manifeste ou exprime dans une matière un certain rayonnement de l'être, une certaine forme, une certaine âme, une certaine vérité . . . il n'en donne pas dans l'âme une expression conceptuelle et discursive. C'est ainsi qu'il suggère sans faire proprement connaître, et qu'il exprime ce que nos idées ne peuvent pas signifier." AS, p. 99.
7. "Est-il normal, en raison de la nature de l'intelligence, que la perception du beau s'accompagne de la présence ou de l'ébouche d'un concept, si confus soit-il, et qu'elle suggère des idées, néanmoins ce n'est pas là le constitutif formel; la splendeur elle-même ou la lumière de la forme brilliant dans l'objet beau n'est pas presentée à l'esprit par un concept ou par une idée, mais bien par l'objet sensible saisi intuitivement et en qui passe, comme par une cause instrumentale, cette lumière d'une forme." AS, pp. 210-11.
8. "Cette saisie d'une réalité intelligible immédiatement 'sensible au coeur,' et sans recours au concept comme moyen formel." AS, p. 213.
9. "On comprehend par là que l'intelligence ne songe pas . . . à abstraire du singulier sensible en la contemplation du beau." AS, p. 212.
10. *Situation,* p. 97.
11. "Voilà une connaissance bien différente de ce qu'on appelle couramment connaissance; une connaissance qui n'est pas exprimable en idées et en jugements, mais qui est plutôt expérience que connaissance, et expérience créatrice, car elle veut s'exprimer, et elle n'est exprimable que dans une oeuvre. Cette connaissance n'est préalable ni présupposée à l'activité créatrice, mais inviscérée dans celle-ci,

consubstantielle au mouvement vers l'oeuvre, et c'est là proprement ce que j'appelle *connaissance poétique.*" *Situation,* p. 106.

12. "De là les perplexités de la condition du poète. S'il entend les mots de passe et les secrets qui se balbutient dans les choses, s'il perçoit des réalités, des correspondances, des chiffres d'horreur ou de beauté d'une objectivité très certaine, s'il capte comme un sourcier les rayonnements des transcendantaux, ce n'est pas en dégageant cette objectivité pour elle-même, c'est en recevant tout cela dans les replis de son sentiment et de sa passion — non pas comme autre que lui, selon la loi du savior spéculatif, mais au contraire comme inséparable de lui, et à vrai dire comme lui-même; et c'est pour ainsi saisir obscurement son être à lui d'une connaissance qui n'aboutira qu'en étant créatrice, qui ne se conceptualisera que dans un ouvrage fait de ses mains. Se nourissant d'une intelligibilité liée, voilà pourquoi la connaissance de connaturalité affective, la connaissance par résonance dans la subjectivité, est par nature une connaissance poétique, ordonée de soi à un ouvrage de sons ou de couleurs, de formes ou de mots." *Frontières,* pp. 197-8. While it is evident that Maritain is concerned for the most part here with the privileged case of aesthetic experience, that of the artist whose knowledge results in a work of art, he gives reasons to believe in certain texts, that what he says need not necessarily and uniquely be limited to the artist. "Cette poésie qui n'est pas le privilège des poetes, ni même des autres artistes — elle peut aussi se trouver chez un garçon qui ne sait que regarder et dire a a a comme Jérémie, ou qui s'enivre d'elle jusqu'à l'égarement ou au suicide, sans avoir rien dit ni fait de toute sa vie." *Situation,* pp. 93-4.
13. "En premier lieu: la connaissance poétique est une connaissance par connaturalité affective du type operatif ou tendant à s'exprimer dans une oeuvre. Ce n'est pas une connaissance par mode de connaissance, c'est une connaissance par mode d'instinct ou d'inclination, par mode de résonance dans le sujet, et qui va à créer une oeuvre." *Situation,* p. 129.
14. "Mais ce qui n'est pas saisi par mode de quiddité, d'essence ou d'intelligibilité. . . . Si l'expérience poétique ne porte pas sur l'existence nue, en revanche son mode est tout existentiel. Appliquée au mode, à la manière de s'emparer du réel, aucune expression n'est trop fort pour écarter de l'intuition poétique les lois propres de l'appéhension conceptuelle des essences. Car, ainsi qu'on l'a vu plus haut, le saisi de l'expérience poétique est saisi comme non-conceptualisable. Ainsi c'est le mode de cette expérience qui est toute existentiel." *Situation,* p. 129.

15. "C'est dire avec les Anciens que la vérité de l'art se prend per ordinem et conformitatem ad regulas artis, et c'est dire que toute oeuvre d'art doit être logique. Là est sa vérité. Elle doit tremper dans la logique: non pas dans la pseudo-logique des idées claires, et non pas dans la logique de la connaissance et de la démonstration, mais dans la logique ouvrière, toujours mystérieure et déconcertante, celle de la structure du vivant, et de la géométrie intime de la nature." AS, pp. 84-5. The meaning of this logic of art as referred to here by Maritain can be clarified by referring to a passage of Maritain in *Réflexions sur l'intelligence,* p. 97 (Paris: Nouvelle Libraire Nationale, 1924): "On ne peut parler de la dialectique de la connaissance réelle qu'au sens ou l'on parle parfois de la logique de la morphologénèse animale ou végétale, c'est-à-dire au sens d'un progrès soumis à des lois dans les choses. La logique au sens propre signifie toute autre chose: un art de progresser dans les moyens intelligibles par lesquels une conclusion est rendue nécessitante pour l'esprit."
16. "Mais le beau connaturel à l'homme, c'est celui qui vient délecter l'intelligence par les sens et par leur intuition." AS, p. 37.
17. "Il importe toutefois de remarquer que dans le beau que nous avons appelé connaturel à l'homme, et qui est propre à l'art humain, cet éclat de la forme, si purement intelligible qu'il puisse être en lui-même, est saisi *dans le sensible et par le sensible, et* non pas séparement de lui." AS, p. 40.
18. AS, p. 40.
19. ". . . entrevoit . . . le spirituel . . . dans la chair et par la pointe même du sens que l'intelligence aiguise . . . trouve (le spirituel) à tous les carrefours du singulier et du contingent." *Frontières,* pp. 22-3.
20. *Situation,* pp. 136-7.
21. *Situation,* p. 155.
22. AS, pp. 96-7.
23. *Frontiéres,* pp. 22-3.
24. AS, pp. 102-3.
25. *Situation,* p. 97.
26. Il y a une analogie singulière entre les beaux-arts et la sagesse. Ils sont comme elle ordonnée à un objet qui dépasse l'homme et qui vaut par soi, et dont l'amplitude est sans limite, car la beauté est infinie comme l'être. . . . Ils sont désintéressés, désirés pour euxmêmes, vraiment nobles parce que leur oeuvre prise en soi n'est pas faite pour qu'on s'en serve comme d'un moyen, mais pour qu'on en jouisse comme d'une fin, étant un fruit véritable,

aliquid ultimum et delectabile. Toute leur valeur est spirituelle, et leur mode d'être est contemplatif." AS, pp. 55-6.

27. "L'oeuvre à laquelle travaillent les beaux-arts est ordonnée à la beauté; en tant que belle est une fin, un absolu, elle se suffit; et si en tant qu'oeuvre à faire elle est matérielle et enfermée dans un genre, en tant oue belle elle appartient au règne de l'esprit, et plonge dans la transcendance et dans l'infinité de l'être." AS. p. 54.
28. "Le poème sera à lui seul un univers se suffisant, sans nul besoin de signifier autre chose que lui." *Situation,* p. 94.
29. "Car si la contemplation n'est leur pas leur acte, comme elle est l'acte de la sagesse, néanmoins ils visent à produire une délectation intellectuelle, c'est-à-dire une sorte de contemplation, et ils supposent aussi chez l'artiste une sorte de contemplation." AS, p. 56.
30. *Frontières,* pp. 193-4.
31. ". . . à peine désignée à la conscience par un choc émotionnel et intellectuel à la fois, ou par une amorce de chant, qui avertit de sa présence mais qui ne l'exprime point." *Situation,* p. 130.
32. ". . . du même coup qu'une réalité de l'univers sera saisie par mode de connaturalité affective, dans une emotion intuitive ou tout ensemble l'univers et le sujet se révéleront au sujet comme en un rayon de ténebre." *Situation,* p. 146.
33. *Frontières,* p. 183-4.
34. "Le beau est ce qui donne la joie." "Si une chose exalte et délecte l'âme par là même qu'elle est donnée à son intuition, elle est bonne à appréhender, elle est belle." AS, pp. 35-6.
35. ". . . est moins une espèce de connaissance qu'une espèce de délectation . . . le beau est essentiellement délectable." AS, p. 41. Cf. also AS, p. 221.
36. AS, p. 41.
37. "Les beaux-arts visent à produire, par l'objet qu'ils font, la joie ou la délectation de l'intelligence moyennant l'intuition du sens." AS, p. 93.
38. "L'idée créatrice, elle, c'est surtout à vrai dire comme une émotion décisive qu'elle apparaît à la conscience, mais comme une émotion transverbérée d'intelligence . . . et si le ton affectif s'impose ici avant tout à notre connaissance de nous-même, en réalité dans cette émotion intelligenciée c'est l'invisible dard intentionnel de l'intuition qui importe principalement." *Frontières,* pp. 183-4. Also p. 195: ". . . l'émotion créatrice n'est pas matière mais forme de l'ouvrage, ce n'est pas une émotion-chose, c'est une émotion intuitive et intentionelle."
39. AS, p. 217.

40. "Sans doute toute beauté sensible suppose une certaine délectation de l'oeil lui-même ou de l'oreille ou de l'imagination; mais il n'y a beauté que si l'intelligence jouit aussi de quelque manière." AS, p. 39.
41. AS, pp. 35-6 and AS, p. 221.
42. "Intégrité, parce que l'intelligence aime l'ordre et aime l'unité, enfin et surtout éclat ou clarté, parce que l'intelligence aime la lumière de l'intelligibilité." AS, pp. 37-8.
43. AS, p. 216.
44. AS, p. 100.
45. AS, p. 255.
46. "L'émotion au sens ordinaire du mot, l'émotion biologique, le développement de passions et de sentiments autres que cette joie; elle est postérieure, sinon quant au temps, au moins quant à la nature des choses, à la perception du beau, et elle reste extrinsèque à ce qui constitue le plus formellement celle-ci." AS, p. 216.
47. "Pour entendre cela, représentons-nous que c'est l'intelligence et le sens ne faisant qu'un, ou, si l'on peut ainsi parler, le sens intelligencié, qui donne lieu dans le coeur à la joie aesthétique. On comprehend par là que l'intelligence ne songe pas — sinon après coup et réflexivement — à abstraire du singulier sensible en la contemplation duquel elle est fixée les raisons inteligible de sa joie." AS, p. 212.
48. "La part des sens la perception de la beauté est même rendue énorme chez nous, et à peu près indispensable du fait que notre intelligence n'est pas intuitive comme celle de l'ange; elle voit sans doute mais à condition d'abstraire et de discourir; seul la connaissance sensitive possède parfaitement chez l'homme l'intuitivité requise à la perception du beau." AS, p. 36-7.
49. "Le beau connaturel à l'homme, c'est celui qui vient délecter l'intelligence par les sens et par leur intuition." AS, p. 37.
50. "Il importe toutefois de remarquer que dans le beau que nous avons appelé connaturel à l'homme, et qui est propre à l'art humain, cet éclat de la forme, si purement intelligible qu'il puisse être en lui-même, est saisi *dans le sensible et par le sensible,* et non pas séparément de lui. L'intuition du beau artistique se tient ainsi à l'extrême opposé de l'abstraction du vrai scientifique. Car c'est par l'appréhension même du sens que la lumière de l'être vient ici pénétrer l'intelligence." AS, p. 40. See also *Situation,* p. 119, where Maritain speaks of the insufficiency of an explanation of aesthetic experience that is entirely on the side of intelligence.

51. "Cette divination du spirituel dans le sensible, et qui s'exprimera elle-même dans le sensible, c'est bien là ce que nous appelons poésie." Frontières, p. 22. Poetry here is synonomous with aesthetic experience. See too *Les Degrés du Savoir,* p. 5: Le poète "jette son coeur dans les choses comme un dard ou une fusée, voit par divination — dans le sensible même, impossible à en séparer — l'éclat d'une lumière spirituelle."
52. AS, p. 36.
53. AS, p. 36 and p. 39.
54. "Sans doute toute beauté sensible suppose une certaine délectation de l'oeil lui-même ou de l'oreille ou de l'imagination. . . . Une belle couleur rince l'oeil comme un parfum puissant dilate la narine; mais de ces deux formes ou qualités la couleur seule est dite belle, parce qu'étant reçue, au contraire du parfum, dans un sens capable de connaissance désintéressée, elle peut être, même par son éclat purement sensible, un objet de joie pour l'intelligence." AS, p. 39. Also AS, p. 209. Maritain gives no further explanation on this point.
55. AS, p. 209.
56. "La splendeur elle-même ou la lumière de la forme brilliant dans l'objet beau n'est pas présentée à l'esprit par un concept ou par une idée, mais bien par l'objet sensible saisi intuitivement et en qui passe, comme par une cause instrumentale, cette lumière d'une forme." AS, p. 211.
57. AS, p. 212.
58. "On dit que l'oeil et l'oreille s'habituent à des rapports nouveaux. C'est bien plutôt l'intelligence qui les accepte, dès qu'elle a compris à quelle fin, et à quelle sorte de beauté, ils sont ordonnés, et qui se prépare ainsi à mieux jouir de l'oeuvre qui les comporte." AS, p. 214.
59. *Degrés du Savoir,* p. 5.
60. AS, pp. 224-6. AS, pp. 48-9.
61. AS, p. 40.
62. "La beauté est essentiellement objet d'intelligence, car ce qui connaît au sens plein du mot, c'est l'intelligence, qui seule est ouverte à l'infinité de l'être. Le lieu naturel de la beauté est le monde intelligible." AS, p. 36.
63. *Situation,* p. 97.
64. *Situation,* p. 113-4.
65. "Cela n'empêche pas que dans un autre sens, comme la philosophie première est appelée méta-physique, la poésie puisse être dite surnaturelle, en tant qu'elle est au-dessus non pas de tout l'ordre de la nature crée et créable, mais de la nature sensible et de toutes

les lois de l'univers matériel et que ses valeurs sont d'ordre transcendental." *Réponse à Jean Cocteau,* p. 23 footnote.

66. *Situation,* pp. 127-8.
67. ". . . les mots avec toute la charge de mensonge et d'à peu près, de connotations associatives parasites, qu'ils trainent avec eux, quitter les mots, ou créer des mots nouveaux, ou transsubstantier les anciens quitter le jeu ordinaire des idées et des concepts, de la vie rationelle, et sociale, et humaine, c'est entrer dans un monde sauvage ou il n'y a rien pour nous protéger, et finalement c'est quitter en quelque façon l'espéce humaine." *Situation,* pp. 96-7.
68. "Tout le logique et tout le rationnel et tout la savior acquis, ont été ramenés le source secrète de rafraichissement et de paix dont on nous parlait tout à l'heure, pour y être transfigurés et vivifiés, et portés, si je puis dire, à l'état créateur, parce qu'ils y sont devenus connaissance poétique. *Situation,* p. 124.
69. *Situation,* p. 94.
70. "L'idée créatrice comme telle est dans notre pensée un moment d'intellection tout à fait spirituel et simple qui par rapport à l'oeuvre est transcendant et illimité." *Degrés du Savoir,* p. 791.
71. *Situation,* p. 154.
72. *Situation,* p. 163.
73. "Du poète il faudrait dire; au principe de son mouvement créateur il connaît comme inconnue la communion des choses (entre elles et avec lui) dans les passages de l'esprit qui fait être . . . cette communication mystérieuse, ne disons pas que le poète echoue à la connaître, à la connaître comme connue, parce que selon l'ordre de la nature il ne cherche nullement à la saisir et tenir comme connue. Cachée dans l'inconscient spirituel, encore une fois son expérience est une connaissance qui n'est pour connaître, mais dès l'origine et dans son essence même, pour produire et créer." *Situation,* p. 158.
74. *Situation,* p. 130-1.
75. *Situation,* pp. 129-39.
76. *Situation,* pp. 104-13.
77. "Je veux dire par connaturalité à la réalité selon qu'elle est inviscérée à la subjectivité même en tant qu'existence intellectuellement productive, et selon qu'elle est atteinte dans sa consonance concrète et existentielle avec le sujet comme sujet. C'est la connaissance poétique." *Situation,* p. 133.
78. *Situation,* p. 154. We find the thing from which poetic knowledge took its departure in the work produced too. But this only because the knowledge of things is a necessary means for knowing ourselves and in poetic knowledge we know the thing and ourselves as one

and so necessarily express the world when we express ourselves. For Maritain the first law of expression is that the subject express himself, and our knowledge of things is as a sine qua non for the realization of this. Cf. *Situation,* pp. 144-9; *Frontières,* p. 198; *Situation,* pp. 104-13.

79. "C'est le soi de l'artiste en tant que substance secrète et personne en acte de communication spirituelle qui est le contenu de cette émotion formatrice." *Frontières,* p. 195.
80. *Frontières,* p. 198.
81. "A vrai dire vous n'avez pas la notion des choses, mais l'expérience d'elles en vous et de vous en elles. Elles ne deviennent pas éternelles en vous, c'est plutôt vous qui devenez visibles en elles." *Situation,* pp. 155-6.
82. AS, pp. 37-8.
83. *Ibid.*
84. AS, p. 221.
85. AS, p. 35.
86. AS, p. 39.
87. AS pp. 40-1.
88. AS, p. 41.
89. AS, p. 217.
90. AS, pp. 41-2.
91. AS, pp. 41-2.
92. AS, pp. 41-2.
93. AS, pp. 218-20.
94. AS, pp. 218-20.
95. AS, p. 220.
96. AS, p. 41.
97. AS, p. 220.
98. AS, p. 221. The ultimate reason for the delight of aesthetic enjoyment as here explained by Maritain can be reduced to the proportion between intellect as nature and the object and the recognition or apprehension of this fact by the intellect. In another text Maritain seems to imply that there is delight too because the intellect, rooted in the senses, is spared any effort of abstraction and so rejoices in the escape from this work of abstraction or discursive activity. "L'intelligence alors, détournée de tout effort d'abstraction, jouit sans travail et sans discours. Elle est dispensée de son labeur ordinaire, elle n'a pas à dégager un intelligibile de la matière ou il est enfoui, pour en parcourir pas à pas les divers attributs; comme le cerf à la source d'eau vive, elle n'a rien à faire qu'à boire, elle boit la clarté de l'être. Fixée dans l'intuition du sens, elle

est irradiée par une lumiére intelligible qui lui est donnée d'un coup, dans le sensible même ou elle resplendit, et qu'elle ne saisit pas sub ratione veri, mais plutôt sub ratione delectabilis, par l'heureuse mise et acte qu'elle lui procure et par la joie que s'ensuit dans l'appetit." AS, pp. 40-1.

99. ". . . dans la mesure où chez l'homme ils servent l'intelligence et pouvent eux-mêmes jouir en connaissant." AS, p. 36.
100. "Aussi bien le sens lui-même ne jouit-il des choses convenablement proportionnées que parce qu'il est lui-même mesure et proportion, et trouve alors en elles une similitude de sa nature." AS, p. 209.
101. AS, p. 36. AS, pp. 212-13.
102. AS, pp. 30-40.
103. AS, p. 100.
104. AS, p. 196.
105. AS, p. 216.
106. AS, p. 216.
107. "C'est à la métaphysique des anciens qu'il faut aller demander ce qu'ils pensaient du Beau, pour de là s'avancer à la rencontre de l'Art, et voir ce qu'il advient de la jonction de ces deux termes. . . . On pourrait, donc, si l'on rassemblait et travaillait à nouveau les matériaux préparés par les scolastiques, en composer une riche et complète théorie de L'Art." *Art et Scolastique,* pp. 2-3.
108. To speak of art as technic is not necessarily to understand it in the narrow sense of sheer physical aptitude or ability in making. Here is to be understood the concept of art as an intellectual habitus, concerned with making as opposed to doing. It is the concept as handed down by traditional philosophy, the intellectual habit of art as opposed to the intellectual habit of prudence. The making-intellect as habitus.
109. Here the term art will be used in the broad sense as embracing every aspect of aesthetic experience and not simply the realization of a work by the artist.
110. To avoid any equivocation it might be noted that the term "beauty of sensible things" is not to be equated with the expression "sensible beauty" in the sense that this latter would be proportioned only to the senses and would have no value outside the realm of the sense world. It can be understood as analagous to the expression "quidditas rei sensibilis" which signifies the proper object of the intellect as attained through material things, the essence of the material thing.
111. Pp. 81 ff.

112. "Scientia autem moralis, si sumatur practice est idem quod prudentia, et sic non pertinent ad habitus speculativas, sed practicas . . . si vero sumatur speculative, pro scientia ethica, quae tractat de natura virtutum, sic pertinet ad Philosophiam, et est pars illius, quia agit de anima ut est actus corporis, et consequenter de moralibus eius." Cursus Philosophicus, Logica II, p. 27, a 1. Vives, 1883. Paris. The term "philosophia" here, referring to a philosophy of nature, embraces both a Cosmology and a Psychology, according to the divisions of the philosophical disciplines in the thought of John of Saint Thomas. In this division the philosophy of man, including considerations of both material and spiritual aspects, simply falls under the philosophy of nature.
113. *Situation,* p. 163.
114. ". . . de toute sa pesanteur vitale va à produire." *Situation,* p. 106.
115. *Situation,* pp. 132-3.
116. "Une connaissance par connaturalité soit intellectuelle, soit affective, à la réalité comme non-conceptualisable et en même temps contemplée, autrement dit comme non-objectivable en notions et cependant comme terme d'union objective. C'est la connaissance de contemplation: qu'il s'agisse d'une contemplation naturelle atteignant, si possible, par une intellection supra ou para-conceptuelle une réalité transcendante, inexprimable de soi dans un verbo mental humain. . . ." "Une connaissance par connaturalité affective à la réalité comme non-conceptualisable parce qu'éveillant à elle-même les profondeurs créatrices du sujet, je veux dire par connaturalité à la réalité selon qu'elle est inviscérée à la subjectivité même en tant qu'existence intellectuellement productive, et selon qu'elle est atteinte dans sa consonance concrète est existentielle avec sujet comme sujet. C'est la connaissance poétique: radicalement factive ou opérative, puisque, inséparable de la productivité de l'esprit (du fait que la connaturalité qu'il éveille actue le sujet comme sujet, ou comme centre de vitalité productive et d'émanation spirituelle), et ne pouvant pas cependant déboucher dans un concept ad intra, elle ne peut déboucher que dans une oeuvre ad extra." *Situation,* pp. 132-3.
117. Darbellay's understanding of this point is as follows (*op. cit.,* p. 253): "En même temps qu'il se perçoit activé par l'expérience poétique, le poète crée. Son intuition de soi et des choses est créatrice. Le regard intellectuel s'inviscère dans la matière de l'expérience et se trouve conduit vers l'oeuvre, de telle sorte qu'il est absolument impossible de distinguer, même pour les besoins de l'analyse, deux mouvements en la connaissance poétique et de concevoir l'un comme antérieur — fût-ce d'une antériorté de nature

— à l'autre. La connaissance poétique est, en effet, l'expérience des êtres et de soi-même, elle est la vie qui se dégage au centre de la subjectivité poétique pour l'oeuvre."

118. *Situation,* p. 163.
119. There are other more cogent arguments as to the need of some terminative knowledge to give direction to the creative movement, especially if it results from the superabundance of the intellect, as Maritain holds. For the intellect produces a term from superabundance as a result of its contemplative activity.
120. *Situation,* p. 99.
121. *Situation,* p. 124.
122. *Situation,* p. 108.
123. *Frontières,* p. 195.
124. *Situation,* p. 163.
125. AS, pp. 55-6.
126. AS, pp. 55-6.
127. AS, pp. 55-6, 42, 37.
128. *Situation,* p. 94.
129. AS, 36, 40.
130. *Réponse,* p. 23.
131. *Situation,* pp. 127-8.
132. *Situation, pp.* 96-7.
133. *Situation,* p. 124.
134. AS, 37-40.
135. AS, 97.
136. AS, 209.
137. AS, 37-39.
138. AS, p. 211.
139. AS, p. 212. *Degrés du Savoir,* p. 5.
140. AS, p. 214.
141. Mercier, *Ontologie,* p. 547.
142. Cr. Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae,* Vol. I, pp. 460 ff.
143. "Dicunt enim instrumentum, ut instrumentaliter agat, praemovendum esse a principali agente. Praemotio autem instrumenti est intrinsica elevatio eius, quae in eo consistit, quod recipit in se prioritate naturae, antequam instrumentaliter agat, entitatem vialem, fluentem, quae est participatio transiens virtutis principalis agentis." Gredt, *op. cit.,* p. 460.
144. *Ibid.,* p. 461.
145. "Ergo secundum duplicem virtutem, quae est in instrumento, duplex est determinatio in effectu . . . aliquando illa dat ultimam determi-

nationem . . . quae non diversificatur nisi accidentaliter . . . accidentalem aliquam modificationem nanciscitur." Gredt, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 172.

146. AS, p. 100.
147. "La délectation du sens lui-même n'est requise dans l'art que ministerialiter." AS, p. 225.
148. "L'émotion au sens ordinaire du mot, l'émotion biologique, le développement de passions et de sentiments autres que cette joie intellectuelle, n'est ainsi qu'un effet — absolument normal — de cette joie: elle est postérieure, si non quant au temps, au moins quant à la nature des choses, à la perception du beau, et elle reste extrinsèque à ce qui constitue le plus formellement celle-ci." AS, p. 216.
149. *Ibid.*
150. Cf. Caillois, *Vocabulaire Esthétique,* pp. 14-15. Challaye, *op. cit.,* pp. 164-5, where he insists that the harmony of aesthetics must follow the kind of harmony that can exist between matter and spirit, between the sensible and intelligible. Gilson also in his *la Philosophie de St. Bonaventure,* pp. 288 ff. indicates the thought of Bonaventure concerning the harmony of the senses and the intellect.
151. *A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics,* pp. 276-7. London: Allen and Unwin, 1933.
152. "Seule la connaissance sensitive possède parfaitement chez l'homme l'intuitivité requise à la perception du beau." AS, p. 37.
153. "Le beau connaturel . . . qui vient délecter même de sens. . . ." AS, p. 37.
154. "Par l'appréhension même du sens. . . ." AS, p. 40.
155. AS, pp. 210-12.
156. ". . . il capte comme un sourcier les rayonnements des transcendentaux." *Frontières,* p. 197.
157. "Ainsi il perçoit dans les choses et délivre un signe, si infime qu'il soit de la spiritualité qu'elles detiennent." *Réponse,* p. 24.
158. "Cette divination du spirituel dans le sensible . . . c'est bien là ce que nous appelons poésie." *Frontières,* p. 22.
159. "La connaissance poétique, je veux dire à la connaissance de la réalité, et de l'intérieur des choses, ou de leurs envers, propre à la poésie ou à l'esprit de poésie." *Situation,* p. 97.
160. ". . . est apparentée au plus secret du concret, au plus intime des essences, quiddités, qualités, talités, haeccéités, ipseités dont regorge et rel et le singulier." *Situation,* p. 152.
161. *Situation,* p. 107. *Frontières,* pp. 22-3. *Rèponse,* p. 25.
162. *Situation,* p. 156, footnote.

TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Dumas-Delacroix, LeSenne, Jolivet, Bergson, Schopenhauer, Kant, Spencer, Schiller, Pradines, as already cited.
2. ". . . être consideré comme but dernier — et per consequent comme mobile originel — de l'action," *Etudes sur la Psychologie des Mystiques,* Tome I, p. 190. Bruges: Charles Beyaert, 1924.
3. "Ces deux points de vue se manifestent à la conscience empirique comme deux series progressives et corrélatives indefinement développables, dont la limite commune serait l'Etre absolu; comme deux tendances dont le terme commun, que se trahirait dans leur convergence, serait cependant hétérogène à chacune d'elles." *Ibid.,* p. 190.
4. Maréchal, *op. cit.,* Tome II, p. 435. Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1937.
5. "Puisque la sensation est 'acte sans matière mais dans les conditions de la matière,' que c'est un acte indivis, qui par ce double aspect est constitué comme un tout, il faut que sa source ne soit pas d'une autre structure qu'elle et qu'elle lui doive sa complexité. Cette source doit donc être complexe aussi, joindre en elle l'unité et la dualité de principes distincts mais corrélatifs, la conscience et l'étendue, l'âme et le corps. La sensation est l'acte des deux en tant qu'ils constituent un composé unique. Le moyen âge traduisait ainsi cette verité: sensatio est actus conjuncti." André Marc, *Psychologie Réflexive,* Tome I, pp. 157-8. Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle, 1948.
6. *Principles of Psychology,* p. 627.
7. "Or le fait précisément que la sensation est l'acte de tout l'être permet d'établir quel est son en-soi. Telle qu'elle nous est apparue, elle est une organisation de l'étendue par une conscience, son organisation par une âme, dont elle reçoit sa structure. Elle est donc vie au sens biologique du mot. Elle est l'acte d'un sentant parce qu'elle est l'acte d'un vivant et parce qu'en lui ce qui anime le sens, anime aussi le corps. L'être sensitif est encore un animal. De là suit le rôle de la sensation dans l'ensemble du système vital. Très légitimement Maurice Pradines introduit les perspectives biologiques dans les problèmes de la sensation. Les faits et le raisonnement y obligent. Or la vie s'entretient, se défend, se transmet. Le vivant ne se suffit pas à lui seul pour l'accomplissement de ces fonctions; il lui faut l'extérieur. Mais si la sensation, qui est en elle-même mouvement, implique dans le sujet sentant la locomotion et la possibilité de se déplacer, cette dernière faculté n'a d'autre signification

que de permettre ces fonctions d'entretien, de défense ou de transmission de la vie. Alors que le végétal trouve sur place sa nourriture et n'a pas à la chercher, l'animal ne l'a pas à sa disposition immédiate; force lui est de la quêter, de la chasser. Il n'est qu'en dépendance lointaine de son milieu. Mais cette chasse doit être dirigée. Elle le sera côté des choses par les signaux qu'elles lanceront sur leur position dans l'espace et sur leur rôle pour l'alimentation, du côté du chasseur par les appareils destinés à capter ces signaux. Ces signaux seront les qualités sensibles et ces appareils seront les sens et leurs organes, aussi le progrès en précision de la motricité est'il intimement lié au progrès de la sensibilité." Marc, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

8. *De Sensu et Sensato,* L. 2, No. 21.
9. *II-II,* q clxvii, a 2.
10. "Mais la matière humaine est vivante; elevons-nous d'un plan: le vivant reagit en tant que totalité. Et voilà que déjà, grâce à la reaction organique qui lui est commune avec la plante et l'animal, l'homme trouve toute sa multiplicité constitutive unifiée et orientée dans chacune de ses réactions sur le milieu extérieur: la réaction biologique humaine, comme celle de toute être vivant, superpose à l'unité infime de la qualité physique, simple élément d'une multiplicité diversifiée, une unité supérieure embrassant cette divérsification elle-même: l'unité d'un type à maintenir, c-est-à-dire, à perpétuellement réaliser." *Op. cit.,* p. 187.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 188.
12. "Mais nous admettons aussi qu'elle constitue, par les caractères formels de l'unité qu'elle suppose et de la réaction qu'elle amorce, une prémière émergence, sur le fond de la finalité organique, d'une finalité supérieure, individuelle et consciente. Volontiers nous dirions, comme M. Bergson, que la sensation n'a pas de raison d'être si elle n'est un commencement de liberté: en effet, dans la mesure ou la sensation s'évade de la pure quantité, l'action qu'elle prepare se degage de pur mecanisme." *Ibid.,* p. 188.
13. de Finance, *op. cit.,* p. 266.
14. Marc, *op. cit.,* pp. 157 ff.
15. *II Posterior Analytics,* 19. Oxford Translation.
16. *Analytica Posteriora, II,* lect 20. Saint Thomas makes the following remark concerning sensation in man with reference to its subordination to the intellectual faculty: "Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universalem naturam in particulari, non esset

possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis. *Ibid.*

17. "Toute entreprise de différenciation sensorielle par la vie est en réalité une entreprise de jeu. Il s'agit de 'jouer' en quelque sorte avec des états originellement fort sérieux, puisqu'ils sont des stimulations directes de nos activités de relation essentielles, appropriation et défense . . . il s'agit de jouer avec eux en les dégradant affectivement jusqu'à les mettre en état de nous figurer simplement, à distance de jeu, l'excitation." *Op. cit.,* II*, p. 208.
18. "Mais de loin en loin, par distraction, la nature suscite des âmes plus détachées de la vie. Je ne parle pas de ce détachement voulu, raisonné, systématique, qui est oeuvre de réflexion et de philosophie. Je parle d'un détachement naturel, inné à la structure du sens ou de la conscience. . . ." *Le Rire,* p. 118.
19. *Op. cit.,* p. 628.
20. "Nous venons de vérifier à diverses reprises que la question de l'attention n'était pas essentiellement distincte de celle de la conscience. En effet, la conscience nous est apparue comme un savior concentré, ramassé, sous l'action d'un dynamisme d'adaptation (cum scire), l'exercice d'une faculté de synthèse dont le but est d'insérer profondement notre activité dans le réel; et il est facile de voir que tous ces caractères définissent l'attention même. C'est donc l'attention qui semble créer la conscience." Pradines, *op. cit.,* I, p. 32.
21. "Il était impossible qu'une connaissance inaffective et distante à caractère imaginatif ne creât pas pour l'être vivant, jusqu'au sein de la perception, une tentation de distraction à l'égard de son propre objet." Pradines, *op. cit.,* II*, pp. 214-15.
22. "Il semble donc évident qu'attention et conscience, distraction et inconscience (ou subconscious) ont partie liée et qu'en passant de celles-ci à celles-là on passe seulement des effets à leurs causes ou du moins à un de leurs facteurs déterminants." Pradines, *op. cit.,* I, p. 33.
23. ". . . arrache l'animal à lui-même et dissout son activité dans l'inconscience." Pradines, *op. cit.,* II*, p. 21.
24. Spencer, *op. cit.,* p. 633.
25. Saint Thomas in the *Summa Theologica,* I, q lxxviii, a 4, points out the double aspect of human sensation, from one point of view coinciding with the sensation of the animal and from another differing.
26. Saint Thomas' exposition of this argument is found in *De Unitate Intellectus,* I, 17: "Cujus quidem consequentiae ratio talis est, quia unumquodque operatur in quantum est ens, eo igitur modo unicuique competit operari quo sibi convenit esse. Formae igitur quae nullam

operationem habent sine conjunctione suae materiae, ipsae non operantur, sed compositum est quod operatur per formam. Unde hujusmodi formae ipsae quidem proprie loquendo non sunt, sed eis aliquid est. Sicut enim calor non calefacit, sed calidem; ita etiam calor non est proprie loquendo, sed calidem est per calorem. Propter quod Aristoteles dicit in XI Metaph. quod de accidentibus non vere dicitur quod sunt entia, sed magis quod sunt entis. Et similis ratio est de formis substantialibus quae nullam operationem habent absque conjunctione suae materiae, hoc excepto quod hujusmodi formae sunt principium essendi substantialiter. Forma igitur quae operationem habet secundum aliquam sui potentiam vel virtutem absque communicatione suae materiae, ipsa est quae habet esse; nec est per esse compositi tantum, sicut aliae formae, sed magis compositum est per esse ejus." (Edition of Perrier, *Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora,* Paris: Lethielleux, 1949). We find the same observation in a later chapter of the same work: "Si autem contra hoc objiciatur quod potentia animae non potest esse immaterialior aut simplior quam ejus essentia, optime quidem procederet ratio si essentia animae humanae sic esset forma materiae, quod non per esse suum esset sed per esse compositi, sicut est de aliis formis quae secundum se nec esse nec operationes habent praeter conjugationem materiae, quae propter hoc materiae immersae dicuntur. Anima autem humana, quia secundum suum esse est, cui aliqualiter communicat materia non totaliter comprehendens ipsam, eo quod major est dignitas hujus formae quam capacitas materiae, nihil prohibet quin habeat aliquam operationem vel virtutem ad quam materia non attingit." (*Ibid.,* III, 17).

27. "C'est toujours le même sujet qui est actif ou passif, sous divers rapports, et selon des séries diverses de processus. Les facultés sont bien distinctes du sujet, mais pas plus que des qualités ne le sont de la substance, et encore avec cette précision que ces qualités psychiques étant de soi inétendues se trouvent et rapport immédiat les unes avec les autres. C'est ce rapport ontologique qui donne à la cogitative, à l'imagination, à l'affectivité sensible d'être plus parfaites dans l'homme que dans les animaux: cette "refluentia" des facultés spirituelles, intelligence et volonté, donnera à ces pouvoirs concrets une plus grande capacité, une plus grande "susceptibilité." Cette affinité les rendra aptes à collaborer avec les facultés spirituelles et à subir leur influence." *Somme Théologique,* No. 1, *L'Ame Humaine,* p. 376. Editions la Revue des Jeunes, Paris: Desclée, 1949.

28. *De Anima,* xiii, 397.
29. I-II, q. 74, a 3, ad 1.
30. Gilson summarizes St. Bonaventure's teaching on this point in his *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure,* pp. 281-6. Paris: Vrin, 1943.
31. *Op. cit.,* p. 165.
32. *Thomistic Psychology,* p. 146. New York: Macmillan, 1941.
33. "Car on ne voit pas comment un sens pourait produire des effets affectifs contraires à sa nature, s'il n'avait subi dans sa constitution même une modification profonde." *Op. cit.,* II* pp. 204-5. Cf. also pp. 246-7.
34. "... n'est à aucun degré une combination, un assemblement, de materiaux. Elle consiste, non à faire une nouveauté, au moins apparente, par redistribution ou fusionnement d'éléments sensoriels inchangés, mais à faire naître dans ces éléments mêmes, en y suscitant une espèce de germination intérieure, une nouveauté faite de leur maturation. Ainsi le nouveau ne résulte pas de l'amalgame de l'ancien: c'est l'ancien même qui devient nouveau." *Op. cit.,* II*, p. 351.
35. ". . . les obscurités qui maintiennent partout leur mystère relatif aux processus par lesquels la vie change de niveau." *Op. cit.,* II*, p. 216.
36. "La perception," says Pradines, "est une fonction pratique, destinée à nous présenter les choses dans leurs relations plus ou moins stabilisées à nos tendances elles-mêmes stables." *Op. cit.,* II*, p. 301.
37. "La loi de la perception, c'est la retouche. Et l'herbivore même, qui reconnaît l'herbe en général, son herbe, à travers une herbe d'une espèce et d'un espèce et d'un jour, lui fait subir une retouche, une sorte d'animalisation, imposée par les lois de son estomac et l'intérêt supérieur de la régularité de ses réactions conservatrices à l'aliment. Ce que nous appelons *la nature* est aussi *notre* nature, et les genres y sont répartis, divisés et reconnus, bref, retouchés, sous le jour de nos besoins et de nos commodités." *Ibid.*
38. "... exerce au contraire su l'homme une action de stimulation étonnante. Les plus grands de ses plaisirs sont précisément ce qu'il appelle ses distractions, et il n'y a rien qui le charme autant que d'être arraché à lui-même. Ne doutons pas que nous ne touchions ici au principe du plaisir de l'art." *Op. cit.,* II, p. 215.
39. "Mais l'arrachement à une condition d'existence par l'assomption à un plan de vie supérieur peut être la source d'un plaisir intense, et cela non pas seulement si la première condition était un tissu de douleurs, mais même so l'on pouvait supposer qu'elle fût un tissu de plaisirs." Pradines, *op. cit.,* II*, pp. 249-50.
40. "Il faut avouer que le fait purement psychologique et bien incontestable de ce plaisir attaché au ravissement esthétique nous donne

sur la sincérité de ce que nous croyons être nos attachements essentiels un avertissement inquiétant. Certes, il faut que les exigences de la vie, en dépit des compensations qu'elles nous apportent, pésent bien douloureusement sur nos épaules pour que nous éprouvions une telle joie à nous en sentir allégés." *Ibid.,* p. 373.

41. "La vision recouvre, dans sa purification esthétique, sa pléntitude de spiritualité, puisque l'esprit, rendu à lui-même, se trouve délivré de l'obsession préoccupant des choses: la sensation ne lui apporte plus des craintes, des espérances, des désirs ou ces états qui participent encore de notre vie besogneuse: des indifférences." *Ibid.,* pp. 313-4.
42. "Si le plaisir qu'il donne est essentiellement dans la sensation pure, la sensation pure ne peut être en nous qu'une sensation purifiée; et c'est de cette purification, dont le sentiment est inséparable de sa pureté intrinsèque, qu'elle tire son charme spécifique. Le peuple et les connaisseurs s'accordent nous l'avons vu, pour parler de ravissement. Or, ce caractère consiste en une joie dont les sensations sont seulement la matière, du reste, nècessaire . . . la sensorialité et la spiritualité se confondent." *Ibid.,* p. 317.
43. "La vie se dépasse, non pas par la voie pénible du renoncement, mais par une opération qui n'en sacrifie que les peines et les besognes." *Ibid.,* p. 378.
44. "Je parle d'un detachement naturel, inné à la structure du sens ou de la conscience, et qui se manifeste toute de suite par une manière virginale, en quelque sorte, de voir, d'entendre ou de penser." *Le Rire,* p. 118.
45. "Il y une manière pour l'homme d'être ému sensoriellement par les choses sans les craindre ou les désirer . . . et cette manière définit précisement la sensorialité et la qualité esthétiques: c'est une qualité sans mémoire." Ordinary sensation "ne nous intéressent d'abord que par le passé agréable ou fâcheux qu'elles nous rappellent et dont elles s'habillent." Pradines, *op. cit.,* pp. 389-90.
46. "... une sensation nous fait connaître ce qu'elle nous présente effectivement et non pas ce que nous avons coutume on besoin d'en attendre." *Ibid.,* p. 352.

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